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FBIS-SOV-91-110 *7 June 1991*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

U.S. On-Site Inspection Chief Interviewed *[IZVESTIYA 30 May]* 1
Disarmament Talks at Geneva Previewed *[INTERFAX]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Bessmertnykh Departs for Geneva Talks With Baker *[TASS]* 3
'Spheres of Influence' Deal With U.S. Denied *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jun]* 3
Diplomat Evaluates Bush's Mideast Arms Proposals *[INTERFAX]* 3
NATO Foreign Ministers Approve Joint Statement *[TASS]* 4
NATO Statement Cited *[TASS]* 4
PRAVDA Voices 'Alarm' *[3 Jun]* 4
Lukyanov Briefs Press on UK Visit, New Laws *[TASS]* 5

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

West Europe

Gorbachev Continues Visit to Norway, Sweden 6
Gives Nobel Address in Oslo *[PRAVDA 6 Jun]* 6
Joint Statement Published *[PRAVDA 7 Jun]* 12
Pays Tribute to War Dead *[TASS]* 16
TASS Wraps Up Norway Visit 16
TASS Assails Baltic Demonstrations at Ceremony *[TASS]* 17
Commentary on Relations With Norway *[PRAVDA 6 Jun]* 17
European Reportage on Norway, Sweden Visit *[cross-reference]* 18
Gorbachev Leaves Norway, Arrives in Stockholm *[TASS]* 18
Gives News Conference *[TASS]* 19
Stresses No 'Interference' in Baltics *[TASS]* 19
Interviewed on Talks, Baltics *[Moscow Radio]* 19
More on Stockholm Interview *[Moscow TV]* 20
Talks of 'Turning Point' *[TASS]* 21
Meets Brazil's Collor in Stockholm *[TASS]* 22
Swedish Premier 'Satisfied' With Visit *[TASS]* 22
Departs Stockholm for Home *[TASS]* 22
Yakovlev Interviewed on Country's Prospects *[Vienna TV]* 22
Shevardnadze Interviewed on Soviet Prospects *[Paris Radio]* 27
Comments on Gorbachev Policy *[Paris TV]* 28
Toepfer Meets Yazov on Environmental Damage *[Mainz TV]* 29
Environmental Issues in Withdrawal From Germany *[TASS]* 29
Former SED Head Honecker Sees 'Witch-Hunt' *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jun]* 29
Austrian-Sponsored Business Center Planned *[INTERFAX]* 30
Major Invites Gorbachev To Visit London *[Moscow International]* 30

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

USSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings 5 June *[Moscow TV]* 31
Lukyanov on Future Tasks of Supreme Soviet *[Moscow TV]* 31
New Entry-Exit Law Published *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 6 Jun]* 32

Political & Social

Gorbachev Returns to Moscow From Sweden *[TASS]* 35
Entry-Exit Law Creates Unforeseen Problems *[IZVESTIYA 30 May]* 35
KGB Spokesman Views Struggle Against Terrorism *[TASS]* 37
Bakatin on Politicization of Soviet Army *[FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 6 Jun]* 37
Pavlov, Cabinet Presidium Discuss Monopolies *[TASS]* 38
Drafting of Union, Republic Constitutions Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jun]* 38
Politburo Examines Communist Deputies' Work *[PRAVDA 5 Jun]* 38
USSR, Republic Prosecutors Confer at Collegium *[IZVESTIYA 23 May]* 39
Subsidies, Tax Breaks Urged for Periodicals *[IZVESTIYA 1 Jun]* 40
Independent Human Rights Center To Open in Moscow *[TASS]* 41
TASS Reviews 6 Jun Press 42
TASS Reviews 7 Jun Press 43

Economic

Goskomstat's Pogosov Warns of Inflation *[IZVESTIYA 1 Jun]* 44
USSR Budget Deficit Limit Reached by Mar *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jun]* 45
Forthcoming Income Indexation Law Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 27 May]* 47
Report Marks Opening of Arctic Shipping Season *[Moscow TV]* 48

Agriculture

Government Aide Views Food Supply Problem *[PRAVDA 5 Jun]* 48

Scientific

Details of 'Okean' Satellite Program Published *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jun]* 50
Moscow Links Nuclear Safety With Economic Aid *[Hamburg DIE WELT 5 Jun]* 50

Military

Defense Ministry Denies Military Role in Gulf *[TASS]* 51
Moiseyev on Results of Gulf War, Armed Forces *[TASS]* 51
Defense Ministry Discusses Gulf War Results *[TASS]* 52
Gorbachev Lays Groundwork for Nuclear Tests *[Moscow Radio]* 52
Moscow Meeting Marks Border Guards Day *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May]* 52

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Warns Soviet Troops May Attack *[Vilnius International]* 53
Army Activity Observed *[Vilnius Radio]* 53
Army Attack Feared *[BALTFAX]* 53
Commentary From Moscow *[Moscow International]* 54
Central Paper Views Events *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 5 Jun]* 54
Lithuanian 'Canard' Exposed *[PRAVDA 5 Jun]* 55
Views on OMON Attack on Border Posts Cited *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 5 Jun]* 55
Lithuanian Economic Problems, Policies Assessed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Jun]* 55
Latvia, Soviet Union Begin Consultations *[Riga Radio]* 57
Second Round Begins *[TASS]* 57
Estonian Deputy Views Independence Propects *[Tallinn Radio]* 58
Impact of Freeing Agricultural Prices in Estonia *[Moscow Radio]* 58

RSFSR

Presidential Candidates Continue Campaign 6 Jun *[TASS]* 58
Yeltsin Discusses Candidacy, Issues, Rivals *[Moscow TV]* 59
Denies Reports of Lumbago, Heart Attack *[Radio Rossii]* 69

Reviews Social Security Achievements *[Moscow Radio]* 69
Visits Radiation Zone in Chelyabinsk *[Moscow Radio]* 70
Campaign in Voronezh Reported *[TRUD 4 Jun]* 70
On Possibile Secession From Russia *[INTERFAX]* 72
Political Groups Urge Vote for Yeltsin *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 May]* 72
Ryzhkov Interviewed on 'Who's Who' Program *[Moscow TV]* 73
Addresses Strategic Missile Personnel *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Jun]* 75
Platform, Supporters Assessed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 May]* 75
Zhirinovskiy Discusses Presidential Race *[Moscow TV]* 76
Election Program Cited *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 4 Jun]* 78
Candidate Vadim Bakatin Visits Volgograd 6 Jun *[INTERFAX]* 80
Visits Interior Ministry Academy *[INTERFAX]* 80
Makashov Remarks in Sverdlovsk Cited *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 22]* 80
Vice Presidential Candidates Activities Reported 81
Abdulatipov on Need for Common Sense *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 22]* 81
Rutskoy Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 82
RSFSR Deputies Authorized To Observe Elections *[INTERFAX]* 84
Moscow Mayoral Candidate Klyuyev Interviewed *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 28 May]* 84
Khasbulatov Urges Early Solutions on Union Treaty *[TASS]* 86
Views Political, Economic Options *[MOSCOW NEWS No 18]* 86
Silayev Endorses Far East Self-Government Idea *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jun]* 88
Volgograd Tour Noted *[TASS]* 88
Russian Party Constituent Congress Held *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Jun]* 88
RSFSR Constitutional Debate Worries Isakov *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 25 May]* 88

U.S. On-Site Inspection Chief Interviewed

PM0506091791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Major General Robert Parker, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, by V. Pogrebenkov in Moscow; date of interview not stated; first paragraph is introduction: "Trust Is Based on Verification"]

[Text] On 1 June it will be three years since the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles came into force. As is known, the last of these was eliminated on 12 May 1991. How is the disarmament process progressing? On what foundations does trust between the American and Soviet militaries rest? Major General Robert Parker, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, who is in Moscow at the moment, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Pogrebenkov] As a professional military man, where do you see the significance of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles?

[Parker] The treaty does not have a time limit, but it is intended that it be fulfilled in 13 years. Today we can only speak of the significance of its first phase. This consist of two parts. First of all, over three years, the USSR and the United States have eliminated all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (this totaled 2,692 units). Thus, nuclear missile weapons stopped being a "sacred cow" at least partially. Second, and this is more important—thanks to on-site inspections, we have achieved mutual trust. And this is the most reliable form of verifying the observance of the accord.

[Pogrebenkov] How many inspectors were working on the American side?

[Parker] Our agency was created for the purpose of this treaty, so to speak. It included arms specialists, translators, and technical personnel. These are primarily military people. Around 400 people are working in the agency. Altogether we have carried out around 530 inspections at 117 installations on USSR territory.

[Pogrebenkov] Did American inspectors record any violations of the treaty on the part of the USSR?

[Parker] As far as I know, there were no serious violations although certain issues did arise. For example, about the SS-23 (OTR-23) missiles which the Soviet Union sold to certain East European countries...

[Pogrebenkov] But the USSR sold these missiles with conventional warheads and 16 launchers for them to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria back in 1985-1987, that is, a long time before the treaty was signed. The missiles became the property of those countries, and the Soviet Union has nothing to do with them any longer.

[Parker] These are Soviet-made missiles. They belong to the class of shorter-range missiles which must be destroyed according to the letter and spirit of the treaty. But there is another problem—conducting X-ray examinations of containers bearing SS-25 missiles with the help of a "Cargoscan" apparatus also raises objections from the Soviet side.

[Pogrebenkov] I think this is fully justified. After all, these missiles do not come under the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

[Parker] Yes, that is true. But they are manufactured at the same plant in Votkinsk where the SS-20's are being eliminated. We had to be sure that it was the SS-25 missiles leaving the plant in the launch cannister and not the SS-20's. Soviet and American experts have managed to work out mutually acceptable technical decisions which got rid of both sides' concerns.

[Pogrebenkov] Certain agencies, citing U.S. sources, have recently reported that SS-20 missiles have been discovered in Cuba. What do you think about this?

[Parker] Evidently this is a misunderstanding. It is due to the fact that a journalist might have interpreted facts incorrectly. We know that there is one SS-4 (R-12) Soviet intermediate-range missile in Cuba and it is not performance-capable—it is a museum piece which recalls the tragic days of the Caribbean crisis. I have no information about any SS-20 missiles in Cuba. As far as I know, both the White House and the U.S. State Department have also refuted this report by the U.S. press.

[Pogrebenkov] Will the experience of implementing the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles be useful in future disarmament agreements?

[Parker] The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is unique in that it provided for the complete elimination of two types of nuclear missile weapons. As far as I know, future agreements on disarmament only propose the partial reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons. But whatever happens, the experience of implementing the treaty testifies to the fact that the USSR and the United States are fully capable of cooperating when aiming for mutual concessions in the sphere of disarmament for the sake of achieving greater security. And of course, I would note the experience of carrying out on-site inspections. This verification, rigorous in form but quite reliable in practice, enables us to remove mutual suspicions. Without such verification, the implementation of subsequent agreements in the sphere of disarmament would not be very effective. But I am looking toward the future with optimism.

Disarmament Talks at Geneva Previewed

OW0606054091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 5 Jun 91

[From "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—"Vienna Talks on Confidence Building Measures in Europe: USSR May

Face Isolation Unless It Assumes a More Realistic Position" (by Mikhail Mayorov, diplomatic correspondent)]

[Text] An atmosphere of hope has now emerged in the run-up to the 11th session by 34-nation talks in Vienna on confidence building and security in Europe. Sources close to the negotiations told DP [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent that there might be a breakthrough in the deadlocked talks now that the superpowers sorted out differences on the CFE agreement.

Disarmament issues are not on the agenda of talks on confidence building measures, but their linkage is making itself increasingly felt. Last week's agreement in Lisbon between Mr. Bessmertnykh and Mr. Baker was highly important for breaking the deadlock. The sources mentioned told DP correspondent that the 34-nation talks had a chance of reaching understanding on the whole spectrum of issues related to the prevention of possible military conflicts in Europe.

It was made clear that the optimism by the Soviet negotiators could have been greater but for a change in the situation at the talks. Earlier, the negotiators formed three groups—Warsaw Pact, NATO, and non-aligned countries. With Warsaw Pact's military structures now overhauled, the Soviet Union faces the danger of being isolated unless it assumes a more realistic position.

On May 2, the Soviet delegation submitted a paper, so far unofficial, dealing with restrictions on military activity by land troops and airforces. On the whole, the document is thrust at eliminating the remnants of military confrontation in Europe. Moscow proposes to curtail the scope of military activity by bringing to a minimum the number of military exercises which can be damaging not only to regional security, but also to environment. It is also envisaged to spread similar restrictions on naval activities but the Soviet Union's partners in the talks have so far shown no sign of interest.

The negotiators are due to meet for a 10 day seminar in Vienna on October 8 to discuss military doctrines. However, special expectations are being laid on a meeting in mid-June by the foreign ministers of 34 nations. This may lead to disarmament and confidence building talks to merge again into one set of negotiations as Soviet negotiators are increasingly inclined to prefer. DP correspondent was told that one mandate can help find solutions to issues still unresolved both by the 22-nation and 34-nation talks.

Bessmertnykh Departs for Geneva Talks With Baker

LD0706100591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0932 GMT 7 Jun 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 7 June. (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh left Moscow today for Geneva, for talks today with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. As expected, the question of reducing strategic offensive weapons (SOW) will be at the center of attention at the meeting.

Just before the flight to Switzerland, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh noted in a Moscow airport conversation with a TASS correspondent that several technical questions remain to be resolved in order to conclude the Soviet-American treaty on strategic and offensive weapons. Their successful resolution, he said, will make it possible to speed up the process of preparing for and holding a Soviet-American summit meeting.

'Spheres of Influence' Deal With U.S. Denied

PM0606155791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jun 91 Union Edition p 5

[G. Charodeyev article: "On Sphere of Influence in Europe"]

[Text] ROMPRES and IZVESTIYA correspondents asked Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, the following question: Hungarian and Romanian newspapers have printed reports that last March the USSR and the United States reached agreement on a "redistribution of spheres of influence in Europe." In accordance with this, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are allegedly now in the U.S. sphere of influence, while Romania and Bulgaria are in the Soviet zone. How would you comment on this report?

"We know about these foreign press reports," the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said. "A number of articles have said that a redistribution of spheres of influence in Europe between the Soviet Union and the United States took place even earlier—during the Soviet-U.S. Malta summit in early December 1989. I think that those familiar with the details and philosophy of the Soviet policy of new thinking do not need to be told that nothing of the sort could have happened at summits or other meetings anywhere between Soviet and U.S. officials. The question of a redistribution of spheres of influence was never raised by anyone nor discussed. That is why any articles on this score are either malicious fabrications or the result of a sick imagination," V. Churkin stressed.

Diplomat Evaluates Bush's Mideast Arms Proposals

OW0506125591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 4 Jun 91

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] Igor Porshnev asked a ranking Soviet diplomat and expert on Middle Eastern affairs to comment on U.S. President Bush's recent proposals concerning cutting down arms exports to that region.

The diplomat described the proposals as "a very important initiative" deserving a close study "at the interministerial level." He said it had something in common with the suggestions advanced by the Soviet Union in March, notably that a system of collective security be established in the Persian Gulf as a basis for a regional security system for the Middle East as a whole. "Conceptually, the American and Soviet proposals are quite close. We are now studying Mr. Bush's suggestions at length together with the reaction which they triggered in the Arab countries and Israel," the diplomat said.

He called attention to the "delicacy" of a situation in which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council supply weapons and know-how to the Middle East. This, he said, makes it possible to shift from verbal calls to curtail the arms race in the region to practical steps in that direction.

"If this work is ever to be a success," the diplomat continued, "not only the basic suppliers but also the basic purchasers of weaponry must pool their efforts. The arms race in the Middle East is based on lack of political coordination."

The diplomat denied that during Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's recent meeting with Yasir 'Arafat in Geneva the PLO leader "authorized Moscow to act on behalf of the Palestinians." We have never acted on behalf of the Palestinians, Americans or French, and we don't mean to, the diplomat said.

At the same time, he said the USSR was ready to fulfil the agreements reached in Geneva, i.e., to coordinate its efforts with those of the Palestinians, support their work for regional peace, and refrain from advancing ideas that might damage their interests. "The peace initiative which the USSR and USA are jointly trying to translate into reality," the diplomat said, "leaves our ultimate goal unchanged: we want the fair and lawful Palestinian rights to be observed. We are convinced that a comprehensive regional settlement must guarantee equal security also for Israel."

The Foreign Ministry official cited as a "novel element" in the Soviet Union's approach [in] its determination to abandon rhetoric and propagandistic declarations and launch practical efforts to settle the crisis and prepare for holding a peace conference on the Middle East.

NATO Foreign Ministers Approve Joint Statement

LD0606142391 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Copenhagen June 6 TASS—A session of the NATO Council at foreign minister level today passed a joint statement in connection with an agreement reached by the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers in Lisbon, settling disputable issues on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The session opened here today.

The NATO foreign ministers express satisfaction with the results reached in the Portuguese capital, which inspires hope for rapid ratification of the CFE treaty, signed in Paris in November 1990. The treaty is a cornerstone for a future European security system, the statement reads.

The foreign ministers hope that during the current round of the Vienna talks, the sides will reach progress in reducing the armed forces of NATO and the Soviet Union in Europe and the basic provisions of the Open Skies regime agreement will be signed sooner, the statement reads.

NATO Statement Cited

LD0606222691 Moscow TASS in English 2200 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Copenhagen June 7 TASS—A session of the NATO Council at foreign minister level opened in Copenhagen on Thursday.

Participants adopted a joint statement saying that guarantees of NATO countries' security can be achieved if member countries of the former Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union have equal guarantees.

NATO does not aim to use the changes in Europe to gain some advantages or threaten the interests of some European countries, the statement says.

The document stresses that NATO will continue develop cooperation with countries of eastern and central Europe and the Soviet Union. However, this does not mean that these countries can join NATO.

NATO foreign ministers propose a number of initiatives aimed to deepen cooperation with the Soviet Union and member countries of the former Warsaw Treaty organisation, and promote stability and peace on the continent.

These initiatives include the expansion of diplomatic ties between NATO and other European countries, including the USSR, the intensification of military contacts between the military leadership of NATO and countries in central and eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

The foreign ministers also propose to invite high ranking military officials from these countries to visit NATO military educational establishments to share experience. Military experts could attend NATO military exercises and familiarise themselves with its scientific programmes and exchange opinions on various issues.

PRAVDA Voices 'Alarm'

PM0506103591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jun 91 Second Edition p 5

["Editorial Office Commentary": "Sense of Alarm"]

[Text] As already reported, a joint session of the North Atlantic alliance's leading organs—the Military Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group—has been held at its headquarters. Participating in the sittings were the defense ministers of 14 states, with the exception of France, which is not a member of the bloc's military organization, and Iceland, which does not have its own armed forces.

Attention focused on questions connected with the elaboration of military aspects of the new NATO strategy in the framework of ending the "cold war." At the same time, as the final communique states, the session participants proceeded from the premise that "in view of the changes that have occurred in Europe the possibility of an East-West clash has become considerably less likely" and "the NATO countries' security can be ensured with fewer military means."

On the basis of this conclusion the ministers agreed on the main elements of the future structure of the NATO allied armed forces in Europe. How is it conceived? To judge from the communique and the statements at the final news conference by NATO Secretary General M. Woerner and U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, it is envisioned that the large-scale allied forces concentrated in Germany, along the border with the former GDR, will, first, be considerably reduced and, second, be stationed on the territory of various NATO states (the former FRG, the Benelux countries, and Denmark). It is assumed that the total strength of NATO troops in Europe may be halved over several years.

Since the "geography of defense" remains as before, emphasis has been placed on the troops' enhanced mobility. According to the plan, they will have a three-tier structure: reaction forces, the main defense forces, and support forces. The U.S. role in these forces is defined at present by the functions of air and naval support, but, according to R. Cheney, the participation of ground units is also possible.

The consensus reached by the ministers on this question is not a decision. This must be adopted by a top-level NATO Council session, which is planned for the fall (according to unofficial data, in Italy in November). It will also approve the political aspects of the new strategy, which will be discussed beforehand at a foreign ministers conference (Copenhagen, 6 and 7 June).

Nevertheless, it is clear that the military foundations of the strategy have already virtually been laid at the Brussels session. At the same time, although the overall

trend appears positive, a sense of alarm is emerging. Not only in connection with the upcoming emergence in Europe of such a unique "innovation" as NATO "reaction forces," but also with regard to the operational tasks of these forces and the alliance troops as a whole. For it follows from the final communique that, in addition to threats from non-European regions and the prospect of crises arising in East Europe, NATO also counts the Soviet Union, which is "going through a difficult political evolution" and "still has an impressive military potential," among the "risk factors" for West European security.

Lukyanov Briefs Press on UK Visit, New Laws

LD0606122491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1611 GMT 5 Jun 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jun (TASS)—During his visit to Great Britain next week Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, intends during his meetings with the prime minister, the foreign secretary, and the leadership of parliament, to "clear up questions" in connection with the participation of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in the London meeting of the heads of the seven most industrially developed countries. He announced this today at a press conference in the Kremlin, replying to the TASS correspondent's question.

Anatoliy Lukyanov pointed out that the aim of the visit, which will be made at the invitation of the British Parliament, is "the development of the two parliaments' cooperation."

Concerning the question of Western economic aid to the USSR, the chairman of the Soviet parliament stressed that "the main question here is whether the Seven and all the developed countries are ready to provide such aid." He explained that "it is chiefly not a question of loans but of their participation in Soviet programs such as the production of food and consumer goods, conversion, convertibility of the ruble, and others."

"I think this is what our talks with the Seven will be connected with," Anatoliy Lukyanov said. At the same time he stressed that "if our country itself does not work, no foreign financial injections will help."

Anatoliy Lukyanov announced that work has now been completed on the new version of the Union treaty and that today the USSR president sent it to all the members of the drafting committee for signing, after which it will be conveyed to the Supreme Soviets of the republics and the Union parliament.

"This version demarcates more clearly the powers of the Union and the republics and also clearly resolves the question of the property of the Union and the republics and the taxation system, which will be a two-channel system and will consist of federal and municipal taxes," he said.

Anatoliy Lukyanov announced that the Union treaty could be signed in the next two months.

At the press conference, which was devoted to last Monday's [3 June] second anniversary of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet's new convocation, Anatoliy Lukyanov said that "in the time since then, the parliament has become a stabilizing center for the life of the whole country," it has done a big job: 113 major laws have been adopted, in which such complex problems as property, leaseholding, entrepreneurship, and others are being tackled.

West Europe

Gorbachev Continues Visit to Norway, Sweden

Gives Nobel Address in Oslo

CM0606150791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 June 91 Second Edition p 4

[Text]—Esteemed Mr. Chairman,

Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen,

This moment is no less emotional for me than the one when I first learned about the decision of the Nobel committee. For on similar occasions great men addressed humankind—men famous for their courage in working to bring together morality and politics. Among them were my compatriots.

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize makes one think once again about a seemingly simple and clear question: what is peace?

Preparing for my address I found in an old Russian encyclopedia a definition of "peace" as a "commune"—the traditional cell of Russian peasant life. I saw in that definition the people's profound understanding of peace as harmony, concord, mutual help, and cooperation.

This understanding is embodied in the canons of world religions and in the works of philosophers from antiquity to our time. The names of many of them have been mentioned here before me. Let me add another one to them. Peace "propagates wealth and justice, which constitute the prosperity of nations", a peace which is "just a respite from wars... is not worthy of the name", peace implies "general counsel". This is written almost 200 years ago by Vasiliy Fedorovich Malinovskiy—the dean of the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum in which the great Pushkin was educated.

Since then, of course, history has added a great deal to the specific content of the concept of "peace". In this nuclear age it also means a condition for the survival of the human race. But the essence, as understood both by the popular wisdom and by intellectual leaders, is the same.

Today, peace means the ascent from simple coexistence to cooperation and common creativity among countries and nations.

Peace is movement toward globality and universality of civilization. Never before has the idea that peace is indivisible been so true as it is now.

Peace is not unity in similarity but unity in diversity, in the comparison and conciliation of differences.

And, ideally, peace means the absence of violence. It is an ethical value. And here we have to recall Rajiv Gandhi, who died so tragically a few days ago.

I consider the decision of your committee as a recognition of the great international importance of the changes now under way in the Soviet Union, and as an expression of confidence in our policy of new thinking, which is based on the conviction that at the end of the twentieth century force and arms will have to seriously give way as a major instrument in world politics.

I see the decision to award me the Nobel Peace Prize also as an act of solidarity with the monumental undertaking which has already placed enormous demands on the Soviet people in terms of efforts, costs, hardships, willpower, and character. And solidarity is a universal value which is becoming increasingly indispensable for progress and for the survival of humankind.

But a modern state has to be worthy of solidarity, in other words, it should pursue, in both domestic and international affairs, policies that bring together the interests of its people and those of the world community. This task, however obvious, is not a simple one. Life is much richer and more complex than even the most perfect plans to make it better. It ultimately takes creul vengeance for attempts to forcibly impose abstract schemes, even with the best of intentions. Perestroika has made us understand this about our past, and the actual experience of it has taught us to reckon with the most general laws of civilization.

This, however, came later. But back in March-April 1985 we found ourselves facing a crucial, and I confess, agonizing choice. When I agreed to assume the office of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in effect the highest state office at that time, I realized that we could no longer live as before and that I would not want to remain in that office unless I got support in undertaking major reforms. It was clear to me that we had a long way to go. But of course, I did not imagine how immense were our problems and difficulties. I believe no one at that time could foresee or predict them.

Those who then were governing the country knew what was really happening to it and what we later called "zastoy", roughly translated as stagnation. They saw that our society was marking time, that it was running the risk of falling hopelessly behind the technologically advanced part of the world. Total domination of mainly centrally-managed state property, the pervasive authoritarian- bureaucratic system, ideology's grip on politics, monopoly in social thought and sciences, militarized industries that siphoned off our best, including the best intellectual resources, the unbearable burden of military expenditures that suffocated civilian industries and undermined the social achievements of the period since the revolution which were real and of which we used to be proud—such was the actual situation in the country.

As a result, one of the richest countries in the world, endowed with immense overall potential, was already sliding downward. Our society was declining, both economically and intellectually.

And yet, to a casual observer the country seemed to present a picture of relative well-being, stability and order. The misinformed society under the spell of propaganda was hardly aware of what was going on and what the immediate future had in store. The slightest manifestations of protest were suppressed. Most people considered them heretical, slanderous and counter- revolutionary.

Such was the situation in the spring of 1985, and there was a great temptation to leave things as they were, to make only cosmetic changes. This, however, meant continuing to deceive ourselves and the people.

This was the domestic aspect of the dilemma then before us. As for the foreign policy aspect, there was the East-West confrontation, a rigid division into "friends" and "foes", the two hostile camps with a corresponding set of cold war attributes. Both the East and the West were constrained by the logic of military confrontation, wearing themselves down more and more by the arms race.

The mere thought of dismantling the existing structures did not come easily. However, the realization that we faced inevitable disaster, both domestically and internationally, gave us the strength to make a historic choice, which I have never since regretted.

Perestroyka, which once again is returning our people to common sense, has enabled us to open up to the world, and has restored a normal relationship between the country's internal development and its foreign policy. But all this takes a lot of hard work. To a people which believed that its government's policies had always been true to the cause of peace, we proposed what was in many ways a different policy, which would genuinely serve the cause of peace, while differing from the prevailing view of what it meant and particularly from the established stereotypes as to how one should protect it. We proposed new thinking in foreign policy.

Thus we embarked on a path of major changes, which may turn out to be the most significant in the twentieth century, for our country and for its peoples. But we also did it for the entire world.

[At this point in the version of Gorbachev's speech carried by Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network at 1057 GMT on 5 June, Gorbachev is heckled by a woman speaking Russian. After a pause of 18 seconds, he continues] I began my book about perestroyka and the new thinking with the following words: "We want to be understood". After a while I felt that it was already happening. But now I would like once again to repeat those words here, from this world rostrum. Because to understand us really—to understand so as to believe us—proved to be not at all easy, owing to the immensity of the changes under way in our country. Their magnitude and character are such as to require in-depth analysis. Applying conventional wisdom to perestroyka is unproductive. It is also futile and dangerous to set conditions, to say: We'll understand and believe you, as soon as you, the Soviet Union, come completely to resemble "us", the West.

No one is in a position to describe in detail what perestroyka will finally produce. But it would certainly be a self-delusion to expect that perestroyka will produce "a copy" of anything.

Of course, learning from the experience of others is something we have been doing and will continue to do. But this does not mean that we will come to be exactly like others. Our state will preserve its own identity within the international community. A polygot country, with its uniquely close-knit ethnic composition, cultural diversity and tragic past, the greatness of its historic endeavors and the exploits of its peoples—such a country will find its own path to the civilization of the twenty-first Century and its own place in it. Perestroyka has to be conceived solely in this context, otherwise it will fail and will be rejected. After all, it is impossible to "shed" the country's thousand-year history—a history which, incidentally, we ourselves still have to subject to serious analysis in order to take into future only the truth about it.

We want to be an integral part of modern civilization, to live in harmony with mankind's universal values, abide by the norms of international law, follow the "rules of the game" in our economic relations with the outside world. We want to share with all other peoples the burden of responsibility for the future of our common house.

A period of transition to a new quality in all spheres of society's life is accompanied by painful phenomena. When we were initiating perestroyka we failed to properly assess and foresee everything. Our society turned out to be hard to move off the ground, not ready for major changes which affect people's vital interests and make them leave behind everything to which they had become accustomed over many years. In the beginning we imprudently generated great expectations, without taking into account the fact that it takes time for people to realize that all have to live and work differently, to stop habitually expecting that new life would be given from above.

Perestroyka has now entered its most dramatic phase. Following the transformation of the philosophy of perestroyka into real policy, which began literally to explode the old way of life, difficulties began to mount. Many took fright and wanted to return to the past. It was not only those who used to hold the levers of power in the administration, the Army and various government agencies and who had to make room, but also many whose interests and way of life were put to a severe test and who, during the preceding decades, had forgotten how to take the initiative and to be independent, enterprising and self-reliant.

Hence the discontent, the outbursts of protest and the exorbitant, though understandable, demands which, if satisfied right away, would lead to complete chaos.

Hence the rising political passions and, instead of a constructive opposition, which is only normal in a democratic system, one that is often destructive and unreasonable, not to mention the extremist forces, which are especially cruel and inhuman in areas of interethnic conflict.

During the last six years we have discarded and destroyed much that stood in the way of a renewal and transformation of our society. But when society was given freedom it could not recognize itself, for it had lived too long, as it were, "beyond the looking glass". Contradictions and vices rose to the surface, and even blood has been shed, although we have been able to avoid a bloodbath. The logic of reform has clashed with the logic of their rejection, and with the logic of impatience which breeds intolerance.

In this situation, which is one of great opportunity and of major risks, at a high point of perestroyka's crisis, our task is to stay the course while also addressing current everyday problems—which are literally tearing this policy apart—and to do it in such a way as to prevent a social and political explosion.

Now about my position. As to the fundamental choice, I long ago made a final and irrevocable decision. Nothing, no pressure, either from the right or from the left, will make me abandon the positions of perestroyka and new thinking. I do not intend to change my views or convictions. My choice is a final one.

It is my profound conviction that the problems arising in the course of our transformations can be solved solely by constitutional means. That is why I make every effort to keep this process within the confines of democracy and reforms.

This applies also to the problem of self-determination of nations, which is a challenging one for us. We are looking for mechanisms to solve that problem within the framework of a constitutional process, we recognise the peoples' legitimate choice, with the understanding that if a people really decides, through a fair referendum, to withdraw from the Soviet Union, a certain agreed transition period will then be needed.

[Text] Steering a peaceful course is not easy in a country where generation after generation of people were led to believe that, if you are "against" or disagree and I have power or another force, then you must be thrown out of politics or even hidden away in jail. For centuries all the country's problems used to be finally resolved by violent means. All this has left an almost indelible mark on our entire "political culture," if the term is at all appropriate in this case.

Our democracy is being born in pain. A political culture is emerging—one that presupposes debate and pluralism, but also legal order and, if democracy is to work, strong government authority based on one law for all. This process is gaining strength. Being resolute in the pursuit of perestroyka, a subject of much debate these days, must be measured by the commitment to change, to the policy of democratic development. Being resolute does not mean a return to repression, diktat or the suppression of rights and freedoms. I will never agree to having our society split once again into "reds" and "whites", into those who claim to speak and act "on behalf of the people" and those who are "enemies of the people". Being resolute today means to act within the framework of political and social pluralism and the rule of law to provide conditions for continued reform and prevent a breakdown of the state and economic collapse, prevent the elements of chaos from becoming catastrophic.

All this requires taking certain tactical steps, to search for various ways of addressing both short- and long-term tasks. Such efforts and political and economic steps, agreements based on reasonable compromise, are there for everyone to see. I am convinced that the One-plus-Nine statement will go down in history as one such step, as a great opportunity. Not all in our decisions is readily correctly understood. For the most part, our decisions are unpopular, they arouse waves of criticism. But life has many more surprises in store for us, just as we will sometimes surprise it. Jumping to conclusions after every step taken by the Soviet leadership, after every decree by the president, trying to figure out whether he is moving left or right, backward or forward, would be an exercise in futility and would not lead to understanding.

We will seek answers to the questions we face only by moving forward, only by continuing and even radicalising reforms, by consistently democratising our society. But we will proceed prudently, carefully weighing each step we take.

There is already a consensus in our society that we have to move towards a mixed economy, toward a market. There are still differences as to how to do it and how fast we should move. Some are in favour of rushing through a transitional period as fast as possible, no matter what. Although this may smack of adventurism we should not overlook the fact that such views enjoy support. People are tired and are easily swayed by populism. So it would be just as dangerous to move too slowly, to keep people waiting in suspense. For them, life today is difficult, a life of considerable hardship.

Work on a new Union treaty has entered its final stage. Its adoption will open a new chapter in the history of our multinational state.

After a time of rampant separatism and euphoria, when almost every village proclaimed sovereignty, a centripetal force is beginning to gather momentum, based on a more sensible view of existing realities and the risks involved. And this is what counts most now. There is a growing will to achieve consensus, and a growing understanding that we have a state, a country, a common life.

This is what must be preserved first of all. Only then can we afford to start figuring out which party or club to join and what God to worship.

The stormy and contradictory process of perestroyka, particularly in the past two years, has made us face squarely the problem of criteria to measure the effectiveness of state leadership. In the new environment of a multiparty system, freedom of thought, rediscovered ethnic identity and sovereignty of the republics, the interests of society must absolutely be put above those of various parties or groups, or any other sectoral, parochial or private interests, even though they also have the right to exist and to be represented in the political process and in public life, and, of course, they must be taken into account in the big policies of the state.

Ladies and gentlemen,

International politics is another area where a great deal depends on the correct interpretation of what is now happening in the Soviet Union. This is true today and it will remain so in the future.

We are now approaching what might be the crucial point when the world community and, above all, the states with the greatest potential to influence world developments will have to decide on their stance with regard to the soviet union, and to act on this basis.

The more I reflect on the current world developments, the more I become convinced that the world needs perestroyka no less than the Soviet Union needs it. Fortunately, the present generation of policy-makers, for the most part, are becoming increasingly aware of this interrelationship, and also of the fact that now that perestroika has entered its crucial phase the soviet union is entitled to expect large-scale support to assure its success.

Recently, we have been seriously rethinking the substance and the role of our economic cooperation with other countries, above all major Western nations. We realise, of course, that we have to carry out measures that would enable us really to open up to the world economy and become its organic part. But at the same time we come to the conclusion that there is a need for a kind of synchronization of our actions towards that end with those of the Group of Seven and of the European communities. In other words, we are thinking of a fundamentally new phase in our international cooperation. txt
In these months much is being decided and will be decided in our country to create the prerequisites for overcoming the systematic crisis and gradually recovering to a normal life.

The multitude of specific tasks to be addressed in this context may be summarised within three main areas:

—Stabilizing the democratic process on the basis of a broad social consensus and a new state structure of our Union as a genuine, free, and voluntary federation,

—Intensifying economic reform to establish a mixed market economy based on a new system of property relations,

—Taking vigorous steps to open the country up to the world economy through rouble convertibility and acceptance of civilized "rules of the game" adopted in the world market, and through membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

These three areas are closely interrelated.

Therefore there is a need for discussion in the Group of Seven and in the European Community. We need a joint program of action to be implemented over a number of years.

If we fail to reach an understanding regarding a new phase of cooperation, we will have to look for other ways, for time is of the essence. But if we are to move to that new phase, those who participate in and even shape world politics also must continue to change, to review their philosophic perception of the changing realities of the contemporary world and of its imperatives. Otherwise, there is no point in drawing up a joint program of practical action.

The Soviet leadership, both in the centre and in the republics, as well as a large part of the Soviet public understand this need, although in some parts of our society not everyone is receptive to such ideas. There are some flag-wavers who claim a monopoly of patriotism and think that it means "not getting entangled" with the outside world. Next to them are those who would like to reverse course altogether. That kind of "patriotism" is nothing but a self- serving pursuit of one's own interests.

Clearly, as the Soviet Union proceeds with perestroyka, its role and its participation in building a new world will become more constructive and significant. What we have done on the basis of new thinking has made it possible to channel international cooperation along new, peaceful lines. Over these years we have come a long way in the general political cooperation with the West. It stood a difficult test at a time of momentous change in Eastern Europe and of the search for a solution to the German problem. It has withstood the crushing stress of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. There is no doubt that this cooperation, which all of us need, will become more effective and indispensable if our economies become more integrated and start working more or less in synchronized rhythm.

To me, it is self-evident that if Soviet perestroyka succeeds, there will be a real chance of building a new world order. And if perestroyka fails, the prospect of entering a new peaceful period in history will vanish, at least for the foreseeable future.

I believe that the movement that we have launched towards that goal has fairly good prospects of success. After all, mankind has already benefited greatly in recent years, and this has created a certain positive momentum.

The cold war is over. The risk of a global nuclear war has practically disappeared. The iron curtain is gone. Germany has united, which is a momentous milestone in the history of Europe. There is not a single country on our continent which would not regard itself as fully sovereign and independent.

The USSR and the United States, the two nuclear superpowers, have moved from confrontation to interaction and, in some important cases, partnership. This has had a decisive effect on the entire international climate. This should be preserved and filled with new substance. The climate of Soviet-U.S. trust should be protected, for it is a common asset of the world community. Any revision of the direction and potential of the Soviet-U.S. relationship would have grave consequences for the entire global process.

The ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have begun to acquire real significance, they are being transformed into real policies and have found a more specific and topical expression in the charter of Paris for a new Europe. Institutional forms of European security are beginning to take shape.

Real disarmament has begun. Its first phase is nearing completion, and following the signing, I hope shortly, of the START treaty, the time will come to give practical consideration to the ideas which have already been put forward for the future. There seems, however, to be a need to develop a general concept for this new phase, which would embrace all negotiations concerning the principal components of the problem of disarmament and new ideas reflecting the changes in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, a concept that would incorporate recent major initiatives of President Bush and President Mitterrand. We are now thinking about it.

Armed forces and military budgets are being reduced. Foreign troops are leaving the territories of other countries. Their strength is diminishing and their composition is becoming more defense-oriented. First steps have been taken in the conversion of military industries, and what seemed inconceivable is happening: Recent Cold war adversaries are establishing cooperation in this area. Their military officials exchange visits, show each other military facilities that only recently used to be top secret and together consider ways to achieve demilitarization.

The information environment has changed beyond recognition throughout Europe and in most of the world, and with it, the scale and intensity and the psychological atmosphere of communication among people of various countries.

Deideologizing relations among states, which we proclaimed as one of the principles of the new thinking, has brought down many prejudices, biased attitudes and suspicions and has cleared and improved the international atmosphere. I have to note, however, that this process has been more intensive and frank on our part than on the part of the West.

I dare say that the European process has already acquired elements of irreversibility, or at least that conlfict of a scale and nature that were typical of Europe for many centuries and particuarly in the 20th century have been ruled out.

Should it gain the necessary momentum, every nation and every country will have at their disposal in the foreseeable future the potential of a community of unprecedented strength, encompassing essentially the entire upper tier of the globe, provided they make their own corresponding contribution.

In such a context, in the process of creating a new Europe, in which erstwhile "curtains" and "walls" will be forever relegated to the past and borders between states will increasingly lose their "divisive" purpose, self-determination of soverign nations will be realized in a completely different way.

However, our vision of the European space from the Atlantic to the Urals is not that of a closed system. Since it includes the Soviet Union, which reaches to the shores of the Pacific, and the translatlantic USA and Canada with inseparable links to the old world, it goes beyond its nominal geographic boundaries.

The idea is not at all to consolidate a part of our civilization on, so to say, a European platform versus the rest of the world. Suspicions of that kind do exist. But, on the contrary, the idea is to develop and build upon the momentum of integration in Europe, embodied politically in the charter of Paris for the whole of Europe. This should be done in the context of a common movement toward a new and peaceful period in world history, towards new interrelationship and integrity of mankind. As my friend Giulio Andreotti so aptly remarked recently in Moscow, "East-West rapprochement alone is not enough for progress of the entire world towards peace. However, agreement between them is a great contribution to the common cause". Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East, all of them, are to play a great role in this "common cause" whose prospects are difficult to forecast today.

The new integrity of the world, in our view, can be built only on the principles of the freedom of choice and balance of interests. Every state, and now also a number of existing or emerging regional interstate groups, have their own interests. They are all equal and deserve respect.

We consider it dangerously outdated when suspicions are aroused by, for instance, improved Soviet-Chinese or Soviet-German, German- French, Soviet-U.S.or U.S.-Indian relations, etc. In our times, good relations benefit all. Any worsening of relations anywhere is a common loss.

Progress towards the civilization of the 21st century will certainly not be simple or easy. One cannot get rid overnight of the heavy legacy of the past or the dangers created in the post-war years. We are experiencing a

turning point in international affairs and are only at the beginning of a new, and I hope mostly peaceful, lengthy period in the history of civilization.

With less East-West confrontation, or even none at all, old contradictions, which seemed secondary in the face of the nuclear threat, are resurfacing. The melting ice of the Cold War reveals old conflicts and claims, and entirely new problems accumulate rapidly.

We can already see many obstacles and dangers on the road to durable peace, including:

—Increased nationalism, separatism, and disintegrational processes in a number of countries and regions,

—The growing gap in the level and quality of socio-economic development between "rich" and "poor" countries, dire consequences of the poverty of hundreds of millions of people, to whom informational transparency makes it possible to see how people live in developed countries. Hence the unprecedented passions and brutality and even fanaticism of mass protests. Poverty is also the breeding ground for the spread of terrorism and the emergence and persistence of dictatorial regimes with their unpredictable behaviour in relations among states,

The dangerously rapid accumulation of the "costs" of previous forms of progress, such as the threat of environmental catastrophe and of the depletion of energy and primary resources, uncontrollable overpopulation, pandemics, drug abuse, and so on,

—The gap between basically peaceful policies and selfish economies bent on achieving a kind of "technological hegemony". Unless those two vectors are brought together, civilization will tend to break down into incompatible sectors,

—Further improvement in modern weaponry, even if under the pretext of strengthening security. This may result not only in a new spiral of the arms race and a perilous overabundance of arms in many states, but also in a final divorce between the process of disarmament and development, and, what is more, in an erosion of the foundations and criteria of the emerging new world politics.

How can the world community cope with all this? All these tasks are enormously complex. They cannot be postponed. Tomorrow may be too late.

I am convinced that in order to solve these problems there is no other way but to seek and implement uncommonly new forms of interaction. We are simply doomed to such interaction, or we shall be unable to consolidate positive trends which have emerged and are gaining strength, and which we simply must not sacrifice.

However, to accomplish this all members of the world community should resolutely discard old stereotypes and motivations nurtured by the Cold War, and give up the habit of seeking each other's weak points and exploiting them in their own interests. We have to respect the peculiarities and differences which will always exist, even when human rights and the peoples' Freedoms are observed throughout the world. I keep repeating that with the end of confrontation differences can be made a source of healthy competition, an important factor for progress. This is an incentive to study each other, to engage in exchanges, a prerequisite for the growth of mutual trust.

For knowledge and trust are the foundations of a new world order. Hence the necessity, in my view, to learn to forecast the course of events in various regions of the globe, by pooling the efforts of scientists, philosophers and humanitarian thinkers within the U.N. framework. Policies, even the most prudent and precise, are made by man. We need maximum insurance to guarantee that decisions taken by members of the world community should not affect the security, sovereignty and vital interests of its other members or damage the natural environment and the moral climate of the world.

I am an optimist and I believe that together we shall be able now to make the right historical choice so as not to miss the great chance at the turn of centuries and millennia and make the current extremely difficult transition to a peaceful world order. A balance of interests rather than a balance of power, a search for compromise and concord rather than a search for advantages at other people's expense, and respect for equality rather than claims to leadership—such are the elements which can provide the groundwork for world progress and which should be readily acceptable for reasonable people informed by the experience of the 20th century.

The future prospect of truly peaceful global politics lies in the creation through joint efforts of a single international democratic space in which states shall be guided by the priority of human rights and welfare for their own citizens and the promotion of the same rights and similar welfare elsewhere. This is an imperative of the growing integrity of modern world and of the interdependence of its components.

I have been suspected of utopian thinking more than once, and particularly when five years ago I proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and joint efforts to create a system of international security. It may well be that by that date it will not have happened. But look, merely five years have passed and have we not actually and noticeably moved in that direction? Have we not been able to cross the threshold of mistrust, though mistrust has not completely disappeared? Has not the political thinking in the world changed substantially? Does not most of the world community already regard weapons of mass destruction as unacceptable for achieving political objectives?

Ladies and gentlemen, two weeks from today it will be exactly fifty years since the beginning of the fascist invasion of my country. And in another six months we shall mark fifty years since Pearl Harbour, after which

the war turned into a global tragedy. Memories of it still hurt. But they also urge us to value the chance given to the present generation.

In conclusion let me say again that I view the award of the Nobel Prize to me as an expression of understanding of my intentions, my aspirations, the objectives of the profound transformation we have begun in our country, and the ideas of new thinking. I see it as your acknowledgement of my commitment to peaceful means of implementing the objectives of perestroyka.

I am grateful for this to the members of the committee and wish to assure them that, if I understand correctly their motives, they are not mistaken.

Thank you.

Joint Statement Published

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["Joint Soviet-Norwegian Statement"]

[Text]

1. International Development

Europe

The Soviet Union and Norway welcome the historic changes that have taken place in Europe. These changes create opportunities for consolidating the friendly ties between states and strengthening security and stability throughout the continent of Europe.

The sides stress the significance of the purposeful fulfillment of the commitments and tasks defined by the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and other fundamental documents adopted within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

They highlight the importance of respect for human rights, the democratic form of government, and the right to determine one's own future oneself, the ideals of the rule-of-law state and social justice as the foundation for the further development of friendly ties and cooperation between states and as a prerequisite for lasting peace and security in Europe.

They emphasize the significance of building a peace order in Europe, founded on the post-confrontation realities and principles consolidated in the joint declaration of the 22 adopted in Paris. The sides note the particular importance of the section declaring that the states that signed the document are no longer opponents, will build new partnership relations, and extend to one another the hand of friendship. They confirm their determination actively to promote agreements on disarmament and on conventional, nuclear, and chemical arms control.

They recognize, in this connection, that security is indivisible and that lasting security may be created only through joint cooperation. They also recognize that the building of a new European peace order is a gradual process that must be effected in such a way that the security interests of no state are negatively affected at any stage.

The sides confirm that, in their bilateral ties and in relation to all other states, they will base themselves on the ten fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which were subsequently endorsed by the Paris Charter. All of these principles have equal significance, and each of them must be interpreted in light of the others.

The sides confirm, in this connection, the importance of the principles of the sovereign equality of states, rejection of the threat or use of force, respect for political independence and territorial integrity, and also the peaceful settlement of disputes as the foundation for further developing and strengthening their mutual ties.

The Soviet Union and Norway confirm their support for the CSCE. They firmly intend to cooperate between themselves and with other participating states with the aim of further strengthening and developing the process, which is the cornerstone of the new European architecture. They are agreed that a different orientation in matters relating to a policy on security does not weaken their possibilities for promoting the process.

The sides stress the importance of economic, scientific-technical, and technological cooperation between CSCE member countries in accordance with the recommendations of the Bonn document and the Paris Charter for a new Europe.

The sides are agreed that the nature-protection dimension of cooperation within the CSCE framework must be further strengthened in accordance with the Paris Charter. They are disposed to promote the effective use of the CSCE as a forum for devising commitments and tasks in the field of environmental protection.

They stress, in this connection, the importance of far-reaching commitments regarding the exchange of information on potential ecological problems and the early notification of ecological disasters, and also the importance of measures that might create conditions for the systematic appraisal of the states' performance of the commitments they have assumed. The sides are agreed that existing organizations are called on to play an important role in the concrete designing and implementation of nature-preserving measures that are being worked out within the CSCE framework—such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Council of Europe, the European Communities, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Respect for the rights of man and basic freedoms is a precondition for progress in the efforts to create a stable new peace order in Europe. The sides stress the importance of active participation in the CSCE process by individual persons, organizations and institutions, and attach importance in this connection to the creation of the best possible conditions for the participation of nongovernment organizations in CSCE meetings in accordance with the practice that has taken shape. In this context, they are agreed that the CSCE conference on the human dimension must also continue its work after the forthcoming meeting in Moscow and become a permanent element in the CSCE process.

The sides regard the forthcoming meeting in Moscow as an important opportunity for consolidating the successes already achieved and for further onward advances. They emphasize, in this connection, the significance of the further development and strengthening of the CSCE mechanism for the human dimension.

The sides highlight the importance of creating conditions for the rapid and effective use of the CSCE in connection with situations of conflict and crisis. In this connection, they attach particular importance to strengthening the CSCE's political consultative mechanism, including, especially, the Council of Ministers and the committee of senior officials.

They are agreed that opportunities should be created to convene emergency sessions of the committee of senior officials. They are also agreed that the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center should be tasked with overcoming and resolving political conflicts as well.

The sides expressed themselves in favor of increasing their joint efforts to affirm the priority of international law and to strengthen international law and order on its basis. They advocate the settlement of international disputes exclusively by peaceful means. The sides attach special importance to improving the mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this connection they emphasize the importance of the document adopted by the CSCE conference in Valletta (Malta) on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and urge the speediest practical implementation of its provisions.

The Soviet Union and Norway emphasize the importance of the Council of Europe in the new Europe. They consider that the experience and competency of the Council of Europe in such areas as human rights, fundamental liberties, the principle of the rule-of-law state, and culture will make a considerable contribution to the building of a free and integral Europe and to the human dimension of the CSCE. The sides expressed a desire for the further development of the Soviet Union's links with the Council of Europe on the basis of mutual interest and the principles underlying cooperation in the Council of Europe.

Arms Control and Disarmament

The Soviet Union and Norway emphasize the importance of a purposeful continuation of work on arms limitation and disarmament and on measures to strengthen trust and security in Europe. They will actively promote the formulation of treaties for the control of conventional and nuclear armaments which lead to a stable balance at a lower level and strengthen the security of all affected parties. Armed forces should not exceed the level necessary for averting war and creating the conditions for effective self-defense. The sides share the viewpoint that an important aim of the continuation of talks on control of conventional armaments should be to assist a defensive orientation of the structural reorganization of armed forces.

United Nations Organization

The Soviet Union and Norway stress the importance of achieving progress in the resolution of current global problems. They are agreed that the United Nations should play a central role in this connection. They welcome the positive role which the United Nations is playing today in activity to strengthen international peace and security, mutual understanding, trust, and stability in the world as well as to expand constructive cooperation between all states.

The sides have agreed to work in such a direction that the positive development regarding the United Nations' assistance to the resolution of conflicts can be continued. In this way they want to underscore the United Nations' potential for assisting work both for the preservation and establishment of peace. In this context the sides favor increasing by all means possible the UN's preventive capabilities. Independently, or jointly with third parties, the sides will facilitate increasing that role which the United Nations can play in these spheres, or where the UN Charter opens up opportunities for this.

Environment and Development

Rapprochement between East and West and progress in the resolution of regional conflicts have created more favorable political premises in the search for an answer to the major challenges of the modern world—poverty, backwardness, and the threat to the environment.

They recognize that for the possible achievement of positive economic and social development, stable and favorable general international conditions are required, and this presupposes strengthening international cooperation. The sides underscore the importance of extensive aid to the most poverty-stricken and least developed countries on the part of the rest of the world community.

The sides are agreed that it is important to continue, both on a national and international level, to observe the recommendations contained in the report of the International Commission for the Environment and Development. They confirm the desirability of close cooperation in the matter of preparing a UN conference on

issues of the environment and development in Brazil in June 1992, which should adopt specific agreements, and determine periods of validity of programs and plans for financing them with the aim of dealing with the major global problems of the environment and developments.

The sides regard climatic changes as one of the major ecological problems confronting the world community today. They recognize that the principle of common but differentiated [razlichayushcheysya] responsibility should lie at the basis of any global response to the negative consequences of a change in climate. Moreover, the developed countries must play a leading role. The sides fully support the negotiations being conducted to work out a convention on the climate, so that work on its draft should be completed in time for the 1992 UN conference on the environment and development.

The sides completely support the negotiations being conducted within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe on new agreements on reducing emissions which can damage the atmosphere, and emphasize the need to arrive at effective regional solutions based on the maximum permissible levels of sensitivity of nature. The aim should be to work out the most financially effective measures, based on a sensible division of the burden of expenditure between countries.

Cooperation in the Sphere of Power Engineering

The sides consider the solution of problems in the interrelation between power engineering, the natural environment, and economic development as one of the central tasks in global and regional international cooperation.

The sides agree that implementation of the proposal on a European power grid could facilitate the creation of a more stable power market and the solution of important issues concerning the close interrelation between power engineering and protecting the natural environment. The sides consider the proposal to be an important impetus toward cooperation in the wider political and economic dimension as well.

Both sides have a positive attitude toward global cooperation in the sphere of power engineering policies, based on the widening of contacts and the strengthening of mutual trust between oil-importing and -exporting countries. The global power engineering dialogue should now also include issues of protecting the environment.

Bilateral Relations

The sides state that relations and cooperation between the two countries have developed positively during recent years. Profound and constructive changes in Europe have created the conditions for further strengthening dialogue and bilateral relations and for the development of cooperation and good-neighborliness.

The governments of the two countries will work actively so that the obligations and tasks of the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and other basic documents of the CSCE may find their most specific expression in the further development of bilateral relations. The development of long-term cooperation will be an important contribution in resolving common problems and strengthening trust and stability in the wider European context.

Political Contacts

The sides favor strengthening political dialogue by means of regular consultations on international and bilateral issues.

Special significance is being attached to contacts at a higher political level. Meetings between ministers of foreign affairs for regular conversations are envisioned.

As cooperation widens, the sides also favor the further development of contacts between industry ministries and other authorities and administrative bodies. The sides attach significance to the most effective use possible of the mixed commissions set up in accordance with the various agreements on cooperation.

The sides stress the significance of the continuation and strengthening of contacts between the defense ministries of the two countries as well as in the military sphere.

The Demarcation of the Continental Shelf and Economic Zones in the Barents Sea

The sides acknowledge the importance of reaching agreement on the line of demarcation of the continental shelf and the economic zones of the sides in the Barents Sea. A mutually acceptable line of demarcation will be of great significance for the further development of neighborly relations between the peoples of the two countries and will open up possibilities for further cooperation in the north.

In connection with this, the sides note with satisfaction the important progress reached during recent years at talks between Soviet and Norwegian experts on the basis of the norms of international law. They express their striving toward the speedy attainment of a mutually acceptable compromise decision on this issue.

Economic Cooperation

The sides discussed the development of bilateral economic links and established that major tasks face the economies of the two countries as far as the continuation of traditional mutual trade and the further development of economic cooperation in new spheres is concerned. The sides stressed the importance of solving problems that impede the expansion of mutual trade.

The sides agree that significant opportunities exist for increasing trade and developing economic, industrial, and scientific and technical cooperation, not least in the power engineering sphere. The creation of the necessary conditions to realize this potential is the common task of the sides. An agreement on mutual protection of and

incentives for investment, which was initialed and will soon be signed, lies ahead as a specific contribution to this matter.

The sides confirm the tasks of the long-term program for developing economic and industrial cooperation between Norway and the USSR, including the need to improve the structure of bilateral trade and to use new forms of cooperation between the two countries' economies.

Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector

The sides stress the great importance they attach to the traditionally good cooperation between the two countries in the fisheries sector. The sides single out the importance of responsible management of the sea's resources and agree to continue and deepen cooperation within the framework of the mixed Soviet-Norwegian fisheries commission.

Cooperation in the Power Engineering Sector

The sides note that cooperation between Soviet and Norwegian enterprises in the power engineering sector has expanded in recent years. They intend to continue to develop this cooperation.

Environmental Protection

The sides stress the importance of bilateral cooperation in the field of environmental protection and will strengthen and expand their contribution toward the implementation of specific measures capable of reducing the scale of pollution and of improving the state of the environment on both sides of their common border.

The sides agree that it is important to speed up the progress of negotiations on the modernization of the "Pechenganikel" metallurgical combine on the Kola peninsula. In this connection, they will seek to ensure that the negotiations on technical solutions and issues of financing are completed as quickly as possible and that the combine's modernization can be carried out in the shortest possible period, by 1995 if possible.

The sides agree that it is necessary to strengthen the procedure for the exchange of information on nuclear installations. In addition, they agreed to study the possibilites of cooperating on the elaboration of measures to enhance the safety of nuclear reactors and of the storage and burial of radioactive waste.

The sides agree to act in favor of continuing cooperation in the field of nature protection policy in the Arctic regions. They welcome the conference on protecting the Arctic environment, to be held in Rovaniemi, Finland, on 13 and 14 June 1991 at the initiative of the Government of the Republic of Finland, and will cooperate actively in implementing the documents agreed upon there.

The sides discussed the subject of nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya and noted the nature protection interests which exist in this context. They agreed to maintain close contact on this matter.

The sides discussed the subject of raising the Soviet nuclear submarine, the Komsomolets, and agreed in their assessment that the opinions of all affected parties should be taken into account when the various aspects of this operation are considered.

The sides agree to strengthen cooperation in the fight against pollution of the Barents Sea and agreed that they will study the question of concluding a bilateral agreement on combating oil pollution there.

Cooperation in the Field of Culture and Science

The sides recognize the great importance which the strengthening of cultural ties will have for shaping a free and integrated Europe. The expansion of cultural contacts is an important instrument in work to strengthen understanding of the national peculiarities of states and of the common European cultural heritage.

The diversity and wealth of their cultures can be brought out only through the free development of the arts and the free exchange of thoughts and ideas.

The 1981 agreement creates a positive basis for cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and Norway. The sides consider it important to make full use of the opportunities provided by the agreement.

At the same time, the sides agreed that development since then has created more favorable conditions for direct contacts between independent organizations in the sphere of theater, cinema, and the fine arts. The sides support and will encourage such direct contacts between representatives of the cultural world and the spheres of art and science in both countries.

The sides agreed to strengthen contacts in the field of science and scientific research.

Cooperation in Other Fields

The sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in the fight against the illegal transportation of drugs and will continue work on drawing up an appropriate bilateral agreement.

The sides are equally agreed in their evaluation of the significance of strengthening cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.

Cooperation in the North

The sides recognize that the Soviet Union and Norway, as neighbor countries in the north, show great interest in developing the broadest and most productive cooperation with the aim of tackling common tasks in various fields in this region. The Soviet Union and Norway will continue to develop the positive contacts that have

already been established, and will strive actively to create conditions for the expansion of cooperation. The sides favor making the content of their being neighbors as specific as possible.

For this purpose the sides intend:

—To develop contacts between the regional authorities of northwest Russia and northern Norway;
—To develop contacts between the small peoples of the two countries;
—To strengthen economic cooperation, including within the framework of a working group on economic cooperation between the northern regions of the USSR and Norway;
—To develop cooperation in the field of tourism;
—To expand cooperation in solving ecological problems in the north;
—To develop and improve systems of communication: road, rail and shipping communication, and air routes;
—To examine the possibility of cooperating in the field of using the northern maritime route for international shipping;
—To continue work aimed at developing modern telecommunication networks;
—To develop cooperation in the field of rescue operations in the Barents Sea on the basis of the 1988 agreement;
—To ease cross-border contacts by introducing a simplified entry and exit procedure for the citizens of both countries;
—To establish honorary consulates in Murmansk and Hammerfest;
—To continue cooperation in the field of polar research on the basis of the 1988 agreement;
—To develop contacts in the field of culture and sports.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

G. Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of the Kingdom of Norway

[dated] 5 June 1991

Pays Tribute to War Dead

LD0606120591 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Oslo June 6 TASS—Before his departure from the Norwegian capital for Sweden, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev paid tribute to the memory of Norwegians and Soviet soldiers who died in the Second World War fighting for the freedom and independence of Norway.

Gorbachev laid a wreath at the national monument on the central square of the fortress Akershus. Opened in May 1970 on the 25th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the monument is a tribute to all Norwegians who perished in the Second World War.

At the city cemetery Vestre Gravlund, Gorbachev laid a wreath at the monument to Soviet Soldiers who died in Norway.

Both ceremonies were attended by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

TASS Wraps Up Norway Visit

LD0606140291 Moscow TASS in English 1013 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Oslo June 6 TASS—The Soviet Union and Norway welcome historic changes in Europe, creating possibilities for stronger friendly relations between states and better security and stability on the European continent, says a joint Soviet-Norwegian statement signed by President Gorbachev and Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland in Oslo on Wednesday.

Gorbachev was in Norway on a short working visit, during which he read a Nobel lecture in Oslo, held talks with the Norwegian prime minister and was received by King Harald V.

In the joint statement, the sides stressed the importance of establishing a peace order in Europe, based on post-confrontation realities and principles recorded in the joint declaration of 22 nations in Paris.

The Soviet Union and Norway pointed to the importance of achieving progress to settle pressing global problems and welcomed the positive role the United Nations is now playing in strengthening international peace and security, mutual understanding, trust and stability in the world as well as expanding constructive cooperation between all states.

The statement says that the Soviet Union and Norway, the two neighbouring countries in the North, display great interest in developing the broadest possible productive cooperation to settle common goals in various spheres in Northern Europe.

Speaking after the talks in Oslo at the joint news conference with the Norwegian prime minister, Gorbachev told reporters that during the talks, held in a "frank atmosphere", the sides had discussed the state of and prospects for bilateal relations, as well as the development of the European process.

The sides exchanged opinions on mechanisms which could make Soviet cooperation with Nordic countries more effective.

A dinner was given by the Norwegian king and queen in honour of the Soviet president and his wife on Wednesday evening. The heads of the two states exchanged speeches at the dinner.

Addressing the Soviet guest, King Harald V noted that the demarcation lines in post-war Europe are being erased, and confrontation and conflicts are being forced to yield to cooperation and talks.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the charter for a new Europe signed in Paris in November 1990 have created a basis for a new and permanent peace order in Europe. The Norwegian monarch pointed to the important contribution by the Soviet leader to this progress.

Speaking about the talks in Oslo, Gorbachev described them as "very frank, substantive and successful". In the Soviet president's opinion, Soviet-Norwegian relations have a bright future. As the USSR is overcoming the period of crisis in its development, these relations "will be increasing in dynamism and scale".

TASS Assails Baltic Demonstrations at Ceremony

LD0506181891 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 5 Jun 91

[by international news analyst Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow June 5 TASS—An unseemly attempt by certain forces to darken the Nobel ceremony atmosphere is how one can evaluate protest demonstrations staged in Norway by Baltic emigres "in view of the latest developments in Lithuania".

A vociferous campaign over the developments is being obviously stepped up by those forces that would like to block the visible mutual understanding between the Soviet president and the leaders of major capitalist countries on the question of assistance to the Soviet Union in carrying out economic reforms.

It was not fortuitous, apparently, that Lithuanian Parliament Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis during his recent visit to Washington opposed the idea of granting agricultural credits to the Soviet Union.

Later on in an interview with the information service of the LOS ANGELES TIMES newspaper, Landsbergis criticised the Bush Administration, asserting that if the United States believes that the preservation of the Soviet communist empire would be of benefit, it makes a very big error.

It is natural to suppose that the Lithuanian leader and his policy supporters in the Baltics and abroad consider it a just cause to take any actions capable of doing if only slight harm to the "Soviet empire" and to its leader personally.

Incidentally, it is precisely due to President Gorbachev's bold reforms that Soviet republics have been able to edge towards genuine independence, which they could not even dream of only recently. But should the public of Scandinavian countries toe along a line indicated by over-ambitious leaders of Baltic republics?

Unfortunately, some news media of these countries did not manage to restrain their emotions. The Norwegian newspaper DAGBLADET believes that "last night's dramatic developments in Vilnius not only threaten the revived democracy of that country, but are also an inadmissible provocation against the free world and, not to a minor extent, against Norway as the host of the Nobel peace prize ceremonies."

Thus, two absolutely incommensurable notions are being weighed against each other: on the one hand, the policy of perestroyka in the USSR that made it possible to do away with the cold war and move from the confrontation with the West to cooperation and earned Mikhail Gorbachev universal recognition and, on the other hand, an attempt by the Soviet military to "catch" seven deserters from the Soviet Army (it must be recalled that the law on universal military duty is still in effect in the USSR).

A sober approach should not give way to emotions in international politics, even if prompted by lofty motives. The majority of people in Norway are apparently aware of that. According to the REUTER news agency, many Norwegians, it seems, are unconcerned about the Soviet leader's visit.

Meanwhile, an odd fact has been reported by REUTERS: Someone arranged the delivery of Lithuanians residing in neighbouring Sweden to Oslo by special buses.

Commentary on Relations With Norway

PM0606140891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jun 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by special correspondents T. Kolesnichenko, Yu. Kuznetsov: "The World as One"]

[Excerpts] Oslo, 5 Jun—M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Norway, which began today, is, on the one hand, a working visit centered on the examination of bilateral relations between our countries and the exchange of opinions on the most pressing international problems. On the other hand, it is a repayment, so to speak, of a "debt" incurred last December, when M.S. Gorbachev was unable to go to Oslo personally for the Nobel Peace Prize presentation ceremony. Under the rules, the winner of this prize may deliver his traditional lecture within the next six months, and that is what happened today. [passage omitted]

The Nobel Prize lecture will, of course, be studied by our own politicians and by those people abroad on whom foreign policy decisionmaking depends. Let us be frank, not everyone over there has yet arrived at an understanding of the ideas that the laureate incorporated in his lecture. For instance, we are still living in conditions where "bloc" philosophy, although it is undergoing a process of transformation, still continues to exist. People still talk to us about the "balance of forces," parities, military rivalry, and so on, and so forth. But in the lecture, for instance, we heard something entirely different and new. For instance, that the world's integrity can now be based only on the principles of freedom of choice and balance of interests. Every state has its own interests. They all have equal rights, and deserve respect.

And respect means studying each other. Hence another conclusion: that knowledge and trust are the foundation of the new world order.

These and other innovative theoretical propositions in M.S. Gorbachev's lecture served as a good prelude to the Soviet president's subsequent talks with the Norwegian prime minister. The history of our bilateral relations merits nothing less than an exclamation mark. After all, for 1,000 years now there has been no war between Norway and our country. Since ancient times, since the days of the Vikings, our countries have been drawn to one another, and the Kievan princes gave their daughters in marriage to the kings of Norway.

But history is only a flattering background color to the picture of present-day relations. It is therefore important that during the talks, particularly on the Soviet side, an understanding of the problems that concern Norway was shown.

As a result, in the course of the talks the intention was expressed to develop Soviet-Norwegian relations, resolving contentious problems like the demarcation of the sea area of the Barents Sea or Soviet nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya. These tests, incidentally, prompt particular concern here. Now, judging by the talks, this problem will be removed.

In general the question of environmental conservation has become a priority matter. And it must be admitted that Norwegian fears in connection with atmospheric pollution on the Kola Peninsula are not the inventions of scientists and experts, but a matter of profound concern to the people themselves, who can see the forests withering and the rivers being poisoned. In the course of the talks, work on eliminating this problem was given new impetus—the question of joint nature conservation measures in the Kola Peninsula region is being studied by the USSR, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and within the framework of an intergovernmental agreement, cooperation in the sphere of the ecology of the Barents Sea is also being organized.

The USSR also represents an important market for Norway to sell various goods, first and foremost pulp and paper, which we newspapermen so badly need (in 1989 these products accounted for 63 percent of Soviet imports from Norway). True, such forms of cooperation as production sharing and joint enterprises have not yet become really widespread in Soviet-Norwegian economic relations. And, to all appearances, the main blame rests with our side. The joint Soviet-Norwegian enterprises that have been set up have not yet managed to find their feet. The fact is that in Norway small and medium sized firms operate highly efficiently, and their activity makes the local economy sound and stable. In our country, such organizations do not yet exist, and Norwegian firms have to deal with our vast monopolist associations, which cannot show appropriate flexibility and promptness in decisionmaking. And therefore one is reluctant even to enumerate the concrete problems. They are the same as we face everywhere on the foreign market—people do not respond in time, the teletypes are silent, nobody knows who specifically you should talk to, who takes the decisions, and so forth. We can only hope that since we are now radically changing our economy, these problems will disappear.

In general trade and economic ties lag considerably behind the development of political relations with Norway. Soviet-Norwegian cultural and humanitarian ties are developing more successfully. In the course of the talks it was decided to increase exchanges of cultural personalities, musicians, and writers.

In conclusion we would like to note another factor. People here keep a very close eye on the events now taking place in our Baltic region, particularly Lithuania. There is, metaphorically speaking, a "hot line" between Oslo and Vilnius. But sometimes it can be a bad line. Thus, for instance, yesterday all the newspapers here published a photograph of Landsbergis calling on the people to "save the homeland." Soviet journalists and diplomats were besieged by representatives of the mass media with one and the same question: What has happened—are there tanks in the streets of Vilnius again? It turned out to be nothing of the kind. But the weakness of our information service was also confirmed. Neither our news agencies, nor our press, nobody was sending the necessary information here, although, as you can easily see, on the eve of the Soviet president's visit this was very important. At the same time we must note the restraint and understanding with which people in the Norwegian capital view the problems of the Baltic region. All the conditions have now been created—especially now, after the "nine plus one" statement—for resolving by constitutional means the most urgent problems of the region, and in particular the problems of the peoples who live in the Baltic region. [passage omitted]

European Reportage on Norway, Sweden Visit

WA0606153991

For European reportage on the visit by President Mikhail Gorbachev to Norway and Sweden, including reports on his talks in Norway with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and his meeting in Sweden with Brazilian President Fernando Collor, see the International Affairs and Nordic Countries sections of the 5 June West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Gorbachev Leaves Norway, Arrives in Stockholm

LD0606102291 Moscow TASS in English 1000 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Stockholm June 6 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in Sweden today on a working visit.

In the capital's Arlanda Airport, Gorbachev and hiw wife Raisa were welcomed by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Ingrid Carlsson.

The motorcade headed for Stockholm's Alfred Nobel Street, the site of the Soviet president's residence during his stay in the Swedish capital.

The programme of the visit includes talks with Carlsson and a conversation with King Carl XVI Gustaf.

Gives News Conference

LD0606154291 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 6 Jun 91

[By TASS special correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov, Igor Revyakin, and Vitaliy Chukseyev]

[Text] Stockholm June 6 TASS—Summing up the results of talks with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, President Mikhail Gorbachev gave a spontaneous news conference here today.

"Like in Oslo, we managed to use time reasonably, although we were pressed for time. We managed to have substantial discussions. At the request of the prime minister and his colleagues, I thoroughly informed them about the current stage of perestroyka," Gorbachev said.

"I am satisfied with our cooperation in recent years and we decided to continue the process. As for bilateral relations, we have great reserves. We discussed a large power engineering project and cooperation in ecology. We discussed the current stage of cooperation with due account of changes in our country," Gorbachev said.

"We had substantial discussion of the situation in the Baltic republics. I told the prime minister in detail about work done to reform the federation," Gorbachev said.

"This is a complex process, and has reached a final stage. Nine republics held a referendum and stated their willingness to retain the Union as a federation. The process is developing. It is a constructive process, even if not an easy one," Gorbachev said.

Speaking about granting independence to republics, Gorbachev noted that "the problem should be resolved within the framework of a democratic process and within the framework of the constitution". "I must tell those trying to wreck this constitutional process that great disappointments are awaiting them," Gorbachev said.

Stresses No 'Interference' in Baltics

LD0606162191 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT 6 Jun 91

[by special correspondents]

[Text] Stockholm June 6 TASS—The Soviet leadership intends to address the problem of Baltic republics within the framework of the democratic process and the Soviet constitution and laws rather than by resettling 2.5 million Russians and other non-indigenous population in those republics elsewhere, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said today.

He was speaking to reporters after his talks with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson.

Gorbachev said that they discussed "in a fairly thorough manner" the situation in the Baltics and that he briefed Carlsson in detail on the complex process of reforms in the USSR, which has entered the decisive phase.

Gorbachev said that Soviet laws and the constitution envisage the right to self-determination and define mechanisms for exercising this right and that those attempting to foil this constitutional process are in for major disappointments.

"We shall not permit it," he stressed.

On the Swedish government's position on the Baltic issue, Gorbachev said that Carlsson agreed that it should be solved constitutionally.

Gorbachev added that "sympathies on the part of neighbouring countries with these or other peoples—not only in the Baltics—must not develop into ways and means of interference in the affairs of the Soviet Union, especially now that the union is being reformed".

He said that any forms of encouragement for secessionism, disrespect for national minorities, and violations of their rights were inadmissible.

Interviewed on Talks, Baltics

LD0606155791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1430 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Interview with President M. S. Gorbachev by unidentified correspondents following his talks with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, in Stockholm on 6 June—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mikhail Sergeyevich, your meeting with the Swedish prime minister lasted much longer than planned. What caused it and what were the main issues at the talks?

[Gorbachev] You know, even though we have a very limited time at our disposal, just as in Oslo we are nevertheless making very rational use of it and we have succeeded with the prime minister in having a very thorough talk on our bilateral relations, the European process, and the role of the United Nations. But I must say that at the request of the prime minister and his colleagues, I described in detail to them the current stage of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, the main trends, the main problems, the tasks we are tackling. I am very satisfied with the good atmosphere in which our cooperation has been proceeding over the last few years. We have found it necessary to continue what we began here and, as for bilateral relations, here too we have opportunities for increasing cooperation. We spoke of an energy and power space and the implementation, possibly, of a major all-European power engineering project. We spoke about an ecological project, since this affects all of us Europeans. We also spoke of the current stage of

cooperation within the framework of the changes, taking account of the changes that are taking place in our country at this stage of perestroyka.

[Correspondent] Speaking about the Baltic republics, do you think that the Swedes are encouraging the separatists in the Baltic republics?

[Gorbachev] You know, the prime minister and I had quite a thorough discussion about this situation. I briefed him on the work that we are doing, which is going on in our country, in the context of reforming our federation. This is a complicated process. It has reached its final stage, and nine republics have held a referendum and spoken in favor of preserving the Union as a federation, but a renewed federation, with a big redistribution of powers, a federation by other means, so to speak. And this process is continuing. It is constructive, although it is not simple, even in the framework of those who have come to agreement. But nevertheless, we have arrived at the final stage. And these nine republics embrace 90 to 93 percent of the territory, of the population, of the resources base. That is an immense community.

But, you know, there are quite a lot of difficulties, and it is important here that we should not end up as a result of the reform process with some sort of situation where, as it were, we have to deal with first-class and second-class people, with first and second-class peoples. That is why I said in Oslo yesterday, addressing the international press, and today I am addressing you, that one must see everything, see what is emerging, what requires resolving, taking into account the wishes and desires of the indigenous peoples of the Baltic area. But one must see that two and a half million Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Jews live there. Aren't they people? You just try to tell the Russians, 150 million of them, that the Russians are to be counted as...the Russians, so many of whom laid down their lives to save all peoples from fascism, in cooperation with...[several voices try to interrupt] No, no, no, don't be in a hurry. I will finish what I was saying. You just try to tell them. Comrade Yeltsin once said what I find to be some not altogether well considered things. He said: Let the Russians return to Russia; we will accept them. How, then? All two and half million from the Baltics alone? Are 11 million Russians from Ukraine supposed to get up and go to Russia? What kind of...[changes thought] This is not the way. We propose to resolve everything in the framework of a democratic process, in a constitutional framework, a framework of laws, and our laws and constitution provide for the right to self-determination. They foresee, have the mechanisms for resolving this self-determination, and that is the way to go.

[Correspondent] Are the Swedes going too far?

[Gorbachev] I do not think that the Swedish Government and the Swedish people fail to understand the situation and process that is going on in our country, although probably there are differing opinions in your country too on this score. But I think we shall cooperate in order to understand one another well in this matter.

More on Stockholm Interview

LD0606212791 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Interview with President M.S. Gorbachev by unidentified correspondents in Stocholm on 6 June; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded; video shows Gorbachev with journalists, with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson beside him]

[Text] ["Vremya" correspondent] Mikhail Sergeyevich, just one question for the "Vremya" program. Your meeting with the Swedish prime minister lasted much longer than planned. What caused it, and what were the main issues at the talks?

[Gorbachev] You know, even though we have a very limited time at our disposal, just as in Oslo, we are nevertheless making very rational use of it, and we have succeeded with the prime minister in having a very thorough talk on our bilateral relations, the European process, and the role of the United Nations. But I must say that at the request of the prime minister and his colleagues, I described in detail to them the current stage of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, the main trends, the main problems, the tasks we are tackling.

I am very satisfied with the good atmosphere in which our cooperation has been proceeding over the last few years. We have found it necessary to continue what we began here and, as for bilateral relations, here too we have opportunities for increasing cooperation. We spoke of energy and power, and the possible implementation of a major all-European power engineering project. We spoke about an ecological project, since this affects all of us Europeans. We also discussed the current stage of cooperation within the framework of the changes, taking account of the changes that are taking place in our country at this stage of perestroyka.

[Correspondent] Speaking about the Baltic republics, do you think the Swedes are encouraging the separatists there?

[Gorbachev] You know, the prime minister and I had quite a thorough discussion about this situation. I briefed him on the work we are doing, which is going on in our country, in the context of reforming our federation. This is a complicated process. It has reached its final stage, and nine republics have held a referendum and spoken in favor of preserving the Union as a federation, but a renewed federation, with a big redistribution of powers—a federation by other means, so to speak. This process is continuing. It is constructive, although it is not simple, even in the framework of those who have come to agreement. Nevertheless, we have arrived at the final stage. These nine republics embrace

90 to 93 percent of the territory, of the population, of the resource base. That is an immense community.

But there are quite a lot of difficulties, and it is important here that we should not end up as a result of the reform process with some sort of situation where we have to deal with first-class and second-class people, with first- and second-class peoples. That is why I said in Oslo yesterday, addressing the international press, and today I am addressing you, that one must see everything, see what is emerging, what requires resolving, taking into account the wishes and desires of the indigenous peoples of the Baltic area. But one must see that two and a half million Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Jews live there. Aren't they people? You just try to tell the Russians, 150 million of them, that the Russians are to be counted as... [changes thought] the Russians, so many of who laid down their lives to save all peoples from fascism, in cooperation with... [several voices try to interrupt) No, no, no, don't be in a hurry, I will finish what I was saying. You just try to tell them.

Comrade Yeltsin once said what I find to be some not altogether well-considered things. He said: Let the Russians return to Russia; we will accept them. How? All two and half million from the Baltics alone? Are 11 million Russians from the Ukraine supposed to get up and go to Russia? What kind of.... [Gorbachev changes thought] This is not the way. We propose to resolve everything in the framework of a democratic process, in a constitutional framework, a framework of laws, and our legal constitution provides for the right to self-determination. It foresees, has mechanisms for resolving this self-determination, and that is the way to go. Those people who attempt to undermine this constitutional process, I must say, can expect great disappointments. We shall not allow this.

[Correspondent] Do you approve of Swedish support for the Baltic peoples?

[Gorbachev] I would say the following. There can be no difference between us—the prime minister agrees with this—in the sense that our constitution and our new draft Union treaty enshrine the right of every people to self-determination and to decide voluntarily whether or not they are to be in the Union. But all this needs to be decided within the constitution. We have no differences in this respect. It is precisely in this way that one must decide. Sympathy on the part of neighboring countries for various peoples, however—I am not just speaking here about the Baltic peoples—should not escalate into ways and means of interfering in the affairs of the Soviet Union, especially when it is really engaged in the process of reforming the Union. It is necessary to support this healthy process, which is taking place within a constitutional framework. If we encourage separatism, a lack of respect for a minority, and the flouting of the rights of this minority, that is impermissible.

[Correspondent] Are the Swedes going too far?

[Gorbachev] I do not think that the Swedish Government and the Swedish people fail to understand the situation that... [changes thought] and the process that is going on in our country, although probably there are differing opinions in your country too on this score. But I think we shall cooperate in order to understand one another well in this matter. This is very important, very important. One cannot allow improvisation in this matter.

Talks of 'Turning Point'

LD0606210791 Moscow TASS in English 2038 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Stockholm June 6 TASS—"All of us, the world community of [word indistinct] land peoples, are at the turning point, a kind of the moment of the truth, when one has to make a decision to move from one type of international cooperation to a new one, "Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said at a breakfast given by the Swedish government in honour of the Soviet president and his wife in Stockholm on Thursday.

He said that what kind of world will enter the 21st century and what image civilisation will have depends on whether the Soviet Union with huge potentials and vast resources will organically integrate into the world context.

Gorbachev noted that the moment has come to make a historic choice for the Soviet Union and the world, primarily for the most influential states and groups [word indistinct] as well as northern Europe, which "plays a specific and constructive role in the [word indistinct] process and in the search for a peaceful period in the world history".

He said that the Soviet Union and Sweden have "compatible" approaches towards major issues concerning both countries' interests.

The talks helped both leaders to have a better understanding of the situation, their views and everybody's attitude towards principles and rules, indispensable for everyone, of building a new Europe. They "will promote the development of Soviet-Swedish relations upward," Gorbachev said.

Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson noted in his speech that new political thinking was essential not only for the Soviet Union. It had a positive influence on [words indistinct] as well. The "Cold War" confrontation has [words indistinct] cooperation and growing mutual understanding on many crucial issues. Changes in Europe have been especially tremendous. This part of the world is no longer divided into two opposing parts.

The past years showed that major changes can take place in europe posing no threat to stability. The consolidation of democracy and freedom have created the prerequisites for this process.

This is the only way to create a firm basis for fruitful international cooperation, Carlsson said.

He said that Sweden links hopes for this with the continuation of democracy and perestroika in the Soviet Union.

Meets Brazil's Collor in Stockholm

LD0606162991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1601 GMT 16 Jun 91

[Text] Stockholm, 6 June (TASS)—TASS special correspondent: USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, who is on a working visit here, has received Fernando Collor de Mello, president of Brazil, who is taking part in the activities staged for the world day for protection of the environment. A conversation took place during which issues on the international situation and bilateral relations were discussed. Fernando Collor de Mello invited the USSR president to the world conference for the protection of the environment which is to take place in Brazil in 1992.

Swedish Premier 'Satisfied' With Visit

LD0606190191 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Stockholm June 6 TASS—Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson today said he was satisfied with the Soviet president's visit to the Swedish capital.

Addressing a news conference here, Carlsson said he had an hour long one to one meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. Later, they continued talks together with members of delegations.

Carlsson noted changes in bilateral relations during the years of perestroika. He recalled that when he visited Moscow five years ago, there were a number of complex issues, and the sides had to discuss them. There were problems with reunification of families. The sides discussed the Baltic economic zone and the Wallenberg issue.

The Baltic economic zone issue was positively resolved. Sweden cannot complain about reunification of families. The Soviet side is planning to make things clear about Raul Wallenberg's fate, and the prime minister said he was satisfied with this.

"We received substantial information about the situation in the Soviet Union and its economic and political problems, on which Gorbachev is working," Carlsson said. He noted Sweden's intention to develop technical and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The sides also focused on the European process. "we have considerable grounds for developing a bilateral dialogue," Carlsson said.

Asked whether or not the sides discussed the Baltic issue, Carlsson said the Swedish side outlined its position, noting the right of the Baltic peoples to self-determination, inadmissibility of using violence and the importance of political dialogue. President Gorbachev set out his position on the issue, Carlsson said.

Later in the day, Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko held a press briefing. Talks with the leaders of Norway and Sweden were constructive and profound, he said.

"I would describe them as wide-scale talks, despite their briefness. They will boost the development of bilateral relations," Ignatenko said.

Departs Stockholm for Home

LD0606171291 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Stockholm June 6 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev today left for home after ending his brief working visit to Sweden.

At Arlanda Airport, Gorbachev was seen off by Swedish statesmen, including Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson.

Yakovlev Interviewed on Country's Prospects

AU0506184591 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 1815 GMT 4 Jun 91

["Club 2" program hosted by Hugo Portisch, with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Mikhail Gorbachev's chief adviser; former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; and Marion Graefin Doenhoff, publisher of the Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT, on 4 June 1991 in Vienna; Yakovlev and Kissinger answer with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Portisch] My first question to you, Mr. Yakovlev, because we are dealing with the USSR's future: Will the Soviet Union continue to be a socialist state, or will it be a Western-style democracy with a pluralist development? Will the Communist Party be able and willing to give up its claim to a monopoly on power? What type of political structure will we have to expect in the Soviet Union in the near future?

[Yakovlev] That is a question that I could also ask you. No one in the Soviet Union can answer the question about our future, scientifically or otherwise. Why am I unable to answer the question? Because we are undergoing a very contradictory and complicated process resulting from the clash of different forces. Talking about the Communist Party, we do not only have one communist party, we already have four communist parties. Nobody knows how many parties there are in the Soviet Union. There are more than 100 political parties in Georgia alone.

However, what matters is not the number of political parties. What matters is the fact that there are very serious forces that are opposed to perestroyka. We will have to wait and see what will happen to the Soviet

Union and the CPSU, and what its orientation will be. The party program will be at issue before long, and then it will soon be clear how the party will develop. Nonetheless, I am convinced that there can be no monopoly of the CPSU any more. There will be a multiparty system.

As far as I am concerned, I think it would be better for us to have a system of two or three parties. For the time being, many new parties are being founded. That is not very helpful. However, we will see how things will develop, in what direction, and toward what type of society. I do not think there will be an analogy to any other society in the West or in the East. Something new will develop.

This much is clear: The development will go in the direction of a democratic process, and sooner or later, the counter-forces will suffer a defeat. In any case, the direction will be democratic. However, the future will show what type of democracy we will have—will it be a Western-style democracy? I don't think there are any analogies in the West. Every country has its own specific democracy, and we will have our own specific democracy, too. I personally believe that we are currently going through a very complicated period of time.

We have much freedom, but we do not yet have a democracy—as paradoxical as it may sound. For the time being, the people are not yet without chains. The people are still unable to show initiative or an enterprising spirit. They do not understand what is going on. I would say that there is a sort of uncertainty—who is right, who is to blame? Is it Gorbachev, is it Yeltsin, or are other people responsible? People are trying to find out, and they are trying to make up their minds. Developing initiative and an independent mind—that is the first step of democratic development. However, the future will show what the next step will be.

[Portisch] But that sounds very much as if we had to expect a period of very heated controversies. Are you worried that the controversies could possibly get out of hand and could degenerate into an intervention by the Army or into a sort of coup, or that it could even degenerate into civil war?

[Yakovlev] I am not worried in that respect. First, regarding civil war, we do not have social or political forces interested in civil war. The forces who hypothetically might have an interest in such a development of events are aware that they will suffer a defeat. Second, regarding a military coup, I do not believe that such a coup will take place. There is no tradition of military coups in our country. The military has never staged a coup—neither before nor after the revolution. There was just one attempt—the Decembrist Conspiracy—which was a purely local affair and ended unsuccessfully. That is why I do not believe in a military coup. Our military officers do not tend to favor coups.

[Portisch] But there has been civil war.

[Yakovlev] That was after the revolution—a revolution that exchanged one system for another. At that time, two antagonistic forces clashed, the forces of the owners and the forces of those who intended to take possession of their property by force.

[Portisch] Do you not see such a situation now—two antagonistic forces that could possibly be so antagonistic that the development might take a bad turn?

[Yakovlev] Of course there are conflicting interests, but they are not material interests, they are conflicting ideologies. Ideologies play a very important part. In this respect, the situation is very grave. Some people have the old dogmatic attitude, whereas others have a realistic outlook and want to do what must normally be done in a normal country, in a normal democratic system ruled by the law —if you like, in a civil bourgeois society from which we moved far away, and which was fought by Marx who rejected the bourgeois society. But that is the direction we must pursue. [passage omitted]

I could say something about the plan worked out at Harvard by Yavlinskiy and others. I took part in the talks. At first, Yavlinskiy's mission was a private one. He was supposed to discuss with U.S. economic experts possible ways out of the crisis and forms of cooperation at an academic level. The scientists reached certain conclusions and achieved agreement. Yavlinskiy returned to Moscow. We—Gorbachev, I, Primakov, and Yavlinskiy—discussed it. Then it was raised to an official level, and now Primakov, Yavlinskiy, and Shcherbakov—one of the deputy prime ministers—are in Washington. I don't know whether they are already back. They held negotiations with President Bush on the plan. I do not yet know the results.

However, according to press reports, our president has been invited to the Group of Seven meeting of Western industrial countries to discuss the problems of economic cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union. We do not understand why the West asks whether Gorbachev should be helped, or whether Yeltsin should be helped, and whether help should be given now or later. Nor do we understand the thesis that help can only be given to the Soviet Union after a period of stabilization has begun. I think that all those questions are quite artificial.

Gorbachev or Yeltsin—the two politicians do not have strategic differences of opinion. Both advocate perestroyka, the renewal of society, the transition to a new quality, the democratization of society, and so on. Therefore, whomever you help, you will help the reform process. Second, when should help be given? People say that help can only be given after stabilization has begun. However, without cooperation, there will be no stabilization, at least not so soon. Of course, we are the ones that are particularly interested in such stabilization because it would be a tragic historic event if perestroyka were to fail. We cannot know whether and when another attempt will be successful.

But it would also be very bad for you. Therefore, every bit of help and cooperation is a contribution toward the present development, a contribution toward this new world order that we are discussing. The West must understand that. We do not just say that you should give us money. We say that the Soviet Union must be given an opportunity, as soon as possible, to become integrated in the system of the international division of labor, to take part in international economic organizations as an equal partner.

[Portisch] But, Mr. Yakovlev, you just said that there could be a tragic event, a tragic setback. That is precisely what the West is concerned about. The situation in the Soviet Union does not warrant the assessment that there will be no setback, that billions [no monetary unit given] can be invested because the prospects are good. The West has adopted a wait and see attitude, and you know the main argument. The main argument is that Gorbachev wants to save the CPSU and does not permit the party to split up into four parties, that consequently he is forced to make concessions to all sides, and that there is no solid concept. It is not only a perestroyka of the Soviet Union, it is also a perestroyka of the party. That is something that the West is viewing with increasing skepticism.

[Yakovlev] That is the wrong logic. Of course, Gorbachev is the representative of the Communist Party. Being the general secretary, he cannot pursue the breakdown of the party but must lead it. At the same time, however, many other parties have emerged, and now we see that the communists are a minority in Moscow, in Leningrad, and in the RSFSR. The communist majority in the USSR Supreme Soviet is split into two parts. Part of the communists favor democracy; we could call the other part the orthodox part of the communists. The Russian president will run in the elections with a deputy who leads the democratically minded communists in parliament.

Regarding the CPSU's monopoly, there will be no such monopoly because the party no longer is a united party. I think there are even more than the four parties mentioned by Gorbachev—ranging from the right conservatives to the radical left. There are left centrist parties, parties that are close to the social democrats, and others. Regarding the argument that Gorbachev intends to maintain the party, may be that is what he wants. However, he is responsible for the state where a multiparty system is developing. If we had elections today, I would be unable to predict the results. [passage omitted]

[Kissinger] [passage omitted] It is in nobody's interest to see the Soviet Union collapse. But I would wonder whether Mr. Yakovlev could explain to our audience what the failure of perestroyka would mean.

[Yakovlev] Where do I see the danger? I said earlier that I do not see the danger of a direct military coup or of any other coup. I see a danger in two cases. First, increasing social tensions as a result of the economic situation—when the people lose patience, when they do not want to line up at shops any more, and when they are finally fed up with the shortage of goods, when they cannot buy bread or meat or other things. You may remember that the 1917 revolution began with the women who lined up for bread, and that led to the first revolution. For the time being, the women are patient, even though they grumble. We men are just imagining that we decide everything. In reality, the women have the decisive say.

Second, there is the danger of a provocation, a provocation between nationalities. The national conflicts worry us. In Latvia, for instance, 50 percent of the people are non-Latvians. If the Latvian Government is wise enough it will bring about a consensus and will guarantee equal human rights for everyone. They have abolished some of their discriminating laws. That is good. In Central Asia, for instance, the government will solve the problems, I think. In Kazakhstan, there is a certain consensus between the Kazakhs and the Russians. I am worried about the Moldovan Republic. There is a mixed population. The Moldovans live on one side of the river, and the Russians and Ukrainians on the other. The Russian-Ukrainian people will never agree to the secession from the Soviet Union; therefore a conflict is possible.

Now imagine our situation. What are we supposed to do? I am afraid of such situations—social tensions and provocations between nationalities.

[Doenhoff] I would like to ask an additional question. If the new union—Nine plus One—comes about, what responsibilities would the central government have? Probably foreign and security policy, but how about financial policy?

[Yakovlev] At this stage, we agreed with the nine republics that the central government remains responsible for defense policy. National security forces will also be present in every republic, in addition, communications, energy, basic research, and general social programs in which all republics are interested. That includes the solution of problems such as Chernobyl and Lake Aral. Nobody will reject that. In other words, we will cooperate in ecological problems. All republics agree that the union government should be in charge of these problems.

Regarding financial policy, all republics agree on a unified finance policy and a single monetary system. Taxes are a problem. The central government insists that there should be three types of taxes, meaning municipal taxes, republic taxes, and all-Soviet taxes. The republics have said that they are in favor of republic taxes; however, they reject all-Soviet taxes for industrial enterprises. That is now at issue. I believe, however, that this problem will also be settled.

I would like to add that I have heard the West speak about a tragedy. People in the West say that Nine plus One means a split of the Soviet Union, etcetera. But, nine republics means 90 percent of the people and 90

percent of the economy. To be sure, 100 percent would be better, but 90 percent is 90 percent, and not 10 percent.

[Kissinger] What happens to the six republics that have not joined those nine republics?

[Yakovlev] First, there will be a referendum in Armenia, and nothing has been decided. It is not yet clear how they will vote. Second, while the Moldovans do not take part in the negotiations of the nine, they have not said that they intend to secede. Then there are the other republics that have not taken part in the negotiations. They plan to have a single economic area. However, we reject that. If a republic does not want to be part of the Soviet Union but prefers to be a sovereign republic, we will start establishing relations with them as we have maintained with any other foreign country. [passage omitted]

[Doenhoff] Yeltsin has said that every republic should have their own national armies. Is that conceivable?

[Yakovlev] No, he has already distanced himself from this statement. Foreign policy must, of course, be unified. Nonetheless, we will have to share responsibilities. For instance, all republics have the obligation to meet the commitments that the Soviet Union assumed as a state. Second, all negotiations on serious problems concerning the Soviet Union's interests and general international developments must be resolved in the name of the Soviet Union as a whole, with the participation of the republics, of course.

However, there are many problems that the republics can and must decide separately—problems connected with travel, consular problems, or the problems of external trade relations between companies, between the republics and foreign countries. When a republic guarantees payments, the matter must be dealt with by the respective republic.

At the last meeting, we agreed on the name of the new union. The name will be Union of Sovereign Soviet States.

[Portisch] That means that you also say goodbye to socialism, because it is more than just a change of name.

[Yakovlev] No, it would be too long. One more letter—why?

[Portisch] Mr. Yakovlev, I am serious.

[Yakovlev] I am also serious.

[Portisch] [passage omitted] Taking leave of socialism also means taking leave of a certain philosophy and of a certain claim to the world.

[Yakovlev] First, as for our influence on a socialist development of the world, it has never been taken seriously in the West. Second, I do not know of any country that would not seek to bring its influence to bear on the world and on other countries. Third, on your question: I would find it very strange if the United States were to call itself United Capitalist States of America. Why capitalist? What does it mean?

The term socialism implies an ideology. In my view, the name of a country should not contain an ideology. For instance, why should a country be called democratic republic? Democratic implies an ideology. Therefore, we have decided to maintain the name USSR—as it was in the past. But the word socialist has been replaced with the word sovereign. For us, the word sovereign is of much greater political significance than the word socialist, the ideology of a social system.

What we are trying to achieve now—and this is my personal opinion—is neither socialism nor capitalism. Let me return to what we discussed earlier. It will be a society about which we know very little. We know its most important principles. It will be a democracy, it will be a state ruled by the law, it will be a civil society.

[Portisch] It marks a huge change. [passage omitted]

[Yakovlev] I think that from a philosophical viewpoint, the point now is for mankind to enter a peaceful stage of development—slowly, contradictorily, but peacefully. What does that mean? It means that we will leave an artificial world that was dictated by the use of force, wars, arms, and conquests, and will proceed to a period of natural relations. There are our experiences with the European Community. That is a stage of a natural development. Neither Germany, nor France, nor Britain, nor Italy have dictated this development. It is a natural process where the contradictions between states, which in the past were resolved by military means, are about to be overcome.

Therefore, I would like to stress that I also see the world order in this way, that the United States is not the world policeman when the Soviet Union is weakened. That is not possible. There is Japan, there is the united Europe, there is Australia, Canada, Brazil, Nigeria, Algeria, etcetera.

[Portisch] But, Mr. Yakovlev, essentially we have spoken in these categories for years. There have been transnational problems for years—ecological problems, population problems, etcetera. The realization has gained ground everywhere for years that these problems must be resolved on an international basis. [passage omitted] Regarding the Group of Seven summit scheduled to take place in London in July, in which Gorbachev would like to take part, what should be the goal of the summit?

[Yakovlev] First, you are right to say that we have discussed the global problems for years. However, it is one thing to discuss them under pressure, at gunpoint, so to speak, and it is another thing to discuss them without pressure, in a situation where no one has to take the possibility of nuclear war seriously any more.

If we achieve nuclear disarmament in this new situation which constitutes a new quality, the solutions to global problems will not have to be discussed but they will be implemented.

[Portisch] So the first step should be nuclear disarmament.

[Yakovlev] Disarmament in general. I think we will sign an agreement before the end of this year. I do not think any important problem has remained unsolved.

[Kissinger] I agree. [passage omitted]

[Yakovlev] I would like to stress that the situation has changed qualitatively. There are arms, but there is more confidence. Where there were weapons without confidence in the past, there are weapons and confidence now. That is a different situation. Regarding your second question about cooperation and participation, I think that the most important thing is for the Soviet Union to take part in all international economic organizations. We must learn to do business, we must learn what a bank is, we must know how it works, we must learn the credit business and management, we must know how everything works, we must know how the world economy works.

In those 70 years, we always proceeded from a negative basis. Our entire policy, socialist industrialization, and collectivization were always based on the negation of the capitalist, bourgeois economic principles. That was a mistake. We held the view that there are certain leaps in history. However, history is a continuous process.

Ranking first among my priorities is the Soviet Union's participation in the whole civilization process—without any ideologization. The problem at issue in the Soviet Union is this: The sooner we de-ideologize our economy, the better we will make headway. However, that is a difficult process because those who were educated during those 70 years always think about the plan, state planning, the old distribution mechanisms, the subordination of the infrastructure to various economic tasks, even though it should be the other way round.

So, we must be included in the world system. That is the most important problem. Of course, there is the additional problem of credits, the purely material aid, there are the problems of know-how, agricultural problems, etcetera. Why do I think that the West should have an interest in seeing these problems solved? If the West helps us it also helps itself—perhaps indirectly, but in the future possibly also directly. I think that if Russia, the Soviet Union becomes a partner in the general development of civilization, this can only benefit international developments. You may say that this is very idealistic and romantic. But I see an imperative in it because there is no other way for our country to end its centuries of isolation.

[Doenhoff] You said that the Soviet Union should join the major international organizations. I suppose you mean the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the EC. But is it possible that Russia will eventually become a member of NATO?

[Yakovlev] In my view, NATO will no longer exist by that time. Why should it?

[Kissinger] We should not create too many illusions. [passage omitted]

(Yakovlev] Let me add something on the history of expansionism, which was broached by Henry Kissinger. We have meanwhile realized how much it burdens our state. However, this expansionism, the emergence of the Russian empire, happened under certain circumstances. At that time, there were rivalries between Russia, England, France, Austria-Hungary. There were various alliances.

However, now we are now discussing the transition to normal cooperation—without weapons, without any artificial aspects, but as a natural development of history. Interest in territories is disappearing because it has ceased to be of importance. Is it of any importance that Uzbekistan produces cotton? No. Japan has proved that the lack of raw materials does not mean that a state does not develop well. However, we are still thinking in old categories, and I believe this way of thinking is particularly acute in our country.

An article was published recently saying that I destroyed the Soviet Union, the system, and the CPSU, and I was even accused. It is laughable to think that I have such a demonic power. I am asking myself, what were they worth if one person was capable of destroying them? So we see how deeply rooted these dogmatic ideas are. I would like to reiterate that joint efforts are necessary to turn a giant like the Soviet Union, which adheres to its old traditions so much, into the direction of civilization.

I do not consider this a mere national problem. That does not mean that we invite you to interfere in our internal affairs, but the point is to show understanding for these processes.

Regarding the nuclear weapons you mentioned, I have read the book on foreign policy that you wrote in 1957. You said at that time that the existence of nuclear weapons makes war senseless. You arrived at the conclusion that nuclear wars are senseless. You also said that it is doubtful that a war could be unleashed deliberately, but you said that it could break out by some coincidence. That was already an issue at that time.

Your thesis has been generally confirmed today. I can only congratulate you on the fact that history has confirmed what you said at that time, Professor Kissinger. [passage omitted]

[Portisch] I think 12 June is a key date for the Soviet Union because then the presidential elections will be held. Would you agree with Henry Kissinger that a certain degree of stability and predictable political conditions can be created until this fall, and that a dialogue

between the Soviet Union and the West, or a dialogue between Gorbachev and Bush will lead to an overall strategy regarding the Soviet Union's future?

[Yakovlev] First, 12 June is really an important day because of the elections in the large republics. They will show the ratio of forces and public opinion. I do not want to voice my sympathy or antipathy about these elections.

[Portisch] But it would be very nice, Mr. Yakovlev, if you could tell our audience what is at stake in these elections. You do not have to voice sympathies. We only want to know what is at stake, and why.

[Yakovlev] The elections are important because there are only three real candidates—Yeltsin, Ryzhkov, and Bakatin. However, there is one aspect about which I am concerned. With the exception of Bakatin, they have all nominated military officials as vice presidents. General Makashev has nominated himself as a candidate. I do not think he represents a real danger. Who is supported by whom? Ryzhkov was officially nominated by the Communist Party, and I think that means something to an analytical mind. Yeltsin was nominated by the miners of the Kuzbas basin, the miners of the Urals. For the time being, he ranks first in opinion polls. Bakatin is a growing serious politician.

At a news conference during the 28th party congress, I was asked whom I would suggest if Gorbachev were to step down as general secretary. I said I would suggest Bakatin. Incidentally, he suggested me at a news conference held at the same time. [indistinct interruption] I would not say so. So there are three candidates. I am sincerely worried that any old figures might come back, given our political and economic situation. Indeed, these elections are of great importance, and I am somewhat concerned. The results could also bring about a change, any change could be possible because that is Russia.

I have stated publicly, and I reiterate that I back the consensus that has developed now between the central government of the Union and the Republic of Russia. I think it is a good thing. I think you asked another question.

[Portisch] I asked you whether we would have more stable political conditions in the Soviet Union by the fall.

[Yakovlev] Yes, I think Professor Kissinger's forecasts are correct. The situation is relatively stable now. The Nine plus One agreement has calmed down the situation in the country; it is less explosive now. Nine republics and the central government plan to work together. Nonetheless, I hesitate to say that it will not deteriorate again. But the people have shown a very positive attitude toward this Nine plus One agreement.

Today is 3 June. Now the Council of the Federation is meeting on the unsolved problems of the Union treaty. Many people hope that the agreement will be signed, and the leaders of the republics must take that into account. The people are weary of the talks on the economic situation. The people tell them that they can seize power if they like, or else, they will ask them to go. The politicians in the parties understand that very well. There is a limit. You cannot keep talking about ideologies. You have to solve the problems practically, and the dateline mentioned by Professor Kissinger is realistic. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Soviet Prospects

[Editorial Report] Paris France-Inter Radio Network at 1721 GMT on 4 June condunts a 40-minute phone-in program with studio guest Eduard Shevardnadze, former USSR foreign minister. The program is hosted by Alain Bedouet, and questions are also put by journalists Ralph Pinto and Ulysse Gosset. Shevardnadze speaks in Russian, with simultaneous translation into French.

A listener on the telephone asks: Mr. Shevardnadze, do you agree with the idea that your country of origin, Georgia, should recover its full sovereignty and reach independence?

Shevardnadze replies: I must say that it is my people who made this choice and I respect my people's choice. I not only respect the choice of my people but also the choice of any other people or nation. He goes on to say that republics which do not sign the treaty of union could build relations between the center and the republics on new bases and principles.

In reply to a question read out from a listener concerning Western help to the USSR, he says it is necessary to have a stable USSR; aid has to be given, cooperation developed, and disarmament continued; he would like the broadest possible cooperation. A journalist asks about the possible independence of republics like Lithuania. He says the USSR's constitution proclaims the right of republics to self-determination; the foundation of a state of law is its constitution.

A listener's question is read out about Shevardnadze's resignation, asking whether this could be interpreted as a desertion. Shevardnadze says he was not attempting to desert, he was beginning a fight for democracy. He acted in accordance with his conscience and moral principles.

A listener phones to ask about the real economic situation in the USSR; Shevardnadze says the situation is serious, the country is in a state of crisis.

Pinto then asks: What are currently the chances of a dictatorship? Will Gorbachev be able to hold out two, three, four months? Are you willing to help him again against dictators?

Shevardnadze replies: As far as I am able to, as far as possible, of course. I have already helped him and I shall continue to help him. I am a sincere supporter of democratization, a sincere supporter of my country's renewal, of the setting up of a state of law. I understand fully well that without an adequate economic basis, all

these slogans will remain mere good intentions. Therefore, as far as I am able to, I am also ready to participate in the economic rebirth of my country, like any good citizen of my country. He goes on to say that solutions will have to be found to the economic problems or else the people will go out onto the streets and demand a strong leader, possibly a dictator, to put order in the country.

A listener asks Shevardnadze what lessons he has drawn from the Gulf war. Shevardnadze says he speaks at length about this in his book 'For Future, Write Freedom.' He says the world community showed that aggression could not go unpunished; the UN Security Council was able to put a brake on that aggression—this was the main lesson for potential aggressors.

Pinto asks Shevardnadze if it is true that he threatened to resign three times before his actual resignation; Shevardnadze refers to the account he gave of his resignation in his book. In a general way he thinks the Soviet policy on the Gulf conflict was a good one.

A listener's question is read out asking whether he considers himself a communist. He says he is a member of the CPSU but that does not stop him from speaking out if he disagrees with the party line.

Replying to a question on his views on Mr Boris Yeltsin, Shevardnadze says: It would be practical to answer this question after 12 June, after the elections but, I have already said, I think that Boris Yeltsin is a serious politician and I believe that if we speak today of the attitude of the citizens who are on the eve of a vote, I should say that the majority of the Russian population support Yeltsin's candidacy. I think this is quite obvious. Popular support is in fact the basis of the authority of any politician. In any case we shall see what happens during the elections.

Asked whether he would rename Leningrad to St Petersburg, Shevardnadze says it is up to the people of Leningrad to decide themselves.

Pinto says Gorbachev looks likely to go and meet the G-7 group and asks whether Gorbachev can offer the group a market economy in exchange for aid. Shevardnadze says he met Mitterrand today and told him that Gorbachev should be invited to take part in the G-7 talks; Mitterrand has in fact already supported this idea. It is necessary for his partners to listen to Gorbachev, as everything nowadays is a matter of partnership.

A listener asks if his book has come out in Russian and if he can speak with such frankness on the Soviet media. Shevardnadze thinks the book will come out in Russian in the USSR and that he did speak frankly, in his resignation speech for example.

Bedouet reads a passage out of Shevardnadze's book about the past history of the USSR. Shevardnadze says the USSR has lived under conditions of despotism and that millions of people suffered; the country is doing all it can to prevent this happening again. He is against all dictatorships as a result of this.

Asked about Gorbachev's chances of succeeding, Shevardnadze says if no mistakes ae made there is a 100 percent chance of winning this battle of building a democratic society. He fears though that just solutions may not be found. Courage and boldness must be displayed. It is up to the Supreme Soviet on whether it votes for the 500-day program or not.

A listener asks why the USSR continues its high spending on arms. Shevardnadze replies by asking why French taxpayers have to finance the military infrastructure. Important international decisions have been taken which have resulted in arms reductions. The USSR continues to be a militarized country; it should reduce its arms, but so should the others.

In connection with Gorbachev's receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Shevardnadze is asked if he understands the bitterness felt by the Lithuanians, Georgians etc; he says he does understand their feelings but he thinks one has to be objective; one has to pay tribute to Gorbachev for perestroyka, the normalization of relations with the West and so on.

Comments on Gorbachev Policy

LD0406131791 Paris Antenne-2 Television Network in French 1100 GMT 4 Jun 91

[Text] Mr. Shevardnadze, former Soviet foreign minister, is in France, in Paris. The former head of Soviet diplomacy is here for a few days for the publication of his book "The Roads of Freedom". Stephane Manier met Mr. Shevardnadze on Antenne-2 this morning to ask his reaction to this renewed night of tension in Vilnius and to Mr. Gorbachev's current policy.

[Begin recording] [Shevardnadze in Russian fading to French translation] An operation to maintain law and order organized without the consent of local authorities, of the governments of these Republics, which are sovereign states, should not be launched. It is reprehensible. If there is a need for help from the central authority, in Moscow, this help must first be requested by local presidents and authorities.

[Manier] What were Mr. Gorbachev's mistakes?

[Shevardnadze] Personally, I refuse to personalize mistakes. There were mistakes but we, who were in power, are all responsible. Some decisions were made too late, others were too hasty. In particular, we were too slow in moving toward a market economy. It needed to be done three or four years ago, but society was not then ready. Still, it should have been done, since at the time we enjoyed a lot of confidence among the people, while today all that confidence has disappeared. But, Gorbachev alone is not the only one responsile. [end recording]

Toepfer Meets Yazov on Environmental Damage

AU0306191591 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1700 GMT 3 Jun 91

[Text] Federal Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer met Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov in Moscow today to discuss the environmental damage caused by the Soviet forces in eastern Germany.

Soviet Defense Minister Yazov said that it was the first time for him to discuss environmental issues. Federal Environment Minister Toepfer met Yazov in the luxurious building of the Soviet General Staff. The problem discussed is the damage that the Soviet soldiers will leave behind when they pull out—contaminated soil near barracks and on training grounds. So far, German environmentalists have only had access to a mere 3 percent of the area used by the Soviets in the former GDR. The environmental damage that may have contaminated the remaining area—250,000 hectares—is unknown. The Germans are concerned.

Yazov stressed that there are no nuclear or chemical weapons in those areas, and promised Minister Toepfer better cooperation. Both ministers also discussed an inspection from a plane. Yazov submitted a three-point proposal, as Klaus Toepfer said.

[Begin Toepfer recording] He said, first, that he will instruct the troops in the former GDR today or tomorrow to considerably accelerate cooperation in the search for such damage. Second, he promised that there will be a certain stability in connection with the officers, and that they will not be withdrawn in a (?rotating) system, so the information does not get lost. Third, he also told me that he will do everything in his power to avoid further damage. So, I think we have achieved what we could do at this point. We have achieved a better basis for information. [end recording]

Environmental Issues in Withdrawal From Germany

LD0306165691 Moscow TASS in English 1629 GMT 3 Jun 91

[By diplomatic correspondent Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow June 3 TASS—"The Soviet Union has neither nuclear nor chemical weapons on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic," Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov said today at a meeting with Klaus Toepfer, the minister for the environment, conservation and reactor safety of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Toepfer told journalists that both ministers had agreed on improving cooperation between the two countries in the field of ecological condition of territories occupied by the western group.

At present, Toepfer said, Soviet troops have been withdrawn from 100-120 out of 1,000-odd facilities on the territory of the former GDR. "Detailed" information about the condition of the environment is available on two to three per cent of the territory occupied by the troops.

It is necessary to size the problem in an objective way. This is "a great and enormous task" because Soviet troops are occupying 250,000 hectares and therefore "a year or a year and a half, rather than months" are needed to obtain a detailed picture.

The German side, the minister said, has serious apprehensions about the contamination of territories on which Soviet troops are deployed, but the aim of the talks in the USSR was to discuss this issue in order to get a better insight into the problem.

According to Toepfer, the Soviet Defense Minister "insisted on immediately starting the construction of housing for Soviet soldiers". The FRG allocates material resources for this purpose. Otherwise, "the plan of Soviet withdrawal from East Germany can be disrupted".

Toepfer arrived in Moscow on Sunday to attend the Soviet-German commission for cooperation in the field of nature conservation.

Former SED Head Honecker Sees 'Witch-Hunt'

PM0506133391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jun 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Lapskiy: "Interview With Erich Honecker"]

[Text] Berlin—On Sunday local television carried an interview given to German journalists from ADN by Erich Honecker, who is in a Moscow clinic.

After the recent arrest in Berlin of his former comrades-in-arms—former GDR Premier Willi Stoph, former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler, and former National Defense Council Members Fritz Streletz and Hans Albrecht—he drew up a statement and read it out to the TV cameras.

The former chairman of the GDR State Council and SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] leader called their arrest entirely unjustifiable. The arrest was based more on political than on legal grounds. Membership of the state security service and the order to open fire on those trying to violate the Western border were just a pretext for persecuting citizens who had served the GDR faithfully, the 78-year-old Honecker said. The "witch-hunt" and persecution of former SED members should, in his words, profoundly concern all honorable people in the world. All genuine communists and democrats in Germany should protest it.

In Honecker's opinion, the "criminalization" of his activity as head of state and that of his associates who implemented its policy "will invariably affect any democratic opposition within the Basic Law framework." Revenge is a poor counsel when it comes to solving political problems raised by history. The inglorious 1933

episode must not be repeated, Honecker said. At the same time, he justified the strict system of border regulations in the former GDR and the permission to shoot those trying to flee to West Germany or West Berlin, calling it a legal decision made by the Warsaw Pact states.

He referred with gratitude to the Soviet authorities who had given him and his wife Margot shelter in Moscow. As he put it, he was taken from the Soviet military hospital in the small town of Beelitz near Berlin to a Moscow clinic because of a deteriorating heart, kidney, and circulation disease. He is now feeling better and will soon leave the hospital.

Honecker confided his future plans to the German journalists. Together with his wife he would like to fly to Chile, where his daughter—who married a Chilean—and grandchildren live. He would then return to the Soviet Union. He will return to Germany as soon as it is possible—that is, as soon as the arrest warrant against him is canceled. He is attentively following the development of events in unified Germany and corresponding with his friends. He believes that his "historic mission on German soil is not yet finished."

Austrian-Sponsored Business Center Planned

OW0606033591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 5 Jun 91

[From "Banking News"]

[Text] The Soviet Union and Austria on Wednesday announced a $520m project for building a new international business center in Moscow, including an hotel, business offices, and restaurants. The project is to be finalized by 1995.

Moscow City Council's ITC Company, Austria's ABV hotel company, and the Vienna Magistrate [as received] are all behind the project under which a similar center is to put up in central Vienna.

Major Invites Gorbachev To Visit London

LD0606195391 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] The British Prime Minister John Major has suggested inviting President Gorbachev to London immediately after the summit meeting of the big seven there. This was officially announced by a spokesman for the British Government. An appropriate invitation will be sent along diplomatic channels.

Earlier the leaders of the seven industrialized powers favored such an invitation.

Meanwhile in Moscow a member of the Soviet Security Council, Yevgeniy Primakov, has said that Gorbachev is not going to London to beg for help; it is a question of speeding up the Soviet transition to a market economy with certain Western support.

Supreme Soviet

USSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings 5 June

LD0606170491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 2048 GMT on 5 June carries the program, "At the Supreme Soviet Session," on the USSR Supreme Soviet proceedings in the Kremlin, Moscow, on 5 June.

The announcer says the Supreme Soviet spent most of the day discussing the second reading of the denationalization and privatization bill, but there was too much disagreement to enable deputies to conclude their work. A decision was adopted approving additional work in committees and instructing the government to present an assessment of possible social consequences within 10 days. The revised bill is to be submitted to the Supreme Soviet again within two weeks. Recorded excerpts from some speeches follow:

At 2049 GMT Deputy Viktor Lisitskiy calls on deputies to act constitutionally and reject proposals to change the title of the bill. He says the national parliament has no right to pass the buck to the republics and backs the bill.

Deputy Yevgeniya Malkova urges measures to prevent the shadow economy from gaining from privatization and cable for protection for workers at privatized enterprises. Deputy (?Girinovskis) criticizes the opponents of privatization for equating it with exploitation, for the greatest exploiter is the old-fashioned totalitarian state. Deputy Chernyak describes privatization as a means of reviving the economy, for no stimuli will work without turning the worker into an owner. He praises the bill for its flexibility. Deputy Kozyrez calls for clear norms to ensure that privatization proceeds in a controlled manner.

At 2109 GMT Deputy (?Solomin) speaks for the working group that drafted the bill. He says they have come up with the best solution to the problems faced. He urges deputies to pass the bill in principle today. Deputy Kuzmin urges deputies to think about the consequences of the bill for the national economy. He says privatization will be effective only if it is a large-scale operation. Deputy Ubaydullayeva equates privatization with recognition of private property and says that the bill is thus crucial. She proposes that this bill deal only with union property and leave everything else to the republics. She urges measures to protect workers in several sectors from the consequences of destatification.

At 2120 GMT Deputy Aleksandr Orlov, speaking for the control chamber, supports the bill but criticizes provisions which, he says, open the way to an uncontrolled sell-off of national wealth. He calls for a stronger mechanism to protect workers during privatization.

At 2127 GMT Deputy Borodin opposes adoption of the law without indications of its consequences. Deputy Kostishin warns that the shadow economy is keen to get its hands on state property and calls for individual income tax returns to curb such people. He warns that joint enterprises are waiting to pick up bankrupt state enterprises for a pittance after privatization. He doubts whether new-style entrepreneurs will allocate sufficient funds for social purposes. He calls for the law to be introduced gradually. Deputy Pupkevic says the law should not be enacted until efforts have been made to ensure that people understand what it means.

At 2139 GMT the announcer comments that the deputies did right to decide to continue discussion of the privatization bill. The session then approved two appointments: Valeriy Mikhaylovich Serov as chairman of the State Committee for Construction and Investments; and Vladimir Kuzmich Gusev as chairman of the State Committee for Chemistry and Biotechnology.

The announcer adds that at the evening session Deputy Pivovarov briefed deputies on a draft appeal from the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with the Leningrad referendum on changing the city's name. Diametrically opposed views were expressed during the ensuing debate, he says. The deputies decided that more work should be done on the appeal. The subject was salary increases for deputies and cabinet ministers. The Supreme Soviet approved the president's request on the subject.

At 2124 GMT the announcer says the last point was a briefing by Deputy Kim on the results an investigation into the bombing on the Soviet-Afghan border on 4 June. Kim reported that Najibollah sent messages of condolence and apology to Gorbachev and Makhkamov. The deputies will work in committees tomorrow. The next plenary session is on 7 June, he advises at the conclusion of the program.

Lukyanov on Future Tasks of Supreme Soviet

LD0606144691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Jun 91

[Text] Two years have passed since the new Soviet parliament began its work. At today's press conference, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov referred to these past two years as difficult and at times dramatic, but also fairly optimistic. Our democracy is struggling into existence, and the process started by the new Supreme Soviet has still not been completed, but there have already been more than 400 stormy sessions at which 113 laws have been adopted. These will form the foundation for the future rule-of-law state. First and foremost, these are legislative acts concerning the reform of our economy and the transition to the market, the reinforcement of legality and law and order and the stabilization and development of the democratic processes within our society and the new thinking in the international arena. Much has been accomplished.

Nevertheless, in answer to a question from the "Vremya" program about whether the head of the Soviet

parliament is satisfied with the influence which the Supreme Soviet has today over the situation in the country, Anatoliy Ivanovich replied as follows:

[Begin Lukyanov recording] As soon as I am satisfied with everything, then it will be time for me to leave. [laughter in the hall]

There is no way that I am satisfied. We need to work, we need to increase the role of the Supreme Soviet, we need, no matter what it takes, to overcome the battle of the laws, the battle of the budgets, and the battle of the banks. Whatever it calls for, we need to strengthen the authority of the Supreme Soviet to its maximum limit to see that laws are implemented. We need to work a great deal better on draft laws, so that these acts will be very precise. There is no other opinion. There is no satisfaction...[changes thought] I cannot say: Look, I have done everything, or the Supreme Soviet has done everything. I cannot say this, but I can say that a collective has come into being in the human sense, and a galaxy of politicians has come into being—whatever is written or said—who are capable of tackling many issues, and are capable of tackling them a lot better. [end recording]

New Entry-Exit Law Published

PM0606111091 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Jun 91 First Edition pp 1, 5

["USSR Law 'On the Procedure for Exit From the USSR and Entry Into the USSR by Citizens of the USSR'"]

[Text]

Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1. The Right of USSR Citizens To Exit From the USSR and To Enter the USSR

Every citizen of the USSR has the right to exit from the USSR and enter the USSR. The present Law, in compliance with the USSR's international treaties, guarantees USSR citizens' right to exit from the USSR and enter the USSR, regulates procedures for the issue of foreign travel passports to USSR citizens, and lays down provisions for temporary restrictions on citizens' right to exit from the USSR and the procedure for resolving disputes arising from a refusal to issue a foreign travel passport.

USSR citizens exercise their right to exit from the USSR and enter the USSR on the basis of foreign travel passports issued by duly authorized state organs.

Foreign travel passports are valid for travel out of the USSR to all countries in the world. The procedure for entry is regulated by the legislation of the country of destination.

In cases provided for in compliance with the USSR's international treaties, a substitute document may be issued instead of a foreign travel passport.

A USSR citizen cannot be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter the USSR.

Article 2. Foreign Travel Passports

Standard foreign travel passports are issued to USSR citizens. The passport indicates whether it has been issued for temporary travel out of the USSR or for travel out of the USSR for permanent domicile abroad. Foreign travel passports are valid for five years. This period may be extended by duly authorized organs. A state fee is payable for the issue or extension of a foreign travel passport.

Foreign travel passports are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The present Law does not regulate the procedure for the issue of diplomatic or official passports to USSR citizens or seamen's passports.

Chapter II. Documents Required for Exit From the USSR or Entry Into the USSR by USSR Citizens

Article 3. Documents Required for the Crossing of the USSR Border by USSR Citizens

Whenever USSR citizens exit from the USSR or enter the USSR, they must pass through passport control checkpoints and obtain a stamp in the foreign travel passport or substitute document showing the date of crossing the state border. In cases stipulated by international treaties, in order for the citizen to cross the USSR border when traveling out of the USSR the foreign travel passport must contain an entry visa for the foreign state which is the citizen's immediate destination.

Citizens who have not reached the age of 18 and are traveling unaccompanied by their legal representative must present a notarized certificate from their legal representative showing the date of departure from the USSR and the country of destination.

Article 4. Grounds for Issue of Foreign Travel Passports

Foreign travel passports for exit from the USSR either for a temporary stay or for permanent domicile abroad are issued to USSR citizens on the basis of their personal application or an application by their legal representatives to the internal affairs organs.

A foreign travel passport for exit from the USSR for a temporary stay abroad may be issued to a citizen on the basis of an application by the state, social, or religious organization, enterprise (association), or institution sending the citizen abroad, through the administration of the enterprise, organization, or institution.

The rules governing applications for and issue of foreign travel passports for exit from the USSR are laid down by the present Law and by USSR Cabinet of Ministers acts promulgated under this Law, which must be published.

Article 5. Personal or Proxy Application for the Issue of a Foreign Travel Passport

An application for the issue of a foreign travel passport may be submitted by citizens who have reached the age of 18 to internal affairs organs at their place of permanent domicile.

The application must contain information on the citizen necessary for inclusion in the passport. The application should indicate the purpose for which the foreign travel passport is required—for temporary trips out of the USSR or for exit from the USSR for permanent domicile abroad; whether children under the age of 18 will be traveling with the citizen; and it should indicate the existence of circumstances restricting the right to obtain a foreign travel passport under the present Law.

The application must be accompanied by: a document attesting to payment of the state fee; a certified copy of the work record or alternative equivalent document; if children under the age of 18 are to travel, applications from their legal representatives; and, in the case of the intention to leave the USSR for permanent domicile abroad, documents confirming, in accordance with the requirements of Sections One and Two of Article 14 of the present Law, the absence of outstanding maintenance obligations, and documents confirming consent for the departure of children aged from 14 to 18. Where circumstances exist requiring urgent examination of the application in accordance with Section One of Article 6 of the present Law, the appropriate documents should be appended.

An application for the issue of a foreign travel passport submitted by an enterprise, organization, or institution sending a citizen abroad for a temporary stay should include the information and documents indicated in Sections Two and Three of the present article.

Article 6. Procedure and Time Allowed for the Examination of Applications for the Issue of Foreign Travel Passports

Citizens' applications for the issue of foreign travel passports for a temporary stay abroad are to be examined within a month, or, if the trip is associated with urgent medical treatment of the person traveling or serious illness or death of a relative living abroad, within three working days.

Applications for the issue of foreign travel passports for exit from the USSR for permanent domicile abroad are to be examined within three months.

The results of the examination of these applications, and in the case of a refusal, the grounds for refusal as indicated in Article 7 of the present Law, are to be conveyed to the applicants in writing. In the event of the rejection of a request for the issue of a foreign travel passport for exit from the USSR, a repeat application on these matters is to be examined after six months. At this time the documents submitted previously are to be taken into consideration, provided that the information given in them remains unchanged.

An application for the issue of a foreign travel passport submitted by an enterprise, organization, or institution sending a citizen abroad for a temporary stay is to be examined within not more than one month.

Article 7. Grounds for Temporary Restrictions on the Right To Exit the USSR

A citizen of the USSR may be temporarily refused a foreign travel passport for exit from the USSR in the following circumstances:

1) if he is party to information constituting state secrets, or if any contractual or formal commitments are in existence that would bar his exit from the USSR—until the circumstances barring his exit cease to apply;

2) if a criminal case has been instituted against him—until proceedings are completed;

3) if he has been convicted of a crime—until he has served or been released from his sentence;

4) if he is evading the fulfillment of obligations placed on him by the courts—until the obligations are fulfilled;

5) if he has knowingly supplied false information about himself;

6) if he is registered at a draft office and is subject to the draft for active military service—until the expiry of his active military service or until his exemption from it in accordance with the law;

7) if a civil suit has been brought against him in the courts—until proceedings are completed;

8) if he has been declared by a court judgment to be an especially dangerous recidivist, or is under administrative supervision by the militia—until the expiry (lifting) of the court ruling or the termination of supervision.

The circumstances stipulated in Points 1-7 of Section One of the present article constitute grounds for refusal to issue a foreign travel passport to a citizen for exit for permanent domicile abroad, and those stipulated in Points 1-5 and 8 of Section One of the present article constitute grounds for refusal in the case of exit for a temporary stay.

A foreign travel passport issued to a citizen may be confiscated in the circumstances stipulated in Section One of the present article; if the passport is tampered with or if it is used in the commission of a crime; or on termination of USSR citizenship. A passport issued on the basis stipulated in Section Two of Article 4 of the present Law is to be returned to the issuing state organ on termination of the activity for which it was issued.

If a confiscated foreign travel passport is returned to a citizen within its term of validity, a fee is not exacted.

Article 8. Procedure for Appealing Against a Refusal To Issue a Foreign Travel Passport or its Confiscation

In the event of a refusal to issue a foreign travel passport on the grounds stipulated in Point 1 of Section One of Article 7 of the present Law, the citizen may appeal to a commission formed by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which is obliged to give its answer in not more than three months, and thereafter to the courts.

A refusal to issue a foreign travel passport on the grounds stipulated by Points 2, 3, and 8 of Section One of Article 7 of the present Law is not subject to appeal.

In the event of a refusal to issue a foreign travel passport on the grounds stipulated in Points 4 and 5 of Section One of Article 7 of the present Law, or a delay in responding beyond the time allowed by the present Law, or confiscation of a foreign travel passport, the citizen may appeal to the higher internal affairs organ, which is obliged to give its answer in not more than three months, and thereafter to the court at the citizen's place of domicile.

Chapter III. Special Circumstances Governing the Right To Exit the USSR

Article 9. Restrictions on Exit From the USSR on the Grounds of Considerations of Citizens' Safety

In the event of an emergency situation arising in a given country, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers is entitled to impose restrictions on temporary exit for travel to that country on the grounds of the impossibility of ensuring the safety of USSR citizens. Resolutions on the imposition and lifting of such restrictions must be published.

Article 10. Exit From the USSR of Citizens Who Are Juveniles or Not Sui Juris

Citizens of the USSR who have not attained the age of 18 may exit the USSR on the basis of a notarized application by their legal representatives. If either parent has not given consent, the juvenile's exit may be authorized on the basis of a court decision.

Exit from the USSR for permanent domicile abroad by children aged from 14 to 18 may take place only with their consent, expressed in writing and notarized.

Citizens of the USSR deemed by the courts to be not sui juris may exit the USSR only for permanent domicile on the basis of a notarized application by their legal representatives or on the basis of a court decision.

Article 11. Exit From the USSR by Citizens Subject to Drafting for Active Military Service and by Servicemen

Citizens subject to drafting for active military service by law, after registration at the draft office, are obliged to perform their active military service prior to exiting the USSR for permanent domicile abroad, unless they are exempted from performing active military service in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

Citizens of the USSR who have gone abroad temporarily and are subject to drafting for active military service by law, are obliged, on receipt of their draft notification, to return to the USSR to perform their active military service.

Servicemen performing normal-term active military service in accordance with the law surrender their foreign travel passports for the duration of their service. Servicemen serving beyond the normal duration of conscription, ensigns, warrant officers, and members of the officer corps can exit from the USSR on private business provided they have authorization from the command drawn up in line with the procedure approved by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 12. Procedure for Exit From the USSR by Citizens Privy to Information Constituting a State Secret

Exit from the USSR by USSR citizens privy to information constituting a state secret can be refused until the expiry of a prescribed period from the moment the citizens cease to have access to that information. The prescribed period must not exceed five years; it can be extended by a commission formed by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers on a case-by-case basis given the fact, for which there must be documentary confirmation, that the citizen is acquainted with information retaining the significance of a state secret. Information is categorized as constituting a state secret in accordance with the law governing the protection of secret information. In instances when there is a judicial examination of disputes resulting from a refusal to issue a foreign travel passport to a citizen on the basis of information being categorized as constituting a state secret, the composition of the expert commission is determined in line with the procedure prescribed by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. A judicial examination of citizens' exit questions resulting from a need to review the categorization of information as constituting a state secret can be conducted no more frequently than triennially in each instance.

Enterprise, institution, organization, and educational establishment administrations and troop unit commands must bring the restrictions stipulated in Section One of this article to the attention of citizens when they start work or training or are registered for active military service which involves access to information constituting a state secret. As part of this process a written work agreement (contract) is concluded on a voluntary basis before access is given to such information, and a corresponding entry is made on the individual's work record card or equivalent document.

Chapter IV. Legal Position of Citizens Exiting the USSR

Article 13. Financing of USSR Citizens' Exit From the USSR

USSR citizens' exit from the USSR is financed out of their own funds or the funds of the officials, enterprises, public associations, or religious organizations financing

their journey or, in the case of travel for medical treatment, in accordance with Article 17 of the present Law.

The procedure for the acquisition of foreign currency by USSR citizens going abroad is governed by USSR and republic laws.

Article 14. Fulfillment of Obligations by Citizens Leaving the USSR for Permanent Domicile Abroad

In order to obtain foreign travel passports USSR citizens leaving the USSR for permanent domicile abroad submit notarized statements about parents remaining in the USSR and, if there are children below the age of majority remaining in the USSR, a notarized statement from their legal representative in the USSR that there are no demands for alimony payments outstanding against them.

In cases when the statements stipulated by Section One of this article cannot be obtained for various reasons, the person wishing to exit is entitled to apply to a court, which will examine the question of the existence or otherwise of alimony obligations. If the court so decides, these obligations can be discharged in a single payment, or obligations for alimony payments can be stipulated in accordance with international treaties to which the USSR is party.

USSR citizens leaving the USSR for permanent domicile abroad are obliged, by agreement between the parties, to discharge all their property obligations to state, cooperative, and social organizations and citizens.

Article 15. The Property Position of Individuals Leaving the USSR for Permanent Domicile Abroad

Citizens leaving the USSR for permanent domicile abroad are entitled to take with them at their own expense property belonging to themselves and members of their family and foreign currency acquired on a legal basis and to retain on USSR territory property to which they have ownership rights and also money, securities, and other assets deposited with Soviet banks.

The export by citizens of works of art and other assets is governed by USSR legislation.

Article 16. Inadmissibility of Restrictions on the Rights of Citizens Exiting the USSR

All provisions of USSR and republic legislation apply to USSR citizens who have submitted a request to exit the USSR and members of their families; they enjoy all the rights and bear the obligations prescribed by the law. Any arbitrary restriction of their civil, labor, housing, or other rights is not permitted.

USSR citizens who left the USSR for permanent domicile abroad enjoy all the rights guaranteed by USSR and republic legislation and bear the obligations prescribed by the law on the same basis as everybody else should they return to the USSR for permanent domicile or for a certain length of time.

Article 17. Pension Provision and Medical Services for Citizens Who Have Left the USSR

The payment of pensions to USSR citizens who have left the USSR for permanent domicile abroad is effected under the procedure and conditions stipulated by USSR legislation.

The state pays to USSR citizens who have left the USSR medical treatment costs in the instances and under the procedures prescribed by international treaties to which the USSR is party. In the absence of such treaties medical treatment costs are paid in instances prescribed by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and republic governments.

Chapter V. International Treaties

Article 18. The Application of International Treaties.

If an international treaty to which the USSR is party prescribes rules other than those contained in the present Law, the rules of the international treaty apply.

USSR President M. Gorbachev.

Moscow, The Kremlin, 20 May 1991.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Returns to Moscow From Sweden

LD0606191891 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev today returned to Moscow, upon ending his visit to Norway and Sweden.

At Vnukovo airport, the Soviet president was met by Soviet officials, including Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev, parliament leader Anatoliy Lukyanov, First Deputy Prime Minister Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, Soviet Communist Party vice leader Vladimir Ivashko and members of the Soviet Security Council.

Entry-Exit Law Creates Unforeseen Problems

91UN1652A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by I. Andreyev: "Soviet Citizenship in the Shortest Time Possible?"]

[Text] **Restoration of justice in respect of the emigrants may create new problems for them.**

Last week IZVESTIYA (No. 123) published a story "The Right To Have a Foreign Passport" based mainly on the commentary provided by R. Kuznetsov, chief of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Visas and Registration Administration, and on the recently adopted Law on Entry and Exit. One single paragraph of the story has started a fury of calls to the editor. The paragraph deals with the coming repeal of the 1967 Decree of the USSR Supreme

Soviet Presidium according to which all people emigrating to Israel have been and still are stripped of their Soviet citizenship.

Let me remind you—we are talking about approximately 200,000 of our countrymen who have already received permits to emigrate through the "Israeli" channel but have not yet left. Some people have been disposing of their property or other matters, others have not yet had the time to buy a plane or train ticket. In any case, whoever postponed his or her departure till 1 July—the day quoted by the Visas and Registration Administration chief—will have, he said, to return to this agency and reapply for an emigration permit in order to get a foreign passport. They will decide whether to keep their Soviet citizenship or renounce it after they cross the border but they will have to look into the unsmiling eyes of our border guards with the hammer-and-sickle passport in hand...

Understandably, people who are calling IZVESTIYA planned to leave after 1 July. They feel discouraged: The ticket they bought at the cost of immense efforts and sleepless nights will have to be returned even if they were to leave on, say, 2 July. Things do not look better for those who have not yet thought about the departure and now do not know how long the mandatory procedure of getting a foreign passport may take. The callers are asking whether the long- expected act, so humane with respect to emigrants, will be transformed into new problems, troubles, and, in the long run, humiliation.

Really, is it sensible, is it humane to subject the people who are leaving our country forever to such a painful farewell? Where did the date of 1 July, viewed as something confirmed once and forever, emerge from, anyway?

It emerged, as we found out, from the draft decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the enforcement of the Law on Entry and Exit. I want to emphasize here that the decree has not yet been approved by the parliament and therefore it has not been published. I would dare to suggest that if the law itself proved to be such a long distance runner, then the decree on its enforcement, together with the paragraph repealing the discriminatory decree of 1967, did not appear yesterday, either. The date of 1 July, 1991 that caused panic among emigrants emerged at distant approaches to the parliamentary debate—months, if not years before.

I called a number of departments in the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, I called commissions and committees of the Union parliament. Finally, I got a reply to my simple question: Is the date 1 July final?

"No," I was told, "a vote will be taken on each article of the decree in the Supreme Soviet. You can consider," I was told, "that **the date of 1 July officially does not exist** (my emphasis—I.A.). This date, similar to other provisions of the document, may be reconsidered by the parliamentarians as they base their judgment on this fundamental principle—not to cause any harm to the people when passing one or another act in their interests..."

Still, considering that the problems of many emigrants are tied to our country's transportation facilities, I turned to the management of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Railways: Do they have any resources allowing them to apply a bigger effort and to carry a larger number of passengers to other countries than is usual in June?

Alas, one cannot count on Aeroflot. One of the Ministry of Civil Aviation leaders answered my question saying that the main factor in not letting them increase the number of foreign flights in June is the chronic shortage of fuel which is keeping their planes grounded anyway. The second obstacle is the international obligations of Aeroflot, which has to obey strict bilateral agreements on international flights, specifying the frequency of flights if not the weight of the cargo.

But what about our railways? As requested by IZVESTIYA, I. Taburyanskaya, an employee of the agency press center who regularly helps our newspaper, contacted the chiefs of the Ministry of Railways. Here is the answer she got from V. Shagayev, chief of the Main Administration for Passengers of the USSR Ministry of Railways:

"At present, with advance reservations of tickets for passenger trains out of the USSR (45 to 30 days in advance), we can satisfy practically all requests. On average, our railways carry about 350,000 people a month to other countries. Given this figure, the 200,000 emigrants that you have mentioned do not seem an immense number. However, you have to remember, of course, that July is the beginning of vacations for many people and some problems might arise. But I do not think that literally all of these 200,000 emigrants will rush tomorrow to get their tickets abroad. In any case, so far we have not had any occasions of people coming to us specifically because they could not leave the USSR for permanent residency elsewhere due to the absence of railway tickets."

The USSR Ministry of Railways is prepared to consider any proposals on transporting passengers to other countries. But the following factor has to be taken into account in that respect. As you know, there is no direct railway link between the Soviet Union and Israel. Emigrants travel via Poland, Finland, Sweden, Romania, Hungary, or Germany. The Soviet railways have to pay for their transit through these countries in hard currency. As long as we are facing this issue of a possible increase in the numbers of Soviet people going abroad, our government has to decide, as soon as possible, who is going to pay all the hard currency expenses involved in transporting these citizens. Should it be the government or the people who are leaving?

Whatever facet of the issue you look at, the humane and just step made by our society toward the people who are

still our compatriots may become fraught with immense problems. It might be the time to consider, before it is too late: Is it so important to have only one month to end the injustice that has lasted for years?

KGB Spokesman Views Struggle Against Terrorism

LD0606202191 Moscow TASS in English 1437 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Report by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS—The Soviet KGB state security agency and the Interior and Defence Ministries cooperating with it on President Mikhail Gorbachev's decree to disband illegal armed groups and confiscate their weapons have jointly dissolved 33 such groups and prevented a number of acts of extremism and terrorism since the start of the year.

Together, they have also confiscated 44,000 firearms and over 1.2 million rounds of ammunition, reporters were told at a news conference in the KGB's public relations centre today, which was devoted to the agency's fight against terrorism.

Speakers at the news conference said that there are some known 500 terrorist and extremist organisations in the world, which have committed 6,500 acts of international terrorism over the past ten years, leaving 5,000 people dead and more than 11,000 injured.

The chief of the KGB's Directorate for Protecting the Soviet Constitutional System, Valeriy Vorotnikov, told reporters that the use of terrorism as a method of political struggle has been on the increase in this country as institutions of state power have grown weaker and ethnic conflicts escalated.

He said that members of extremist and nationalist organisations often commit murders on ethnic grounds with impunity, take hostages, stage acts of terrorism and sabotage, and perpetrate other dangerous crimes.

According to KGB data, the total membership of illegal armed groups formed in some areas of the country has exceeded 30,000.

Vorotnikov noted increased terrorist threats against people's deputies, public employees and law-enforcement officers. Fifteen deputies serving on governing councils at various levels have been killed by extremists over the past three years and 386 deputies have received 528 threats.

Vorotnikov also noted the increased use of home-made bombs. Fifty people were killed and 130 others wounded in more than 200 bomb explosions in 1990 and 1991, he said.

He added that the increasing merger of terrorism and organised crime represents an exceptional danger.

Bakatin on Politicization of Soviet Army

AU0706092591 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Jun 91 p 2

["W.A." report: "Concern About Politicization of Soviet Army"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 5 June—Soviet ex-Interior Minister Bakatin has complained about the politization of the Soviet Army and called this development an "unhealthy phenomenon" that will hopefully be of a temporary nature. Answering questions by this newspaper, Bakatin, who was dismissed by Gorbachev in a surprise move late last year, for the first time publicly claimed that his ouster was due to political forces over which the Soviet president did not have sufficient power. The former interior minister, who is considered to be a moderate and who was replaced by Latvian party functionary Pugo, who had come from the KGB, did not name any of these forces, but he cited as a reason for his dismissal the fact that his dismissal was engineered by elements who did not like his attempts to come to a "sensible compromise" with the "legally elected governments of some republics" to ensure cooperation. With this, Bakatin was referring to his attempts at that time to use the police and military security forces, which are subordinate to the Soviet Interior Ministry, only in close cooperation with the political leaderships of the individual republics.

The 54-year-old ex-interior minister, who is running in the elections for the office of Russia's president next week, shares "a number of concerns," which made the then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resign last December. However, the latter, who wanted to use this step to warn against a return of the Soviet Union to a Stalin-type dictatorship, should not have given up his post, Bakatin thinks. He himself, the former interior minister insisted, is and remains a "follower of the profound restructuring of our society" and, therefore, he uses every opportunity to participate in this process. With this Bakatin justified his membership of the Security Council, which was established by Gorbachev a few months ago, but he criticized the fact that so far the president has neglected to sufficiently lay down the powers and functions of the members of this organ. In addition, he has asked Gorbachev to release him from his duties as a member of the Security Council in view of his running for the presidency of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Bakatin insisted that he was not nominated by the Communist Party of Russia, which is particularly orthodox, like former Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov, but by "work collectives" in the Kirov region, where he worked as party secretary in the past. "This fact in particular has confirmed my decision to stand at the presidential elections. Our republic is torn by internal conflict. I consider my candidacy an opportunity to bring about a social consensus and national consolidation." Bakatin, who is hardly expected to stand a chance against popular candidate Yeltsin or his communist

opponent Ryzhkov, said that the striving of individual republics for complete independence is their constitutional right. However, with this he linked numerous reservations concerning such a development and said that Russia, as by far the largest of all Soviet republics, bears the main responsibility "for the preservation and the renewal of the Union."

Pavlov, Cabinet Presidium Discuss Monopolies

LD0606213791 Moscow TASS in English 2130 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Moscow June 7 TASS—The Soviet Cabinet Presidium on Thursday discussed bills on anti-monopoly activities and bankruptcy.

The rate of monopolism in the soviet economy reaches 70 per cent, and its nature considerably differs from that in the West, the struggle with which is often referred to here. There are hardly any grounds for such analogies in conditions of shortages, rather than over-production of commodities.

The problem is how to begin producing principally new products, as they will necessarily be monopolistic. Another problem is what to do with monopolism, technologically pre-determined for many years. It is good that such questions were asked before the bill is adopted.

Participants in the meeting decided to study the work of anti-monopoly laws in several republics, and only after that, to submit the bill to the Soviet parliament. Similar decisions have been taken, concerning the bill on bankruptcy.

Participants focused on working out common financial and credit policies for the second half of the year. There is an urgent need of credit regulation aimed to stimulate production in priority directions, including harvesting, consumer goods production and developing services.

Participants noted that it is necessary to search for a way out of crisis through increasing production, rather than in price hikes.

The Presidium noted that centralised efforts should be taken in this direction. Otherwise, it will be impossible to stop inflation, and contradiction between republics will grow. Speakers said that while the country's national income has reduced by eight per cent, wages have grown by almost 25 per cent.

The meeting chaired by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, also discussed developing the savings system and the country's foreign economic activities.

Drafting of Union, Republic Constitutions Viewed

PM0606155591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jun 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report: "Constitutional Problems Discussed"]

[Text] Preparations for the Union Treaty are being finalized. At the same time, a period of constitutional reform has begun. A number of republics have prepared draft constitutions which are being discussed at Supreme Soviet sessions and scientific and practical conferences. Work is also continuing on a draft Union Constitution.

This explains the examination at an enlarged session of the All-Union Soviet State Building and Legislation Scientific Research Institute Academic Council of the problems of constitutional development in the country. USSR people's deputies, staffers at the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, academics from Moscow, and lawyers from the republics took part. How are constitutional reforms to be implemented, how are the scientific concepts of the constitutions to be prepared, what will the new Union and republic constitutions be like, how can we arrive at the proper relationship between the Constitution and other acts, and how can we ensure sound constitutional order? These questions were the subject of businesslike analysis by the academics and practical workers. The future quest for answers to these questions is particularly urgent.

Politburo Examines Communist Deputies' Work

PM0606120991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo"]

[Text] In accordance with the instruction of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission April (1991) joint plenum, the Politburo has adopted a resolution entitled "On the Work of Communists in Soviets of People's Deputies."

The resolution notes that the process of reforming Soviet society, firmly establishing democracy, and renewing soviets of people's deputies is proving complex and contradictory. Soviets have become an arena of intense political struggle. In a number of regions a threat has emerged of their being dismantled.

In this situation the party's central organs and many party committees and organizations were unready for active political work and have been slow to carry out practical actions to resolve the emerging problems.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo drew the attention of union republic communist party central committees and party republic, kray, and oblast committees to the need to continue pursuing the 28th CPSU Congress' principled course of renewing the political system and firmly strengthening soviets as organs of people's power. Soviets have proved their worth historically and have not exhausted their potential. The idea of "desovietization" that is being foisted on public opinion means in fact the alienation of broad sections of working people from power.

It is the task of party organizations to comprehensively promote the establishment of soviets which in the new conditions could effectively exercise power in the interests of the majority, organically combine legislative [normotvorcheskiy] and executive work at local level, and fully exercise their control functions. Soviets' legal, material, and financial basis should be strengthened.

The resolution expresses support for the course being implemented in the country toward creating an integrated system of state power which combines the existing structures of soviet representative democracy with the institution of presidential power. At the same time it is stressed that the supreme representative organs must retain sufficient powers to monitor the activity of both the Cabinet of Ministers and the president of the USSR.

The Politburo believes that the CPSU should participate more actively within the USSR Constitution and laws in forming the organs of state power and management and exert effective influence on the state's domestic and foreign policy. The task facing union republic communist party central committees and party committees and organizations is to elaborate at congresses, conferences, and plenums a collective policy on the major questions of society's life, defend that policy through their representatives in state and economic organs, and put it into practice.

Party committees and organizations and Communists are instructed to persistently master the methods of parliamentary activity, viewing them as one of the most important ways of exercising the CPSU's political function. In the work of Communist deputies priority is to be given to the effective solution of the urgent problems of daily life.

The resolution notes that a special role in uniting Communist deputies and in their cooperation with other deputies' factions represented in soviets belongs to party groups. In this connection it is proposed to strengthen organization, discipline, and responsibility, without which party groups are amorphous and incapable of realizing their potential.

Union republic communist party central committees, party committees, and primary party organizations are instructed to forge close links with Communist deputies and be centers where they can receive constant help, advice, and support. It is expedient to nominate Communist deputies to elected party organs, hold joint meetings of party committees and Communist groups, and give party organizations and labor collectives regular information on Communists' work in soviets. Full use must be made of the system of ideological and theoretical training for deputies who are CPSU members and for nonparty people who cooperate with Communists.

The Politburo instructs union republic Communist Party Central Committees and party republic, kray, and oblast committees to work through party groups and Communist deputies to step up legislative activity in representative organs of the USSR and the republics.

Specific instructions have been given to CPSU educational institutions to develop scientific research work in the sphere of state building and the party's parliamentary activity as well as in organizing the training of party cadres directly responsible for questions of Communists' work in soviets.

The CPSU mass media have been instructed to analyze more thoroughly and provide objective and comprehensive coverage of the experience of the work of soviets and party groups (Communist factions), not to avoid political debate, and to duly rebuke irresponsible attacks and instances of psychological terror against individual deputies.

USSR, Republic Prosecutors Confer at Collegium

PM0606150391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by V. Rudnev: "General Prosecutor—Among Equals"]

[Text] The first session of the new USSR Prosecutor's Office collegium has been held. It examined cadre questions, prosecutor's office oversight tasks to strengthen the rule of law in the country during the period of implementation of the anticrisis program, and other questions.

I would remind you that the country's Supreme Soviet recently adopted USSR General Prosecutor Nikolay Trubin's proposals on the partial reorganization of the prosecutor's office organs management structure. The USSR Prosecutor's Office collegium comprises the prosecutors of all the union republics and the city of Moscow, who will now on an equal basis determine the strategy for supervising the rule of law and law and order in the country.

The very first item on the agenda, concerning the appointment of new city and oblast prosecutors and conferment of class ranks, prompted criticism on the part of new members of the collegium. Zharmakhan Tuyakbayev, general prosecutor of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], pointed out that it "ill becomes" the USSR Prosecutor's Office to be solving cadre questions for sovereign republics. USSR General Prosecutor Nikolay Trubin backed his Kazakhstan colleague's proposal and proposed that in the future such matters should not be submitted for the consideration of a union conference, which should confine itself to an exchange of information on this matter.

There was a keen discussion of prosecutor's oversight tasks in strengthening the rule of law in the country during the period of the implementation of the anticrisis program. There were arguments not only about the content, but also about the form of the proposed draft decisions. In particular, Russian General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov pointed out that only one program—the Union program—had been submitted for discussion. But the leaders of the republics and the

Union assess the depth of the crisis in different ways. "There is one crisis," V. Stepankov noted, "but different ways of getting out of it have been proposed, which must be reflected in the prosecutor's decision. And it will require orders by the union republic prosecutors to enact a USSR Prosecutor's Office decision."

A different view was expressed by Ukrainian Prosecutor Mikhail Potebenko. He favors consolidation of union republics' efforts to resolve the economic crisis, with the help of unified prosecutor's oversight, among other things.

The new status of union republic prosecutors and the change in the functions of the USSR Prosecutor's Office were the key questions on which speakers focused attention. And despite the different approaches, they were all agreed on what is most important—it is extremely important now to elaborate clear, coordinated measures to ensure constitutional order in the country and protect citizens' rights.

It is extremely important today to correctly implement the anticrisis norms and laws on ownership, land, cooperatives, the general principles of entrepreneurial activity, pricing, and observance of the rule of law in the foreign economic activities of enterprises and organizations. It is necessary to ensure supervision of the validity of permits in monitoring bodies, services of the Main Administration for Combatting Thefts of Socialist Property and Speculation, the KGB, and the Prosecutor's Office itself. It was decided to raise the level of monitoring of law observance in the activities of absolutely all the political parties and mass public associations and movements. If their leading organs or members commit illegal actions prosecutors are obliged to issue official warnings, call the culprits to account, and, if necessary, take legal action to get them removed.

As a result of the discussion the decision proposed by the USSR Prosecutor's Office was adopted in principle. The union republic prosecutors' amendments will be incorporated into it. The decision will be brought into effect by order of the country's general prosecutor, as stipulated by the USSR law "On the USSR Prosecutor's Office."

A joint session of the collegiums of the USSR Prosecutor's Office and USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration examined questions of collaboration in work on the prevention of breaches of legislation in economic relations. It was recommended that the prosecutors make more active use of courts of arbitration in order to take action against the property of violators of economic legislation and to attend arbitration sessions more often.

There were also calls for the rapid elaboration of antimonopoly legislation to prevent, limit, and halt industrial rackets and unscrupulous competition, which are damaging, above all, to people's interests.

Subsidies, Tax Breaks Urged for Periodicals

PM0706132391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jun 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Protsenko under the "On Topics of the Day" rubric: "A Luxury, Not a News Medium. Subscriptions to Periodicals Could Become a Costly Pleasure"]

[Excerpts] It seems that all evil really does proceed from the newspapers. At least, it begins with them. Today we have further confirmation of this. As is known, it is precisely the newspapers that have reported that hyperinflation awaits us in the near future and will hit at all sections of the population. And these "blows" are starting with the newspapers. The subscription cost of them has already risen significantly this year. But it is probable that next year, 1992, a subscription to central publications will be affordable only by very well-off citizens.

The newspapers themselves are not to blame for this. The present increase in the subscription cost was linked, above all, with the fact that the price of paper has increased many times over—as a result IZVESTIYA, for example, makes a loss even when selling an issue for 10-12 kopeks. Over a whole year these losses are expected to total at least 27 million rubles [R]. We admit that we do not yet know how we will extricate ourselves from this situation. However, we will not violate the contract concluded with the subscriber nor demand additional money from the reader.

We are not promising the same for next year. For communications workers are now joining in the fascinating occupation of ravaging the editorial board's purse by raising sky-high the costs of their services. For example, whereas last year IZVESTIYA paid R100 to have a city telephone installed in its Moscow editorial office, this year the cost has gone up to R1,400. The line rental has also increased from R50 to R237.60. The costs of using teletype and telefax machines and so forth have risen.

But it turns out that these are nothing compared with what is to come. Not so long ago the USSR Ministry of Communications informed us of next year's prices for dispatching, forwarding, delivering, and distributing the newspaper. The documents revealed that, whereas this year communications workers are getting a sum total of 2.5-3 kopeks per issue of the newspaper for these services, next year the cost will rise to 16.5 kopeks for a six-page issue and 20.3 kopeks for an eight-pager.

For those who have not understood, I will repeat: Merely in order for communications workers to collect the newspaper from the printing plant and deliver it to the reader in just the same way as they are doing this year, in 1992 **they are demanding 50-100 percent more money than the whole newspaper costs today**, including its production, printing, forwarding, and delivery.

Our planners have calculated that, in order for IZVESTIYA to be able to make ends meet under these conditions, the annual subscription to the newspaper must amount to at least R75. **That is, more than the compensation laid down by the government for the April price hike.**

But even this is still not everything. Literally the other day the USSR Ministry of Communications sent us the very latest draft tariffs for its "services" next year. In this draft the communications workers announce that they would like to **additionally** increase the costs of dispatching the newspaper (i.e. for the fact that bundles of newspapers at the printing plant will be assigned to the addresses of post offices) by a further 30 percent, with a further 60 percent for delivery to the subscriber's home.

Particularly touching is the communications workers' desire to make unearned money also out of distribution—i.e. for the fact that subscribers come to the post office, fill out subscription receipts there, and pay money, while the communications workers graciously consent to accept both the money and the receipts and then systematize the results, determining how many copies of a given newspaper must be conveyed to a given post office. Thus, in the original draft of next year's prices the communications workers demanded that we pay for this service 8 percent of the nominal existing prices in 1991. In the latest draft they wish to receive 10 percent—moreover, **based on the nominal price in the 1992 catalogue.** That is, by escalating the costs of their services and thereby forcing us to raise the subscription cost of the newspaper, communications workers wish to make additional business out of this.

People say to us: You have gotten what you were struggling for. Journalists campaigned louder than anyone for a switch to market relations—now accept it. Well, let us investigate who is "getting" what.

We have gotten quite a lot. The right to write what we think. And, still more importantly, the opportunity to print what one writes, for the present diversity of the periodical press gives everyone the possibility of choosing the publication whose position coincides with his own personal position.

We have not gotten any material privileges or advantages over people in other professions—today, for example, the salary of an IZVESTIYA special correspondent is approximately one-third of the wages of a city transport driver in Moscow. But, on the other hand, every good journalist is now "worth his salt," and the main payment is not for posts and ranks but for thoughts and words. And those of our fraternity who really are worth quite a lot in this life have been enabled to earn quite well with their pen.

The reader, too, has gotten quite a lot. First, the real right to information. Second, the real right to choose and the opportunity to read and subscribe to publications of different views and trends and form his own personal opinion of everything that is happening all around. This is probably the way that real and not just declared "pluralism of opinions" should be manifested—in the opportunity for the reader to familiarize himself with different publications, not in the editorial boards' obligation to print both the neighbor on the right and the neighbor on the left. [passage pmitted]

But in life this very pluralism seems to be coming to an end. Because, given the planned prices for press products, it is becoming beyond the means of a family to subscribe to not only two or three newspapers but even one.

The transition to the market has absolutely nothing to do with this. For there cannot be any market under conditions of someone's **total monopoly** on particular goods or services. And if this is a state monopoly, a natural question arises: **Who in reality will receive all the additional money** which newspaper editorial boards will be forced to take from the subscriber?

Quite recently, as is known, a presidential decree defined the basic sectors of industry whose normal functioning must be preserved in all circumstances. But let us recall how only quite recently the press was also being called the chief driving force of perestroyka. That is, the "basic sector" of our movement today.

And yet there is a paradox: Governments in all countries, when defining priority sectors, do not increase prices but, on the contrary, set up preferential taxation and allocate grants and subsidies. Such benefits are allocated primarily to sectors and to individual enterprises and corporations which produce output that the mass consumer needs. Maybe it would not hurt our government to take the same path? Particularly as periodicals are products in the most mass demand in our country today. And is it not time, moreover, for the government to think about **the consequences of unchecked growth in the costs of glasnost**?

Incidentally, what will the consequences really be? A further overall drop in circulations? Possibly. But, above all, an increase in the popularity of publications of an extremist tendency and gutter ways. Because such a sharp escalation in the costs of mail services will lead to a drop in subscriptions, and the publications' struggle for readers will take place outside "Soyuzpechat" kiosks, in the street—where newspapers are distributed to retail trade. And the methods of this struggle could vary, including with the help of both left-wing and right-wing "ultrarevolutionariness," the puffing up of cheap sensations, etc. And this at a time when that same government does not cease speaking of the need for balanced approaches, to achieve civilian peace....

Independent Human Rights Center To Open in Moscow

LD0606210991 Moscow TASS in English 1441 GMT 6 Jun 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS—The Soviet Union's first independent human rights centre will be opened in Moscow by representatives of Soviet independent human rights organisations during the third conference on human dimension of the CSCE, scheduled to be held in Moscow on September 10 - October 4. This statement was made today by a representative of the Moscow Helsinki group, Aleksey Smirnov.

The centre aims to create conditions for the operation and cooperation of several well-known independent human rights organisations of the Soviet Union, such as the Moscow Helsinki group, the Association for the Defence of Invalids and Mercy, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the Committee on Aid to Refugees and Forced Immigrants, the draft group on human rights, etc.

"Now that the human rights movement is no longer underground, the former methods have become obsolete," Smirnov stressed. "The potential of these organisations has yet to be fully tapped, because they operate on 'home ground' which automatically lowers the level of professionalism and responsibility. The centre will help them go professional and, importantly, ease the burden on the supreme soviets of the USSR, the Russian Federation, the Interior Ministry of the USSR, the USSR Foreign Ministry and other government agencies that have to deal with complaints about human rights violations. Now these complaints can be relayed to the public reception room at our centre which is staffed by experts on such fields as rights of refugees, ethnic minorities, immigration issues, etc.

"The centre is registered at the Moscow City Council," Smirnov continued. "However, it will come into its own only after we receive our own premises. We are going to formally ask for support from Soviet Vice-President Gennadiy Yanayev who is head of the commission to prepare the Moscow conference on the human dimension. Hopefully, our needs will be respected and the centre be opened as part of the parallel events during the Moscow humanitarian forum."

TASS Reviews 6 Jun Press

LD0606083891 Moscow TASS in English 0717 GMT 6 Jun 91

["Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS—Newspapers focus on the visit by President Mikhail Gorbachev to Norway. They report that he delivered a lecture of the Nobel Peace Prize winner for 1990 in the Norwegian capital. PRAVDA features the Nobel lecture by Gorbachev.

The newspaper writes that the lecture "philosophically perceives the connection between revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and prospects for the development of world politics".

Publishing reports by their own and TASS correspondents about the visit by the Soviet leader to Oslo, newspapers say that the president held talks with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, after which they signed a joint Soviet-Norwegian statement.

Gorbachev and Brundtland held a joint news conference. PRAVDA reports that "the first day of Gorbachev's visit to Oslo ended with a banquet in the Royal Palace".

Covering the work of the Soviet parliament, PRAVDA informs its readers that on Wednesday evening deputies debated a draft address by the Soviet legislature to Leningrad citizens in connection with a referendum in the city on the change of Leningrad's name to be held on June 12.

"The document stresses that the solution of this question is the prerogative of the USSR Congress of Poeple's Deputies, the entire people and not only of Leningraders," the newspaper stresses.

In connection with the dispute about the possible renaming of Leningrad, the PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspapers feature a statement by the Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, "calling to prevent an outrage upon the name of glorious Leningrad".

Articles in the TRUD and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspapers deal with the same topic.

The press gives extensive coverage to the election campaign for the presidency of the Russian Federation. The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, TRUD, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and PRAVDA newspapers print readers' mail about candidates. Their ideas about candidates are different of course.

The SELSKAYA ZHIZN newspaper carries an interview with the presidential candidate Vadim Bakatin. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA prints an interview with writer Valentin Rasputin, an authorised representative of presidential candidate Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The same newspaper features an interview with another hopeful, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publishes the Soviet law on the order of exit from and entry into the USSR by Soviet citizens. The same newspaper runs a decision by the Soviet parliament on the enactment of this law.

Under the heading "Polemical Thoughts", PRAVDA prints an article by Chairman of the Soviet Parliament Committee on Legislation and Law and Order Yuriy Kalmykov.

The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and SELSKAYA ZHIZN newspapers give the digest of the decision on "the work of Communists in local councils" by the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publish the digest of a decision by the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee on the improvement of information contacts inside the CPSU.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA prints an article by secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee Gennadiy Zyuganov, who ponders over "the destiny of our statehood".

PRAVDA, TRUD, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA run a report by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman about an incident on June 4 when the Tajik village of Namadgutiy Poen near the Soviet-Afghan border was raided by a warplane. SELKSAYA ZHIZN also writes about this incident.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes that NOVIY MIR magazine editor-in- chief Sergey Zalygin told the newspaper that after the magazine's application, he received "the certificate of a Second World War participant" issued to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn on May 29, 1991. The newspaper also describes the fate of the magazine which opened Solzhenitsyn for readers throughout the world.

Today is the day of Aleksandr Pushkin's birth. PRAVDA, TRUD, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA mark the 192nd anniversary since the birth of the genius of Russian literature.

TRUD carries an interview with Russian Minister of Culture Yuriy Solomin.

Under the heading "From Secret Archives", the same newspaper published documents, for the first time in the mass press, about the case of the former commander of the Western Military District, Army General Dmitriy Pavlov.

Ion Iliescu was elected to the post of Romanian president one year ago. TRUD features an interview with the Romanian president.

TASS Reviews 7 Jun Press

LD0706065191 Moscow TASS in English 0547 GMT 7 Jun 91

["Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 7 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev's trip to Norway and Sweden remains the focus of media attention. Newspapers report details of the Soviet leader's stay in the two Scandinavian countries.

PRAVDA carries the text of the Soviet-Norwegian joint statement, an account of the joint news conference held in Oslo by Gorbachev and Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

The newspaper also runs the texts of brief speeches exchanged by Harald V, the king of Norway, and President Gorbachev at a dinner given in Oslo in honour of the Soviet guests, and speeches made by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Gorbachev at a luncheon given in Stockholm in honour of the Soviet president and his wife.

In dispatches from Stockholm, PRAVDA correspondents emphasise that the Soviet president's visit to the two Scandinavian countries became an important step towards "utterly new forms of cooperation" with the West and towards "the synchronisation of economic reforms and integration of the Soviet economy into the world system".

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper carries full text of Gorbachev's Nobel lecture delivered in Oslo two days ago. TRUD and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) run the lecture in a summarised form.

The press continues to cover the election campaign of six candidates for Russia's Presidency. The presidential elections will be held on June 12.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carries an interview with USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Sharipov who examines the candidates' qualities. He believes, in particular, that the Presidency will be contested mainly by Boris Yeltsin and Nikolay Ryzhkov.

Sharipov speaks out in favour of Ryzhkov, reproaching the incumbent Russian leader that within one year of his stay in office he did not improve the life of people in Russia and lost hold of economic problems.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN (RURAL LIFE), under the rubric "Russia Confronted With the Choice", carries an interview with Boris Yeltsin who said that if elected to Russia's presidency he would further the policy which is being pursued by the Russian leadership now.

Asked about his relations with Mikhail Gorbachev, Yeltsin emphasised: "Proceeding along the road of reforms and renewal, we can and must cooperate".

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA also writes about Yeltsin. USSR People's Deputy V. Yaroshenko relates details of an incident involving the plane with the Russian leader on board during his tour of Spain in April last year.

In the current complex economic situation, Yeltsin, if elected to Russia's presidency, will hardly be able to fully justify the hopes set upon him, and the expectations of a miracle may be replaced by disappointment, writes Leonid Nikitinskiy, news analyst of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA tries to prove that the current leadership of Russia is connected with international adventurists. The newspaper carries photostatic copies of documents, signed by Yeltsin and Russia's Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, and issued, as the newspaper writes, to one of the "godfathers" of Italian Mafia Roberto Coppola who was arrested by Roman police in April this year.

PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA report that the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee's commission for the party's agrarian policy has discussed measures to ensure successful harvesting.

Speakers at the commission's meeting pointed out that the reserves of diesel fuel and gasoline dwindle in many agricultural regions and that a critical state of affairs is taking shape in the provision of farms with fodder and grain harvesting machinery owing to the lack of the supply of metal.

The same newspapers run a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee's Secretariat "On the Results of Zonal Meetings of Secretaries of Primary Party Organisations", expressing concern over the fact that "many party organisations have become confused, slackened their activities and lost influence in collectives. Some organisations even ceased to exist". All this narrows the party's possibilities to actually influence processes taking place in the country, the resolution points out.

PRAVDA frontpages a Soviet parliament address to the residents of the city of Leningrad where an opinion poll about renaming it will be taken on June 12. The parliament requests Leningraders to keep the city's present name, which has become historic.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN carries a statement by the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee on this subject, with a call "to prevent an outrage on the name of glorious Leningrad." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA runs a column of letters and an article on the subject, conveying indignation with the idea of renaming the city on the Neva.

In view of the approaching 50th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, a TRUD correspondent met General of the Army Vadim Matrosov who had served with frontier troops for more than half a century.

Commenting on the developments at the start of the war against Hitlerite fascism, the general, adducing appropriate arguments, categorically rejected accusations contained in a number of articles by publicists and historians that the USSR was allegedly to blame, along with Nazi Germany, for unleashing the Second World War and that Germany's attack on the USSR was ostensibly provoked by the Soviet side.

Economic

Goskomstat's Pogosov Warns of Inflation

PM0606104791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jun 91 Union Edition p 2

[V. Yakovlev report: "Prices and Incomes: Who Will Outgallop Whom?"]

[Text] Two months have elapsed since the price reform was implemented. What positive things have been achieved during this time? I. Pogosov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, has told journalists the following in this regard. A special feature of the reform was that it was implemented under conditions of a great scarcity of goods and services. Moreover, the situation was complicated by the fall in production—which is in itself a factor contributing to rising prices. Half of the consumer goods and 40 percent of the means of production have been switched to free contract prices, and this process is continuing.

Evaluating the situation from this position, I. Pogosov reported that the correlation of the prices of foodstuffs, domestic equipment, and light industrial goods inside the country is close to the correlation that exists in developed countries. This itself is an important condition for the switch to ruble convertibility. On the other hand, slick operators in the shadow economy are being deprived of the possibility of deriving unfounded benefits from the present misalignment of prices. But what have we, the consumers, gotten? Prices in the foodstuffs group have risen most with regard to meat products: The price of beef has increased more than 250 percent, and boiled sausage 220 percent. Price increases of 100-200 percent are to be observed for practically all groups of nonfood commodities, and even more for individual commodities.

Yes, the liberalization of prices covering approximately half of commodity turnover marks a definite advance toward market principles of price formation. At the same time many problems remain unresolved. New problems are arising simultaneously under conditions of the continuing growth in incomes and the reduction in production volume and are complicating the situation. Republics which are in a complex financial position are implementing costly social programs by withholding payments. This is sharply intensifying inflationary processes and leading to the collapse of the country's monetary system.

The prospect is not very reassuring. To resolve the task, I. Pogosov declared, there must be an inverse ratio between the growth in incomes and expenditure. In order to suck up "hot" money and make the present worthless ruble revert to normality and work reliably, during this year the increase in incomes must stand at no more than 0.6 percent for every percentage-point increase in the population's expenditure. Under these conditions a difficult choice has to be made with regard to pricing policy. Two options are possible in principle: either to pursue a line of curbing the growth in prices and of their slow liberalization (while limiting growth in the population's income) or the rapid liberalization of prices leading to their considerable growth while maintaining definite correlations with the growth in incomes.

The first option is attended by the danger of an unwarranted emission of money, an increase in unsatisfied demand, and the exacerbation of sociopolitical tension. The very first months since the price hike have shown that it is extremely difficult to adhere to this position. Real life will evidently be closer to the second option.

Replying to a question from IZVESTIYA about the possible intensification of inflationary processes, I. Pogosov named a package of anti-inflationary measures: the cutting of the budgetary deficit, of defense spending, and of the scale of capital construction, the rigid regulation of growth in incomes, the limiting of social programs, the sale to the population of shares in enterprises and of housing and summer houses, the attraction of foreign capital investments, and much besides. At any rate, if incomes and expenditure grow equally, it will never be possible to achieve a balance. It is clear that the population does not want a drop in living standards, which are already not very high, and is demanding the full indexation of incomes. A dangerous illusion leading to a new spiral of inflation!

But at present inertia is dragging us in precisely this direction. According to data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the population's monetary income increased by 56.8 billion rubles during January-April, while expenditure (together with the increase in money deposits) increased by 61.4 billion rubles. If you take into account the upcoming increase in the wages of miners and metallurgical workers, this will result in a new discharge of money onto the market. And what of the consumer market? Commodity production not only did not increase during the four months but even fell 3 percent compared with the corresponding period last year. How is it possible to balance supply and demand in this situation? Only by means of prices! It should be borne in mind that by the end of the year the amount of "hot" money will stand at approximately half of the volume of retail commodity turnover and paid services. In the final analysis, everything will depend on determination in implementing the planned transformations and on their pace.

USSR Budget Deficit Limit Reached by Mar

PM0606145791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jun 91 Union Edition p 2

[V. Romanyuk article: "Why the State's Coffers Are Empty"]

[Text] What is happening to the Union budget? It seems that the rumors about a snowballing budget deficit are being confirmed. According to the report figures for January-April, Union budget revenue was 30.5 billion rubles [R] as opposed to an expected figure of R75.9 billion. Expenditure over the period was R62.7 billion against a planned R85 billion. If we know anything, it is how to spend. The excess of expenditure over income for the four months was R32.2 billion. Yet the maximum annual budget deficit set by the USSR Supreme Soviet for 1991 is R26.7 billion. We had already passed the limit in March!

Thus, the annual deficit "limit" of the Union budget which was for the first time worked out independently of the republics, has been surpassed. And if things continue at this rate, by the year end we will be facing a Union budget deficit of more than R125 billion. Would that be a catastrophe? By no means. Rather, it would be the result of budget items being irresponsibly worked out at government and legislative levels, and of differences in the positions of the republics and the center—differences which have not been overcome, despite mutual assurances and agreements.

So far we have been unable to implement a unified credit, financial, and tax policy. Certain republics continue to make decisions which run counter to the economic agreement regarding distribution of income between budgets. Of the total debt to the Union budget of R22.8 billion, the RSFSR's [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] share is R15.2 billion, the Ukraine's is R2.7 billion, Uzbekistan's is R0.5 billion, and Kazakhstan's is R0.8 billion; the Baltic republics did not contribute a single ruble during the four months.

It would be wrong to explain all this by citing the continuing "parade of sovereignties." The fall in production continued in January-April. Compared with the same period last year national income over the first quarter fell by 10 percent, and foreign trade turnover fell by more than one-third. As a result, revenue to budgets at all levels became "thinner on the ground." The lack of coordination between republics' actions only exacerbated an already difficult situation.

Let's try to analyze the state of those channels which should replenish the Union budget: the enterprise profit tax, the sales tax, the tax on revenue from foreign economic activity, and funds from republic budgets used to finance statewide programs. We have registered sharp shortfalls under all these headings. For instance, the profits tax has yielded just one-third of sum expected, the sales tax has yielded around 5 percent, and the tax on foreign economic activity has yielded slightly more than a quarter of the sum expected. There are different reasons for this. Why, for instance, has the Union budget failed to receive its envisaged share of the profits tax? As for Russia, it has adopted a decision to fully include the profits tax in the republic's budget. The same thing has happened in the Baltic. Georgia has not transferred a single kopek to the Union budget from the tax on the profits of enterprises under the republic's jurisdiction.

The sales tax has not produced the billions that had been expected. The alteration of the calculation method alone virtually halved the sum. Then a number of republics postponed its introduction for a quarter, and this to led to a failure to collect a considerable sum. A presidential decree abolished this tax for a group of socially important goods. As a result, an absurdly small sum was obtained under this heading in the first quarter—R3.2 billion —whereas the forecast balance of financial resources assumed a yield of R23 billion.

It is curious to analyze the motives which certain republics followed in entering into conflict with the Union budget. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan decided as follows: All revenue from income and taxes would go to the

republic budget, and deductions would then be made "through one channel" [odnokanalno] to the Union budget. But since these are raw-material-producing republics which should be receiving subsidies from the all-Union economic stabilization fund—but are not—they are not transferring anything to the center. For example, Uzbekistan completed its first-quarter budget with a deficit of R2.7 billion (against a planned figure of R1.9 billion). Meanwhile, the stabilization fund remains virtually empty.

The question of setting up a single union-republic fund for social support to the population in connection with the introduction of the new retail prices has not been decided. Meanwhile the expenditure side of the budget continues to increase. The resolution of the social issues connected with the implementation of the miners' demands alone will cost R5 billion this year, compensation for the increased cost of student catering will amount to R4 billion, and compensation for the population's investments will cost R2.2 billion.

Where will this money come from? And why does it seem that we have been "robbing Peter to pay Paul" when we look at the Union budget? In the opinion of R. Meshalkina, senior consultant at the USSR Supreme Soviet Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission, deliberately impossible conditions were set when the Union budget was drawn up. The budget deficit was limited to 2.5 percent. Brave, but impossible. Why? If only because the income side is limited too—the mobilization of some of the income from successful enterprises was ruled out. This is just the kind of income redistribution which saved the budget for so many years. According to USSR Ministry of Finance assessments, the overall revenue shortfall will be more than R70 billion by the year end.

At the same time, laws which excessively inflate the expenditure side of the budget continue to be adopted. It is no suprise that the Union budget deficit in the first quarter overshot the estimated figure by 360 percent (R27.1 billion instead of the planned R5.8 billion). It turns out that even after the long discussions, agreements, and mutual assurances given by the center and the republics, what is happening to the Union budget is pretty obvious.

Before me is a list of Union budget spending plans for 1991. Where could cuts be made? Social spending accounts for 17.5 percent. There is nothing to cut there. Financing for science accounts for 5.2 percent. Mere scraps! Emergency state programs (Chernobyl, the Aral Sea, and others) account for 4.1 percent. One cannot cut them. Expenditure on servicing state debt accounts for 4.3 percent. Nothing can be done about that. Spending on maintaining organs of state power and administration accounts for 0.7 percent. We still make a fuss about the need to reduce the apparatus, and even noted this "reserve" in the anticrisis program. But this reserve is tiny. But military spending—34.9 percent of the Union budget—could be cut. The subsidies for coal—5.6 percent—are also exorbitant. It is also time to look into "other measures," which swallow up 9.3 percent of the Union budget.

Great hopes were pinned on the economic stabilization fund. Enterprises under Union jurisdiction and the republics should have transferred R68.4 billion into it. This was where spending on centralized capital investment, conversion, and the payment of subsidies to a number of republics was pledged [zakladyvalis]. So far, R1.5 billion has been submitted, including R500 million from the USSR Ministry of Finance (the republics are keeping the rest in their own accounts). It had been planned to use this money to implement priority construction projects. Everything fell through. Without seeing any immediate prospect of replenishing its coffers, the USSR Ministry of Finance was forced to give certain republics loans instead of nonexistent subsidies. And funds from the Union budget were used. The USSR Ministry of Finance was unable to repay its R5-billion loan from the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] and was forced to request an extension of the debt to 1 October 1991.

The de-statization of property had been expected to produce yet another nonexistent "hail of money." But the process of privatizing enterprises has ground to a halt, and not only because of the legislators' tardiness. There has been a sharp reduction in the financial potential of many enterprises, which are spending large sums on paying compensation to workers. And the overall political and economic instability is not conducive to the development of the nonstate sector of the economy.

Some hopes are still pinned on the creation of a unified union-republic fund for social support for the population. A number of processing republics—Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and the Baltic republics—have seen their income from raising retail prices surpass their expenditure, while in the other six republics the picture is the reverse. This capital was meant to have made up for the shortage of funds for compensation, but the question of setting up the fund has still not been agreed with the republics. Only Belorussia and Armenia agreed to invest in it—by R1.35 billion and R360 million respectively. Even these sums are absurdly small if you bear in mind that the shortage of funds for compensation measures in 1991 is R42.9 billion in the sphere of Union jurisdiction, and R12.9 billion for the republics.

A glimmer of poverty—that is what the Union budget reveals so far. Assessing the situation as generally alarming, K. Melnik, chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Subcommission for the Budget, expressed the view that measures should be taken in a reasonable manner to reduce budget appropriations as much as possible, and that, to this end, a special system governing the state's financial expenditure should be introduced. This means that it should be financed on the basis of reduced norms and as revenue is received.

Forthcoming Income Indexation Law Viewed

914A0786A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by E. Gonzalyez: "First Perusal of the 101st Law—On Indexation, Which Will Protect Our Incomes Against Inflation and the Increase in Prices"]

[Text] Deputies have calculated that they have created the first 100 laws at the very least. The long-awaited law on the indexation of the incomes of the populace has an opportunity to become the 101st law, or more precisely, Basic Legislation, which definitely presupposes their continuation and refinement at the republic level.

So, the USSR Supreme Soviet intends to sort out the issue of indexation next week. However, this subject is so unusual and strange for us that it would be better to follow the example of deputies and familiarize ourselves with it in advance. Income indexation in conjunction with the increase in prices is practiced abroad—in Europe, in the United States, and Japan. As far as we are concerned, we tried to convince ourselves for a long time that our prices are the most stable in the world. This is why indexation in our country appeared as late as December of last year, in Belorussia. We will, of course, recall this so far limited experience later.

What is the objective of indexing? It is very simple: To protect the monetary income of the populace against losses inflicted by the increase in prices—the incomes of the entire populace, but in turn, primarily of those who are not in a position to earn money: retirees, students, handicapped, and others. Next come those who have fixed low earnings, for example, employees of budget-financed establishments, and then those who just make a little. Those who make a lot will protect themselves.

Of course, this is a rough, even very rough, pattern—just for our initial familiarization. Let us simplify, as much as possible, the idea of indexation as well. Thus, ideally those who receive greater incomes by virtue of price increases should share with those who lose because of this, with the populace. Actually, everything is considerably more complicated, if for no other reason then because in our country an increase in prices without a perceptible increase in incomes is quite possible. Please recall the benefits of increasing subway fares by a factor of three: Alas, they turned out to be much more modest than expected.

Therefore, the point of departure is: Prices grew, prices grow, prices will grow, even the prices of things for which prices are strictly forbidden to grow. For example, they swore before the April price reform that the cost of vodka would remain the same. All other things would become more expensive—cognac, wine, beer, Fanta, and kvass, but vodka would be sacrosanct. Not even a month later, vodka began costing 3 rubles [R] more. This is to say nothing of the goods about which nobody made promises?

It is expected that the growth index of retail prices will be calculated based on a consumer basket. This is when the Ukase on Minimal Consumer Budgets will be useful. It may be calculated in different ways, but in any case it is an intricate endeavor. For example, in Belorussia, a scale was adopted for calculations according to which incomes increase as prices grow but not by far in a direct proportion. In Belorussia, the idea was as follows: A segment of incomes corresponding to the subsistence minimum (for example, the first R100) is compensated in full, or one to one. At double the amount of the subsistence minimum, compensation is already partial. It appears that at four times the subsistence minimum there is no compensation at all. I do not vouch for the accuracy of this, but this is the principle. Incidentally, Belorussians themselves have become convinced, after half a year, that such a scale requires calculations which are too cumbersome, and intend to simplify it. For example, there will be one coefficient for the first R300, and another one, which is much lower, for the second R300. Under Basic Legislation all republics are free to select their own scale of indexation. This is to say nothing about the consumer basket; that is influenced by climate, age, sex, and many other factors.

It is clearly impossible to establish a common index of price increases for the country. However, we may estimate approximately what such protection is going to cost all of us. They say that price indexing by one percent will cost us R3.5 billion. They also say that in the first quarter prices soared by more than 20 percent.

But who is to say precisely what the price index is for specific periods? At present, the State Committee for Statistics registers prices in our country. Unfortunately, our past experience in comparing statistics with life gives us no grounds to trust this organization completely. This might be an unfair reputation but, alas, they have acquired it. This is why there are the following proposals: To set up an independent(?) state(?) service to register the price index, and approximately the same service for trade unions. It may also be done in a simpler and more customary way: leave everything within the State Committee for Statistics, but under the control of public organizations. In general, the Supreme Soviet will make a choice.

Be that as it may, we should be informed about the increase in prices every so often. Just how often? They believe that once a quarter is the optimum. However, this involves so much work that it will be good if we manage to do it even twice a year. It is expected to start in the third quarter of this year, but...

This "but" is so big and forbidding that one does not even want to talk about it. Actually, there is only one argument in favor of urgently introducing indexation: The people will not go along with a further decline in the standard of living. Meanwhile, there are so many arguments against! The first, at which we perhaps may stop, is: Where are the billions to be obtained? The authors of the draft Basic Legislation solved this problem simply:

They said that the sources of incomes themselves should become the sources of indexation. Do you understand? If you receive retirement benefits from a pension fund, compensations in conjunction with price increases should also come from there. A plant pays you for your labor? Let it settle with you on account of inflation as well, and so on.

Everything would fit if it were not for the already mentioned circumstance: The increase in prices does not necessarily create an increase in incomes. Let us disregard the fact that pension funds go around hat in hand at present. We will somehow solve this "technical" problem of transferring funds from enterprises. However, what about the enterprises themselves? Where will they get spare funds?

This is the answer given to this question: The enterprises should earn them. In that case, let me ask this: Are we allowing them to? If it were only the point that plants have an opportunity to earn money, but do not want to. Indeed, we are gradually giving economic managers a freer hand, but with regard to what? We are quietly letting them spend more of the money already earned, for example, we will now let them use a segment of the consumption fund for indexation.

This is to say nothing about the fact that it is barbaric, in and of itself, to allow or forbid the use of net profits which is what the consumption fund actually amounts to. What if there are no such profits? After all, we have no dearth of enterprises with low profit margins, those operating at planned losses, and just at a loss, which to this day cannot come up with R60 for their employees. There are quite a few kolkhozes which are "going under."

They say that the inability to pay for labor and compensate for the increase in prices will now become the main sign of bankruptcy at enterprises. How will this make it any better for anyone?

It would be better (but not by far for all) only if the introduction of indexation were accompanied by a corresponding tax reduction. However, in this case, the state, which will have to index social programs (for example, the cost of food in hospitals, houses for the handicapped, and so on), will be left holding the bag.

This is a vicious circle of sorts. If we protect some it will be worse for others; if we introduce income indexation, the stratification into the rich and the poor will intensify; if we get rid of one kind of social injustice we will come to have another. Apparently, in some way we are going about something wrong. But what?

This is what I would say along with some deputies: We keep dividing all the time, whereas it has long been time to multiply. After all, the 101st law, as well as most of its predecessors, is aimed at dividing in some other manner, perhaps a more fair and reasonable one, what constitutes our... I almost said "wealth."

Please do not get me wrong: I very much like the very idea of income indexation when prices increase. However, when will we embark on creating an economy in which the increase in prices generates incomes?

Here is a simple and instructive example. A deputy representing the agrarian sector spoke during the preliminary discussion of the draft law. He stated that kolkhozes and sovkhozes have no money. No millions will offset the growth of prices for industrial products offered to rural areas. Some of the prices have recently increased dozens of times. Combine harvesters, which already cost R39,000 before, are now being foisted on kolkhozes for R70,000. Therefore, indexing the incomes of kolkhoz members is out of the question.

It would be interesting to know whether indexing the income of a farmer selling his products at market prices might be an issue? Most likely, this is a non-issue, but for a different reason.

Report Marks Opening of Arctic Shipping Season

PM0606134591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Jun 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by O. Padenko and L. Borisenko, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] The Arctic shipping season has opened. This is a busy time for seamen and dockers. Unfortunately, this year they face even more problems than usual in the Far East.

[Padenko] As always, the icebreaker crews, together with the crews of freighters and civil aviation pilots, have prepared conscientiously for their highly responsible job.

The icebreakers Yermak, Krasin, Kapitan Khlebnikov, Murmansk, Magadan, Moskva, and Kiev were the first to leave for the high latitudes, precisely on schedule. The nuclear-powered Arktika has left the Western Basin to join them in the east at the edge of the ice. However, their efforts may be partially thwarted. This is what happened last year. Because of disruptions in the delivery of freight, a substantial number of them, together with the smaller ships, were forced to spend the winter in ports beyond the Polar Circle, and their cargo did not reach consumers.

Supply enterprises must bear in mind that the provision of the inhabitants of the Far North with essential goods, equipment, and construction materials is the one and only state order of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

Agriculture

Government Aide Views Food Supply Problem

PM0706090191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with M.L. Timoshishin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Purchases of Food

Resources, by I. Totskiy; date and place not given: "Our Food Supply: Today and Tomorrow: The Future Will Come. But Will There Be Food?"]

[Text] "Our life is developing strangely," R. Khusyainov, an engineer at the "Kazankompressormash" Science and Production Association, complains in his letter. "Until recently whichever food store you went into there was always a wide range of cereals, pasta, and bakery products on the shelves. Admittedly, buckwheat was a rarity, but on the other hand you could always buy semolina, pearl barley, rice, and rolled oats. But look at those same stores today: completely empty. To where did it all suddenly disappear? After all, last year everyone was talking about a record harvest."

"And not just talking about it, they were producing it," M.L. Timoshishin, recently appointed chairman of the State Committee for Purchases of Food resources, noted after reading the Kazan engineer's letter. "You would think that sales of grain to the state ought to increase. However, that has not happened. An analysis conducted by specialists showed that the amount of grain reaching the elevators is diminishing. Let us compare the last five-year period with the previous one. The gross grain harvest increased by 32 million tonnes but supplies to the state did not increase. In an attempt to remedy matters, purchase prices were raised last year, but the expected result did not materialize. Grain purchases remained at the level of the 10th 5-Year Plan."

[Totskiy] What were the actual figures?

[Timoshishin] The plan target was 85.3 million tonnes but the amount delivered to the elevators toward the state order was 52.3 million tonnes—33 million tonnes less than planned. To give farms an incentive to sell grain to the state, the Union government was forced to send a quantity of material and technical resources to kolkhozes and sovkhozes to sell them in return, and to buy grain from them for hard currency. These measures made it possible to increase resources with a further 15.6 million tonnes of grain. However, the problem of supplying the national economy with grain was not resolved.

So what is there to use for making buns, noodles, and pasta? According to the USSR State Planning Committee's estimates, annual consumption of grain from state resources is 102-105 million tonnes. The situation is indeed causing bewilderment: It was almost a record harvest yet the state cannot meet the planned requirements of the national economy. There is a shortage of 35-36 million tonnes of food and feed grain. It must be bought abroad. But even then interruptions occur. At many large industrial centers the population is often left without flour or cereals. Hence the justified complains from consumers and the social tension.

[Totskiy] There isn't a startling abundance of meat and dairy products in the stores either, Mikhail Lukich...

[Timoshishin] You can't feed animals on fresh air. If there is no feed grain where are you to get meat and milk? Over half of the mixed-feed plants are working erratically because of a lack of raw materials.

Meanwhile, kolkhozes and sovkhozes have kept back for themselves 13 million tonnes more than last year. Probably they decided to use part of it to feed livestock. But not every farm can process it and enrich it with protein and vitamins. And they are sending pure wheat to the feed troughs. The expenditure is enormous but the return, the production of output, is slight. It is no coincidence that in the first four months of the year meat purchases across the country as a whole fell 992,000 tonnes and milk purchases fell by 2,772,000 tonnes. Imagine how much more impoverished the food stores are.

[Totskiy] The editorial office has been receiving reports that certain republics and oblasts have been holding back their produce while at the same time demanding output from the all-Union fund...

[Timoshishin] Unfortunately we have quite a few farms like that. They are not averse to taking from other people's pockets. However, this is the most outright form of local self-interest and freeloading. From some high-level leaders you constantly hear: "What does it matter where the grain and meat are: on the farms or in the state siloes? So long as it is somewhere." Those who behave that way condemn the country's population, particularly in the big cities and industrial centers, to starvation rations.

We make virtually all our bread, pasta, confectionery, flour, and cereals from grain taken from the state resources. It also goes into all mixed feed. Many leaders of large grain-producing farms, perfectly aware of this fact, are in no hurry to replenish the state's food reserves.

[Totskiy] Is it a question of looking after number one?

[Timoshishin] But what about the country's population? Let's come back to the harvest. Last year the gross grain crop (after processing) was 218 million tonnes. The state granaries received only 68 million tonnes. One inevitably thinks of 1978, when with the same quantity of grain, kolkhozes and sovkhozes sold the state 96 million tonnes! In the Russian Federation, for example, only 10 out of 62 oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics fulfilled their state order.

[Totskiy] Who were the "outstanding" ones?

[Timoshishin] Farms in Samara Oblast produced a good harvest last year—20.9 quintals per hectare. They threshed 3,122,000 tonnes of grain. Of that they sold the state 1,078,000 tonnes or 322,000 tonnes less than the state order. Almost 2 million tonnes remained in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz siloes. Nevertheless, oblast leaders repeatedly beseeched the central organs to allocate them extra feed and food grain. Crop farmers in Bashkortostan threshed an average of 20 quintals per hectare. They produced 5.2 million tonnes of grain. They sold the state 1.4 million tonnes. You would think that the local

granaries are not empty. However, they sent petitioners to the USSR State Commission for Food and Purchases to ask for grain for internal farm needs. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan had quite a lot of grain left in their siloes but did not fulfill the state order for sales.

[Totskiy] I have heard it said that the state buys output from kolkhozes and sovkhozes, sends it to the all-Union fund, and leaves nothing for local consumption.

[Timoshishin] Let us examine that claim. Grain and meat and dairy products from state resources are usually sent to consumers in those oblasts, krays, and republics where they are produced and bought. The all-Union consumer is allocated no more than one-fifth of that produce. Last year, for example, out of 10.8 million tonnes of meat only 1.9 million tonnes went to the all-Union fund with 500,000 tonnes sent as subsidy to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. The rest was "consumed" in the areas of production.

Now for milk. Last year, 77 million tonnes of milk were bought on farms. The all-Union fund received 13.2 million tonnes but about 80 percent was used to supply the local population. So much for the rumors that nothing is left for local consumers...

[Totskiy] The conclusion may be drawn from our conversation, Mikhail Lukich, that unless urgent measures are taken to create state resources, the food situation will become ominous?

[Timoshishin] Precisely. Many farms in commercial grain producing zones no longer have an incentive to cultivate it. Why? The reasons are well known. The poor buying power of the ruble and the sharp reduction in supplies of tractors, combines, chemical plant protection agents, and other material and technical resources to the countryside. In addition, kolkhozes and sovkhozes now use grain extensively for barter with industrial, construction, and other enterprises. The absence of price parity for industrial and agricultural output does not boost their interest in increasing grain sales to the state either.

It is also vexing that the main grain-producing republics—Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—are disrupting interrepublic supplies.

I do not want to make gloomy forecasts about the future but the situation compels me. In many places a clearly undesirable trend has been observed—to negotiate in the procurement contract [dogovor o kontraktatsii] for a reduction of grain sales. It is clear to see in the actions of leaders in Bashkortostan, Krasnodar and Altay Krays, and Volgograd, Orenburg, Omsk, Kurgan, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Khmelnitskiy, Ternopol, and some other oblasts. And it is surely no coincidence that the procurement contract for this year covers only 54.2 million tonnes of grain instead of the 83 percent envisaged by the economic agreement between the USSR and the republics and 12 million tonnes less than last year. Is it the case that for farms to meet their food tax and state order we have to return to the "iron hand" of the administrative edict system? Heaven forbid. But it is time to understand that we cannot survive without reliable state food resources.

Scientific

Details of 'Okean' Satellite Program Published

PM0606105791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jun 91 Union Edition p 1

[TASS report: "'Okean' Launched"]

[Text] The "Okean" satellite was launched from the Soviet Union by a "Tsiklon" launcher 4 June 1991.

The main mission of the launch is to obtain prompt oceanographic information and data on the ice situation in the interests of various Soviet national economic sectors and international cooperation.

The satellite has been placed in orbit with the following parameters: maximum distance from the earth's surface (apogee), 679 km; minimum distance from the earth's surface (perigee), 652 km; orbital inclination, 82.5 degrees; initial orbital period, 97.8 minutes.

Complexes of scanning, optical, mechanical, and radiophysical equipment are installed on the satellite.

Information will be received from the satellite at the State Scientific Research Center for the Study of Natural Resources and at autonomous USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology information reception centers for processing and dissemination.

Moscow Links Nuclear Safety With Economic Aid

AU0506144191 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 5 Jun 91 p 10

["mj" report: "Moscow Poses Condition for Aid"]

[Text] Bonn—The USSR obviously makes the acceptance of Western aid for better safety equipment for its nuclear power plants dependent on the extent to which the forthcoming London summit of the seven leading Western industrialized countries are ready to provide economic aid. According to information obtained by DIE WELT, this is why FRG Environment Minister Toepfer met with only hesitating interest from Soviet Nuclear Energy Minister Konovalov concerning his plan to set up, together with Western partners, a program involving billions for the reequipment of Soviet nuclear power plants. As was learned yesterday after Toepfer's return, "for the time being" Konovalov insisted on the standpoint that the Western European reservations concerning nuclear power plant safety are exaggerated.

Within the framework of the joint environmental committee, which has been working since 1988, Toepfer agreed with his Moscow coounterpart Vorontsov on the

establishment of a private German-Soviet environmental office in Bonn to establish contacts between enterprises for environmental technology. In addition, a joint nature preservation prize is to be donated, and next year a "Rhine-Volga Symposium" is to be held, which is to make the experiences of the littoral states of the Rhine in improving the river's water quality "usable" for the Volga.

Concerning the promise by Soviet Defense Minister Yazov to support a rapid stock-taking of the environmental damage left upon withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Germany, Toepfer proposed that the Soviets should take—"with their own means"—aerial photographs of their about 1,000 premises for joint evaluation. This would be a first step toward the desired goal of a closely coordinated "work program." The question of who is responsible for payment was excluded from the discussion. Bonn has allocated 540 million German marks for "direct aversion of danger" by 1994. According to international law, the sending state must "on principle" pay for the removal of damage caused by the army.

Military

Defense Ministry Denies Military Role in Gulf

LD0706082191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0737 GMT 7 Jun 91

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jun (TASS)—A report was circulated here today from the press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense which condemns the spreading of false information about the participation of Soviet servicemen in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

The report says: "An inquiry has come into the USSR Ministry of Defense from a group of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] peoples deputies in connection with rumors about the participation of servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. In particular the inquiry contains a reference to a statement by relatives of servicemen who maintain that "there have been instances where families have received 'fatality notifications' in which it is indicated: 'Died in the Persian Gulf.'"

In reply to this inquiry, dispatched efficiently by RSFSR peoples deputies, it is once again stressed unambiguously that Soviet servicemen did not undertake any kind of participation in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. More than that, in carrying out the instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Defense Ministry halted military and technical cooperation with Iraq. On 9 January 1991, that is, before combat action began, all military specialists were returned to the USSR.

In this way not one action of ours in the international arena implied—and even with the most uncontrolled fantasy could not imply—any kind of participation by Soviet combat, auxilliary, or any kind of other troops or formations in combat actions in the region of the Persian Gulf. Speculation about this has no foundation whatsoever.

As for reference in the letter by 17 RSFSR peoples deputies to the statements by relatives of servicemen about their having received the aforementioned "fatality notifications," it is proposed that there should be at least one serious investigation into who is blatantly spreading false information and into whose clutches certain peoples deputies are falling so easily. The reply contains a request to send to the USSR Ministry of Defense at least one of these "fatality notifications" with an indication of who it was sent by and who received it.

"Isn't it finally time to expose those people who fabricate such falsehoods and rap the knuckles of provocateurs who speculate in criminal fashion over the precious feelings of relatives?"

Moiseyev on Results of Gulf War, Armed Forces

LD0606220191 Moscow TASS in English 2145 GMT 6 Jun 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow June 7 TASS—"The main conclusion drawn at our conference is that political means failed to prevent the Gulf war, although the possibility existed," Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, told TASS after a scientific conference on the results of the Gulf war.

The war's specific feature was that the multinational forces used various means of armed struggle, including old, modern and those which are not in service yet, Moiseyev said.

Analysing the results of the war, Moiseyev said that some people use them as "a pretext" for making immediate changes in the military reform in the Soviet Armed Forces.

He said that "we cannot fully agree with this viewpoint. We should not link the results of the war with the reform in the Soviet Armed Forces launched in 1987".

Moiseyev believes that "the changed balance of military and political forces in the world, the changes that have happened and are continuing to take place in the country's domestic and foreign policy and new approaches towards the defence efficiency and security of our state" have a major influence on the development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

All this calls for the need to specify some provisions in the military doctrine, make amendments to the strategy, the operative art and the tactics, and carry out qualitative changes in the Armed Forces's structure.

He pointed to the fact that many people, including in the USSR, try to present the results and the lessons of the war in "a different, unrealistic light". "There is an

opinion that the Iraqi Army's defeat is the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces," he said.

"This is a deliberate and well planned propagandistic action with far-reaching political goals. It aims to provoke a public opinion that we are not powerful enough, that our army has lost its previous might, that we can be ignored, and that the time has come to dictate will to us. But these are illusions," Moiseyev said.

Defense Ministry Discusses Gulf War Results

LD0606160391 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS—A workshop at the Soviet Defence Ministry today discussed the results of the Gulf war.

Participants exchanged opinions on a wide range of issues, paying special attention to problems of raising requisite forces, preparing and conducting operations by coalition forces, ensuring operational, logistical and technical support, and using different arms of the services.

Summing up the results of the discussion, Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov set specific tasks of applying Gulf war experience to training Soviet command and military units.

Gorbachev Lays Groundwork for Nuclear Tests

LD0506100391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT 5 Jun 91

[Text] USSR President Gorbachev will address the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic with an official proposal to carry out two nuclear explosions as a physics experiment at the Semipalatinsk testing ground in December. The force of one of the explosions will not exceed 20 kilotons and the force of the other will not exceed one kiloton, Nurtazin, chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources, said to a POSTFAKTUM correspondent. According to him, the draft decree by the USSR president envisages complete closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground and its conversion into a scientific-research and scientific-production center under Union-republican subordination. Payment of compensation to the population of this region of Kazakhstan totaling 3.5 billion rubles [R] over a period of 4 to 5 years, and R1 billion for capital construction, will also be submitted to the republican parliament.

Moscow Meeting Marks Border Guards Day

PM0706074591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "In Honor of a Holiday"]

[Text] There was a meeting of troops, veterans, members of the border guard troops, and representatives of the capital's public in the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Central Club in Moscow on 27 May to celebrate Border Guards' Day.

The presidium comprised O.D. Baklanov, deputy chairman of the Defense Council under the USSR president; L.V. Sharin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Affairs; O.S. Shenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and Lieutenant General M.S. Surkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the All-Army Party Committee.

The meeting was opened by Colonel General I.Ya. Kalinichenko, chief of the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops.

Lieutenant General K.Ye. Kortelaynen, first deputy chief of the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops, delivered the report.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Warns Soviet Troops May Attack

LD0606105991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the parliament, has warned about the threat of attacks against Lithuania and especially against the Lithuanian police.

Speaking on television this afternoon [5 June] he stressed that various reactionary political forces, the Soviet occupation forces in Lithuania, [word indistinct], the Black Berets, and the paratroopers are ready for an attack in the next few days while the president Gorbachev of the Soviet Union is away.

"According to available information the new army units arriving in Lithuania are supplied with bullet proof shields which allows us to conclude that preparations have been made to attack people in the street or even the buildings that are being protected," the chairman of the parliament said.

Commenting on rumors being spread in Moscow that, allegedly, on 7 June the Lithuanian police will attack the unit of the Soviet OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out that this could give rise to hysterical moods in some places and give justification for a first strike. The information available to us coincides with the one above, that this time the strike could be directed not at the customs houses, parliament, or the Department for the Defense of the Country but against the Lithuanian police or the entire system of internal affairs. The aim of this could be to attempt to split the police and, what is most important, to disarm it, the leader of the parliament stressed.

He also noted that care has been taken that events of this kind should not harm the president of the Soviet Union, his policies, and his hopes for the granting of huge credits abroad. Vytautas Landsbergis reported that today the chairman of the Soviet parliament is explaining to deputies in the parliament that before his departure for Norway M. Gorbachev summoned top-ranking officials to find out if they were planning to take any actions in Lithuania and that he had received assurances that no such actions would be taken.

Therefore, if any actions does take place the president will not be to blame at all. He will be seen as having taken care to prevent such actions. Some generals are too small fry; they could then be sacrificed for the promised credits from the West, but then what a job would have been done, said Vytautas Landsbergis.

Vytautas Landsbergis wrote an open letter to President Mikhail Gorbachev today urging the Soviet leader to declare publicly that military force against the Republic of Lithuania will not be used any more. V. Landsbergis also urged President Gorbachev to start constructive negotiations so that relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union can become normal.

Army Activity Observed

LD0606200891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 6 Jan 91

[Text] At noon on 5 June the residents of Panevezys and Pasvalys rayons were watching a strange procession. A column of 19 military vehicles, moving without hurry, at parade speed, was driving from Lithuania in the direction of Latvia. The vehicles were full of people dressed in civilian clothes. They were not of conscript age.

That evening military vehicles stopped at the OMON [special purpose militia detachment] base in Vilnius. Young men dressed in sports training suits emerged from them. Yellow bands were tied on their blue sleeves.

Almost 100 men with submachine guns wearing olive berets have arrived in the northern outskirts in Vilnius, where the headquarters of General Uskopchik are situated. It seems that they too were not conscripts.

These facts were mentioned at today's briefing at the Supreme Council. The Soviet Army is disguising itself in this way in Lithuania.

Since Monday evening when groups of armed patrols were dispersed in Vilnius, Army activity has not decreased. Officials at the general staff of the Soviet Ministry of Defense call it a campaign for the spring draft. As is known, a similar autumn-winter action ended with the events of 13 January.

Units of civilian soldiers will probably soon receive material reinforcements. Controllers at the Vilnius airport have asked some enterprises to collect their freight as soon as possible. Storage platforms there, they explained, are required for military ammunition.

Army Attack Feared

OW0706024491 Moscow BALTFAX in English 0930 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] According to the chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis, "information from different sources indicates that troops stationed in the republic as well as the CPSU, the KGB, the black berets and paratroopers acting as black berets are preparing for aggressive actions." "This might happen in the nearest future while President Gorbachev is in Norway," he said on Lithuanian television on Wednesday.

The Lithuanian leader spoke of rumours in Moscow that the Lithuanian Interior Minister intends to "get hold of" the black berets. "This can only make us smile, while the black berets can use it as a pretext for a first attack," Landsbergis said. He claimed to have information that this time the attack will be directed not against customs checkpoints, but the police in order to split and disarm them.

Landsbergis urged the population to be cautious and not give in to provocations, especially on June 12—the day of presidential elections in the Russian Federation.

Commentary From Moscow

LD0606213491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] There have been conflicting reports about developments in Lithuania, and what happened on Monday 3 June was no exception and is still the subject of mass media comment. Commentary is by Vyacheslav Solovyev, and this is what he writes:

As Army posts were set up in parts of the capital Vilnius, including bridges, crossroads, the airport, and outside the Parliament building on Monday night, the Lithuanian leader, a Mr. Landsbergis, spoke on independent television warning the residents of Vilnius and the republic about the danger of new aggression and casualties. He suggested that Soviet troops might attempt to seize the Parliament building and government offices at night, but by 1 AM on Tuesday the patrols were withdrawn and all the troops returned to their barracks. So what did happen in Vilnius?

Military officials insist it was just routine patrolling. General Viktor Avdeyev of the Soviet General Army Staff explains:

[Avdeyev in Russian fading to english report] The general says Army patrolling in Vilnius, as elsewhere in the country, was part of the routine, intended to heighten discipline among servicemen and occasionally to detain deserters. He said the number of Army patrols have been reduced since January's event in the Lithuanian capital and patrolling suspended in central Vilnius.

Gen. Avdeyev spoke of an increase in the nunmber of servicemen in Vilnius because of demobilization and conscription campaigns. Besides, he said, a number of army facilities, such as the officers' club, call-up stations, and army booking offices are all in the central part of the capital.

The general spoke of increased incidence of attacks on soldiers, which caused the garrison commander to resume patrolling in central Vilnius on 3 June. Security was tightened at the railway and bus stations as well as at the airport. Gen. Avdeyev said the garrison commander's decision was constitutional.

Well, it might be just that, but it's a pity that such actions should be held in a way that fuels the already high tensions there. The situation in Vilnius is now back to normal, but it's worthwhile notifying the local authorities if such actions are to be taken in the future.

Central Paper Views Events

PM0706083191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 p 1

[A. Korzun report: "A Colonel Is a Law Unto Himself If the Army Serves Politicians Rather Than the People"]

[Text] "It was an ordinary patrol"—this was how Colonel Grigoriy Belous, military commandant of Vilnius, described to us yesterday the nighttime movements of Soviet Army servicemen in the Lithuanian capital. "True, the patrolling was carried out on an intensified footing, but this did not contravene our powers."

However, experience of the clumsy Baltic policy, implementaiton of which includes the participation of the USSR Armed Forces, puts one in mind all the time of the possibility of a new wave of tension...

So it was on Monday in Vilnius, when at approximately around 2100 hours numerous military checkpoints were set up on certain of the city's bridges, at intersections, and at the airport, and soldiers surrounded the buildings of the republic parliament, the Lithuanian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and other government institutions. Why? Rudzinsksas Sauljus, an employee of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Information Bureau, told our correspondent that although the military had not undertaken any active operations, they had nevertheless broken the law: They had checked civilians' documents.

However, Vilnius Military Commandant G. Belous replied to us that the military patrols had been trying by this means to catch Lithuanian deserters—"Too many of them have been appearing in the city."

At 2300 hours Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman Vytautis Landsbergis appeared on independent television and appealed to the inhabitants of Vilnius and the whole republic: "As a result of the actions of Soviet troops a real threat of new aggression and new casualties has arisen." Landsbergis, according to the information passed on to us from Vilnius, supposed that Soviet Army soldiers could make an attempt to seize the parliament and other administrative buildings during the night.

The republic leadership informed the secretariat of Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, and Colonel General Fedor Kuzmin, commander of Baltic Military District, about the increased tension, but no kind of intelligible answer was forthcoming. Gen. Uskholchik, chief of the Vilnius garrison, also refused to give an explanation. Only in the morning did it emerge that the orders for the patrol were given by Col. Belous, commandant of Vilnius.

The results of the document checks are contradictory: According to some sources, two men were detained, but Aleksandr Luchko said that he had had reports of the detention of seven suspects. Of these only Vjaceslav Tozik, who is charged with going absent without leave from his unit and whose case is now with the prosecutor's office, is still under arrest.

Well, on the eve of Nobel Prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev's departure for Norway and Sweden, countries which support the idea of Baltic independence, the military have prepared an unfortunate present for their country's president.

Lithuanian 'Canard' Exposed

PM0606150591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 Second Edition p 2

[Yu. Stroganov report: "Birth of a 'Canard'"]

[Text] Nothing of the sort happened! No one surrounded the parliament, no one prepared to seize it. Garrison patrols went out into the streets in the evening following routes laid down long ago. Their action was prompted by the complex crime situation in the republic's capital, and the tension in the relations between certain forces and the military. The latest beatings of officers and men were the last straw. It is possible that the appearance of the patrols (which are in accordance with Soviet laws, incidentally) alarmed the parliamentarians, and that they believed that an attack against the Supreme Soviet was being mounted. But it is also likely that someone wanted to avail themselves of the situation to organize another provocation against the military. Whatever the case, Lithuania's "independent television" broadcast an appeal, just like in January, to defend the parliament against a nonexistent aggression.

People responded to the appeal much less actively than in the winter, but, nonetheless, a crowd began to gather at the Supreme Soviet building. Realizing that in such a situation any sort of provocation was possible, the patrols withdrew.

Shortly afterward the "independent television" announced that those who were intending to come to the square need not come because, allegedly, the danger had passed. However, the "canard" had been released. In order to somehow justify the night's action, and perhaps also to pour oil onto the flames of the anti-Army provocation, the parliamentarians proposed to Sajudis the organization of a permanent guard in the square, again just as in January. In my opinion, if they had really believed that an attack was being mounted on the parliament, they would not have allowed those who had already gathered in the square to disperse.

Views on OMON Attack on Border Posts Cited

PM0606161391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 p 1

[V. Tkachuk report: "OMON: Hitting the Road Alone"]

[Text] It is a well known fact that it is far easier to commit some illegal act than to accept responsibility for it. After the attack by the Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] on Latvian customs posts, no one has admitted responsibility, at least in full.

BALTFAX reports that Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Prosecutor V. Dakusis stated that the Prosecutor's Office was aware of possible actions at the customs posts but no one knew what form they would take. E. Johanson, chairman of Latvian SSR KGB, says in a newspaper interview that his staffers were not informed of OMON's intentions.

And finally, the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Center (and it is the Union ministry to which the Riga OMON is subordinate) issued a statement giving a legal assessment of the action. The Baltic republics' establishment of customs borders and creation of customs posts contravenes Union laws, the statement says. In addition, "blatant violations of legality were committed" in the course of customs examinations—for instance produce and industrial goods were confiscated. The prosecutor's representations on this matter were given no attention in the republics. The statement goes on to say: "It was in these conditions that actions were carried out with the participation of the Riga and Vilnius Special Purpose Militia Detachments to clear a number of customs posts on the Latvian and Lithuanian borders. It should be stressed that these measures were implemented without the orders of the USSR MVD."

It turns out that the OMON militiamen have been made into whipping boys (the ambiguity here is entirely apt). No one gave orders—they made their own bed, let them lie in it. We called OMON's Riga base and asked Ceslav Mlinnik, the base commander, to comment on the situation.

"Political prostitutes have always existed," Mlinnik replied, "but we will survive this." Then he said that he did not wish to participate in "lice checks" and did not intend to explain any further. Nevertheless he added that "OMON alone is not capable of closing off the border and clearing so many customs posts." In his words they "worked" at only two, and the remaining posts had been burned down before their arrival.

We also asked him to confirm or deny the rumors of OMON being redeployed to the Baltic Fleet base. Ceslav expressed himself darkly: "Rumors are unconfirmed facts. If they are talking about a new base, so much the better. They said we had cracked up, that we had disintegrated, but we are alive and we will survive."

Lithuanian Economic Problems, Policies Assessed

PM0606154591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Captain Second Rank V. Gromak report: "Landsbergis' Hand Hung in the Air... Lithuania: Economic Commentary"]

[Text] Against a background of half-empty shelves, "murderous" price lists, and the other joyless fruits of the forced privatization carried out by the Lithuanian parliament, V. Landsbergis can perhaps do no more than try to cheer up his fellow citizens with maxims of the

type "The West will help us." But these words can scarcely be greeted with the previous enthusiasm. For some reasons foreign countries are in no hurry to spend precious money on the policies of the new Lithuanian leaders.

Photojournalist K. Jankauskas, who caught a moment during the meeting of the heads of the three Baltic republics in the White House, did not suspect that his photograph would unwittingly symbolize the result of Landsbergis' latest visit to the United States. The photograph was taken at the moment when V. Landsbergis, who had just stood up from behind the table, and U.S. President G. Bush, held their hands out to each other, but their hands were frozen in mid-air at different levels and did not meet in a handshake... Of course the photojournalist had "jumped the gun." But the fact remains that the hearing in the U.S. congressional committee on security and cooperation in Europe and various kinds of contacts with public figures and politicians—the purpose, strictly speaking, of the voyage across the ocean—were not "fruitful" for the Lithuanian leadership this time either. Mr. Landsbergis did not hear what he wanted to hear anyway. You cannot help reflecting seriously on the words of A. Klimajtis, one of the leaders of the Lithuanian emigre movement and at the same time an employee of the European Parliament apparatus: "For the European Community, Lithuania is part of the economic and political system of the Soviet Union. That is why it deems diplomatic recognition of the independence of the Lithuanian Republic premature."

As is known, almost immediately after V. Landsbergis' return from his trip to the United States, Lithuanian Prime Minister G. Vagnorius sent a telegram to the USSR leadership in which he expressed his intention to participate in the implementation of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers program for getting the economy out of the crisis. For many people such an about-turn in Lithuanian policy came unexpectedly. After all, literally the week before this the Lithuanian Government had completely rejected talks of this kind, opting for a totally independent line. I decided to obtain a clarification on this matter from K. Antanavicius, a Lithuanian parliamentary deputy and chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Permanent Economic Commission. Unfortunately I did not manage to speak to him because that day Antanavicius went abroad. So I had to use the services of the weekly ATGIMIMAS, which had published comments by K. Antanavicius under the heading "Yesterday and Tomorrow." Here are a few of the economist's opinions: "Nature and the environment were favorably disposed to us. And what about us? Alas, as I see it, we were our own enemies, we were not distinguished either by our wisdom or by a feeling of responsibility. We are standing like sheep before a new gate—waiting; there has been no progress either in politics or in the economy. But worst of all, we are not using all our possibilities, or looking for various paths and ways out. Sometimes it seems that the ship is floating on without a rudder or sails, while for the captain the most important thing is not to raise the sail and sort things out but, surrounding himself with a company of jokers, to tell new stories and dream about a royal crown..."

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of informing readers of one of the economic stories which are popular in Lithuania and which the citizens are regaled with. Thus, for example, a certain R. Gajaskajte from the "Sajudis" united faction talked herself into accusing Moscow of eating Lithuanian food: "Moscow is afraid of losing Lithuania as a constant supplier of food... If it recognizes Lithuania as an autonomous state, then Moscow will have to pay for our produce in currency, which it does not want to do..."

What can you say, these are "strong" arguments. But it is known that food from Lithuania is now going in a completely different direction than to Moscow. For instance, cheese. It is now being exported to the Netherlands, and Lithuanian cheese makers have concluded a contract with this country. So Moscow is neither here nor there.

But this is an amusing example rather than a serious one. Sober-minded politicians and economists are primarily reflecting on what autonomy will cost Lithuania. To make this idea clearer, let me cite the opinion of Yu. Veselka, chief of the Lithuanian Ministry of Economics Strategic Planning Department, whom it is hard to suspect of having sympathies toward Moscow. So, Yu. Veselka calculated that even at the most modest assessments, the republic will have to spend $3,700 million on oil, gas, coal, agricultural produce, the spare parts needed to operate equipment that has already been installed, and the purchase of ferrous and nonferrous metals. Perhaps the republic is in a position to cover this—to put it bluntly—astronomical sum with the resources it receives from export? Here too everything is calculated. Even at best, exports of industrial output will give the republic 1,700 million. To make ends meet, another $2 billion is needed.

V. Novickas, Lithuanian minister of economics, has a different point of view. He believes that Veselka is formulating the problem in a statistical way. He is apparently not taking into consideration the possible structural changes in the economy. And after all, these might yield a great deal in conjunction with saving resources and expanding exports. The republic could easily sell articles of linen, leather, and so on, on the international market, and not only in the USSR. And indeed, the minister believes, they could get dollars instead of rubles for refrigerators. According to him, you also cannot ignore the television manufacturing complex that exists in Lithuania...

As you can see, the minister has a priori "handed over" to Lithuania the complex of television plants which is one of the subjects of talks between the USSR and Lithuania. And indeed, Novickas' other arguments, you will agree, are based on fairly tenuous assumptions of the

"might be" type. That is why the majority of economists in Lithuania are inclined to take Yu. Veselka's side. After all, Lithuania can only obtain the $1.7 billion—which will not save it anyway—from trade with the USSR. At the moment it does not have any opportunities to fight its way into the super-competitive Western market: The quality of the output for sale is too low and its cost price is too high. And what would happen if the USSR decided to send its dollars to buy meat not in Lithuania, but, for instance, in France? After all, such a thing is also quite possible...

These are the realities today. Speaking at the second conference of the consultative council of political parties and movements, V. Landsbergis was forced to state: "Lithuania is faced with new trials. It will have to live in very difficult conditions..." Admittedly he immediately found a "way out" of the situation, accompanied by the usual collection of propaganda slogans about national exclusivity and the expected mythical prosperity. But increasing numbers of people in Lithuania have long since understood that there is no other choice than to repeal all the anticonstitutional acts it adopted after 11 March of last year, and sign the Union Treaty. Unfortunately the separatist majority of parliamentarians do not support this option. As a result it will become increasingly difficult for ordinary people to live in Lithuania. "We will undoubtedly have to tighten our belts still further," V. Gudas writes about this in the newspaper LIETUVOS RYTAS. "There are still some belts left in the stores..."

Latvia, Soviet Union Begin Consultations

LD0606185991 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1730 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Consultations between the delegations of Latvia and the Soviet Union formed for the discussion of the complex of political, economic, and social questions began today in Jurmala.

The delegation of Latvia is led by Ilmars Bisers, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the delegation of the Soviet Union, formed by a decree of the USSR president, is headed by USSR First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Velichko.

During the first half of the day the delegations discussed the further agenda and the documents prepared for the consultations by the delegation of Latvia. The focus was on economic relations between Latvia and the USSR, and also questions of finances, credits, and mutual deliveries.

During the lunch break the USSR delegation met the representatives of the United Council of Working People who were picketing near the place of the talks.

A special working group was formed for discussing the political questions proposed by the delegation of Latvia. The talks between delegations will continue tomorrow. After that a press conference will be held.

Second Round Begins

LD0606170191 Moscow TASS in English 1022 GMT 6 Jun 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Jurmala June 6 TASS— The second round of the meeting between Latvian and Soviet delegations began in this resort city today. The delegations, led by Deputy Prime Ministers Ilmars Bisers and Vladimir Velichko, will discuss for two days a package of political, social and economic measures.

The first round of the dialogue took place in the Kremlin on April 11. Its participants discussed mostly organisational and procedural matters. They outlined problems to be discussed and decided to create joint working groups. The guest delegation that arrived in Jurmala on Wednesday includes 25 experts. They, the same as officials, received a package of proposals of the Latvian side in mid-May.

On Wednesday, on the eve of the meeting, the republican government analysed at its session Latvia's stand with regard to economic relations with the Soviet Union. It is interested in preserving the existing ties. Latvian officials believe that it would be reasonable to introduce account-settling on the basis of clearing, using the Soviet Union's domestic prices and those of the world market.

They expressed readiness to take part in joint programmes for increasing the production of raw materials—oil, coal and gas, as well as in the distribution of foreign currency credits. However, Latvia wishes to pay back its share of credits by itself, including debt servicing. It wants to take under its jurisdiction all enterprises located on its territory and assume responsibility for customs control.

The Latvian side intends to include in the agenda of the current meeting items dealing with the activities of federal law-enforcement agencies on the territory of the republic and the status of the Soviet Armed Forces. Members of the delegation stressed on more than one occasion that the gaining of de-facto independence by the republic should be the main objective of the contacts.

The only representative of the opposition—leader of the parliamentary minority group Sergey Dimanis—was expelled from the Latvian delegation between the first and second rounds of the dialogue. The group that accounts for one third of the seats reflects the interests of those social and ethnic sections of the population which voted for opposition members at the elections. This is why 67 representatives of industrial enterprises decided to seek a meeting with the Soviet delegation. Their envoy met the guest delegation at the airport on Wednesday.

Estonian Deputy Views Independence Propects

LD0606201191 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0600 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Mikk Titma, member of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, has spent some time in Germany, where he spoke at several institutes dealing with the issues of the East. As he put it himself, he met some very well-informed people. Titma is convinced that a decision was recently taken in the White House to support both USSR President Gorbachev and the Baltic states' renewed independence.

In today's PAEVALEHT, Toomas Sildam sums up Mikk Titma's opinions. In Titma's view, we should in the future concentrate on a peaceful foreign policy while observing Estonian interests. Popular diplomacy must be abandoned. Bush, for example, has warned Landsbergis that a policy degrading Gorbachev and the USSR is harmful to the Baltic states themselves. Our independence is a certainty. Only if something very grave happens in Russia [as heard] can the Baltic states' normal future, be thwarted, Titma says, adding that we have achieved our maximum in the West; now we have to turn eastward to get the maximum over there, too.

Impact of Freeing Agricultural Prices in Estonia

LD0606173291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0200 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] As has already been reported, by decision of the Estonian government, from 1 July free prices will be in operation on agricultural products. This is what our correspondent Heimar Lenk reports on this.

[Lenk] In other words this government decision means the cessation of state supplies of agricultural goods to the population. That is, the transition to the free market. No funds, state orders or state prices will be in effect any longer. Direct market contacts will be in operation between the producers, that is the collective and state farms, joint-stock societies and farmers and the shops. As an analysis shows, today an excessive part of food prices is made up of the costs of processing, transport, storing of goods at various depots, warehouses and so forth. For example, at the present time the state purchase price for meat in Estonia ranges from five to eight rubles [R] per kg. The retail prices ranges from R20 to R30. This means that various state middlemen who are interested in artificially high prices receive much more than the producer. It is expected that within the free market the role of various trade directorates and trading organizations, depots and so forth, will sharply decline.

From 1 July the state will set tariffs for the processing of agricultural produce. This means that, after processing, not the meat packing combine as previously but the farmer himself will sell his goods to the trade network, that is directly to the shops. Consequently, the rural entrepreneur, the farmer, will no longer be interested in artificially raised prices. He will be more interested in his goods finding buyers, and the more this happens, the better.

Incidentally, in the coming week it is planned to privatize one- fifth of all this trade in agricultural products in the republic. Thus, a step toward the market has been taken by the Estonian government. Only the near future, following 1 July, will show whether it is justified.

RSFSR

Presidential Candidates Continue Campaign 6 Jun

LD0606193591 Moscow TASS in English 1911 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS—"A market is a not a goal in itself but a necessary instrument to stabilise economy. This is a distinguishing feature of my position," said former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who is now running for Russian presidency.

He visited the Moscow's first watch-making factory, one of the largest watch-making factories in the country.

Women account for almost 70 per cent of the factory's employees.

Galina Andreyeva, a factory departmental chief, said her employees support Nikolay Ryzhkov and Chairman of the Russian Parliament Boris Yeltsin.

The former is popular for his intention to cut prices, primarily on goods for children, and his firm opposition to the privatisation of apartments.

A common Soviet worker earns about 350 roubles, which is not enough for decent living under the Russian Government's policy.

Some higher educational establishments in Moscow also support Ryzhkov. They appealed to students from other Russian colleges to support Ryzhkov and his programme for protecting young people in Russia.

Another claimant to the Russian presidency Vadim Bakatin, former Soviet interior minister, on Thursday met residents of Voronezh, southern Russia. He proclaims a civilised policy of national reconciliation to rescue the republic from the crisis.

Boris Yeltsin on Thursday participated in an hour-long tv interview.

Other candidates, including leader of the Soviet Liberal-Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Chairman of Kemerovo Regional Council Aman Tuleyev and Commander of the Privolzhsko-Uralsky Military District General Albert Makashov continue campaigning in various Russian regions.

Yeltsin Discusses Candidacy, Issues, Rivals

LD0606203191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Interview with Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet Presidium and RSFSR presidential candidate, with Igor Fesunenko, from the "Who's Who" program—live]

[Text] [Fesunenko] Good evening, esteemed comrades. A special edition of the program "Who's Who" is on the air again for the fifth time; in his program we introduce the contenders for the post of the presidency of Russia. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has just entered the studio: Actually three minutes ago. [addressing Yeltsin] Boris Nikolayevich, welcome. I know that terrible rain has hit Moscow and you were nearly late for the program. I am glad you have managed to arrive on time.

[Yeltsin] I, too, am glad.

[Fesunenko] Greetings.

[Yeltsin] I would like to express my gratitude for the opportunity to speak on Central TV and especially to speak live. This is a rare occasion for me.

[Fesunenko] Good. So, we are beginning a live program on the air. I would like to remind you that we have a 12-channel telephone. The number for all the channels is: 217-45-43. You can see the number on the screen.

Before we begin to answer questions and give the floor to Boris Nikolayevich I would like to remind you that the last edition of this program will take place tomorrow at the same time. We are inviting Aman-Geldy Moldagazyyevich Tuleyev to the studio at 2000 tomorrow and on Monday 10 June, the concluding program, a roundtable, so to speak—a big program—will be held at 2200. All the candidates are invited to take part.

Boris Nikolayevich, will you come to our studio on Monday to meet all your five rivals?

[Yeltsin] The matter is that your invitation arrived after the programme of my trip throughout Russia had been compiled.

[Fesunenko interrupts] Maybe there is a way....

[Yeltsin] I am expected in Orenburg, Sverdlovsk, Smara and in the Komi [republic]....

[Fesunenko interrupts] Boris Nikolayevich, the point is that....

[Yeltsin] I would very much like to return to Moscow by 12 June in order to vote for somebody.

[Fesunenko] Where will you be on 10 June?

[Yeltsin] In Samara.

[Fesunenko] In Samara? Well, that is only two hours flight away. Why don't you fly in for the evening and then continue your trip?

[Yeltsin] I think that we are wasting time.

[Fesunenko] Zhirinovskiy is eager for a fight. He is challenging you. [laughs]

[Yeltsin] He is welcome. He can fight entire Russia 24 hours a day.

[Fesunenko] Well, all right, we are inviting you. We shall see—it is, naturally, your right to decide whether you come or not.

[Unidentified voice reads screen captions] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Born 1931 in the village of Butka, Sverdlovsk Oblast. Russian, non-party member. After graduating from the Urals Polytechnical Institute he worked in the construction industry. For 19 years he was a party worker, and was elected candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. USSR people's deputy. At the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies he was elected chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. Married, with two daughters and three grandchildren. [photo of Yeltsin and condensed version of above text shown, with final words "Central Election Committee information"]

[Fesunenko] Boris Nikolayevich, I will begin the same way as I began the previous four programs. I remind you that we announced our guests beforehand, and publicized our telephone number, and we have received a mass of letters—here is a small part of the letters, telegrams and telephone calls which have arrived in the last few days, including today. I must say that you have received a very large post, a mass of letters wishing you well. There are, of course, those who do not wish you well, just as with any other candidate.

But before going over to specific quewstions and answers, I want to ask the first question myself. Yesterday we met in this same studio, and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov was sitting in your chair. Did you watch this program? What can you say about this program and my interlocutor yesterday?

[Yeltsin] Well, unfortunately I did not manage to see it yesterday, since I flew in late from Chelyabinsk. But I was told about this program. Regarding my attitude to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, I have known him a long time, as far back as Sverdlovsk. I was a party worker, he was general director of Uralmashzavod, and we had contacts at that time. Then he moved to Moscow to work. In general our contacts continued. What can I say favorably about Nikolay Ivanovich? Of course, he has great production experience of work. Experience of work in the party central comittee, in the State Planning Committee, in the Council of Ministers. Great experience. The ability to analyze. The ability, so to speak, to somehow bring to light problems, calmly, in a balanced way. A man who is able to mix with people. On the whole

he has a sufficient number of positive qualities to be a candidate for the role of Russian Federation president. I never speak about the negative qualities of the candidates. That is my rule.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. I must say that about three years ago I met a colleague, an English journalist working in Moscow, Penelope, correspondent for the British television company ITN, and she said that here, she liked the atmosphere during our election campaign more than in England. She said that in England all the candidates try to throw dirt at each other, and say almost nothing about their programs. Here, she said, the candidates as a rule speak about their programs. But, she said with regret, I fear that things here will end up sooner or later just as in England.

So you have behaved like a knight. Thank you. Now I want to remember, I ask you to remember that day, the first day when you became chairman of the Supreme Soviet. You remember how that struggle in the Russian Supreme Soviet developed with difficulty and over a long period. There were rivals, candidates. This lasted several days, there were many rounds of voting. You won by a slight margin. The country followed this struggle literally with bated breath and you were congratulated on your success. I want you to remember what you felt in that minute, apart, of course, from the feeling of joy, when you at last became chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

[Yeltsin] Well, first of all, the fact that the struggle, which had lasted several rounds, was at last over. I think that it exhausted all those who were standing. Secondly, along with a sense of happiness and satisfaction, there was a feeling of enormous responsibility for Russia and its future, its revival. It was with those feelings that I went to the platform.

[Fesunenko] Boris Nikolayevich, everyone naturally realizes and knows—and I think it is superfluous to recall this—that you are one of the most popular and well-known politicians and statesmen in our country. But let us face the facts. Lately—and this is reported on the radio, TV, the Vremya bulletin, and the press, and I think Vremya had a report yesterday—indications have started to appear of a certain decline in your standing. This has happened recently. The findings of the Russian Socio-Political Institute are cited, among others. What do you think of the figures? Do you believe them, or not? If they are right, how do you explain this phonomenon?

[Yeltsin] I think we have to approach this with a certain element of skepticism, perhaps, although certain tendencies of course do have to be taken into account in these public opinion polls. Declines do occur; well, we do have fluctuations from month to month. One month I am the most popular man in the Union. That may last for a month, then it goes down a bit, then it goes up again. This is of course a curve, and not a constant. So I think it is a natural thing in political life.

[Fesunenko] Now a few.... [Fesunenko changes thought] I think your economic and social program is quite well known. You have spoken a lot about it. I shall allow myself, if you have no objection, of course, and I understand that you do not want to make any preliminary statements....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] No.

[Fesunenko] So I understood correctly.... [Fesunenko changes thought] So let us embark on a few personal questions about you, so that viewers—both supporters and opponents, of course—can get to know you better. Your political views, your ideas and proposals are quite well known. Mind you, we will come to that later as well. But let us deal with purely personal tastes. In literature, who is your favorite author?

[Yeltsin] In this connection I would like to remind you that today is a very significant day. Today is the birthday of Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin, and I managed to lay flowers at the monument today.

[Fesunenko] Well, who is your favorite writer, by the way, in connection with this?

[Yeltsin] Chekhov, and among the poets, Pushkin.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. What have you read? I realize that you do not have all that much time for reading creative literature, well, during the past year, what did you find interesting?

[Yeltsin] Platonov was the last one I read. I have read all three of his latest works.

[Fesunenko] What is your attitude toward Solzhenitsyn and particularly his latest work "How Are We To Organize Russia?"

[Yeltsin] My attitude toward Solzhenitsyn now is of course perhaps not as in former times, undoubtedly. Some internal turnaround has taken place here in connection, so to speak, with the general turnaround. But, in this work of his, I believe that there is much that is very necessary and useful there which needs to be used. I do agree with it, but not with everything.

[Fesunenko] Boris Nikolayevich, I hope that you will not hold it against me if I ask you a personal question, the same question which I asked Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov yesterday, the question about health, because Nikolay Ivanovich has had an infarct. This worries everyone. You have also had a few problems with your health—you often write about this in the book. Yesterday, speaking with him, we even came to the conclusion that on the whole it would not be a bad thing if all candidates for high state posts—as is done in civilized countries—could on the whole be required to submit to some reliable, competent medical examination. Are you entirely happy about your health?

[Yeltsin] Yes. Those rumors that are constantly either appearing or vanishing to the effect that I had either one

infarct or two infarcts, etc, well, as they say, the rumors about my death are unconfirmed....

[Fesunenko] [laughs] Thank you.

[Yeltsin] As Mark Twain said. That is why I am quite healthy, I go in for sport. I play tennis twice a week and exert myself thoroughly. Of course, may God give such health to all others of my age.

[Fesunenko] Excellent, you have written a book, a fairly interesting book. I know that it was published abroad. I do not like rooting in someone else's purses and pockets, and I do not like for others doing it to me, but I simply ask: Have you not had the desire to donate part of your royalties to charity or something of this kind?

[Yeltsin] My answer is that it has been published in 32 countries and I at once set the condition that an anti-AIDS and charity public foundation must be set up with the bank. Royalties from all these countries are channelled only there, without my right to use that money for personal purposes. That is why I have not used a single dollar, so to speak. Regarding what is happening inside the country—books are being published—I also donate royalties to some charitable causes, to those oblasts which bring out my book. So that, for the time being, regarding book royalties, I have so far not managed to make use of anything.

[Fesunenko] Thank you, two or three more questions about your family, if you do not mind. What do your children do?

[Yeltsin] Well, my wife has retired. Two daughters: One is a mathematician, a computer scientist. She works at a plant. The other is a construction engineer.

[Fesunenko] Now, TV viewer (Kizdermisheva) from Maykop is asking—I do not know why this interests her—but her question is: What is your wife's nationality?

[Yeltsin] She is Russian.

[Fesunenko] Russian....

[Yeltsin] A Cossack from Orenburg. She is Russian. Probably it is her patronymic that worries you? Well, her father was....

[Fesunenko, interruping] Actually, I do not know what her patronymic is.

[Yeltsin] Iosifovna.

[Fesunenko] I know that here first name is Naina, if I am not mistaken.

[Yeltsin] Yes. But this is not, actually, her first name. When she was born, she was, actually, called and recorded in the birth certificate as Anastasiya. At the time they kept inventing shorter versions—you know how it happens with boys and girls in school—so this is how this name stuck to her.

[Fesunenko] Now to another question. Already starting to enter the sphere of your public and political activity, your views and so on. (Stepan Petrovich Kovalchuk), a worker—unfortunately, I do not know where he comes from—sends the following message by phone: Some time ago you spoke very sharply against privileges for leaders and thereby merited stormy approval on the part of ordinary people. However, now they say—Kovalchuk points out—that you are actually enjoying the same privileges. You have a state-owned dacha in Arkhangelskoye, you stay at health resorts for the elite, you enjoy privileged supplies and many other things. How can you account for this?

[Yeltsin] No, I cannot agree with this. My whole family lives the same way as any other Moscow family. No matter whether it is a family of workers or civil servants, who do not have any privileges. My wife spends three to four hours a day chasing around shops, like all the other unfortunate Moscow women.

[Fesunenko] Like my wife and like millions of others.

[Yeltsin] Quite right. So, in this respect, there are no privileges. As to health service, I am attached to a rayon clinic, which is not far form the house where I live, and I do not have any other privileges, like a health service at a specialized clinic. I have given that up.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. Now, to (Galina Nikolayevna Zharkova), an old-age pensioner from Moscow. She is wondering about your dacha matters. She read a recent issue of GLASNOST newspaper which carried a photograph of a house in Berezhki village of Solnechnogorsk Rayon, which, allegedly, had been previously used for a state farm kindergarten, while now, the newspaper says, your wife bought this enormous house, and, mind you, its cost at purchase, plus a plot of 20 sotkas was just 4,500 rubles. If this is so, could you please explain, (Galina Nikolayevna Zharkova) asks, how come that the price happened to be so low?

[Yeltsin] Since I am against state-owned dachas, and if you want a summer house, then you must have it built at your own expense—I think that every citizen now has a right to it—no matter what his social status is, so we started to look for a plot of land, and we found it. Now, next to this plot there was this dilapidated one-story litle house which we purchased together with the plot. It had not been used. It could not be used for a kindergarten; it is, actually, falling down.

This is a dilapidated building. But meeting glasnost halfway we, of course, put an end to it completely and refused both the house and the land.

[Fesunenko] Is this the one which is under discussion?

[Yeltsin] Yes, after the publication.

[Fesunenko] I congratulate you on this. Incidentally, a question of privileges is a tricky question. I, for example, think that any manager of a major enterprise, so to speak, I am not saying, a minister, I am not saying, a

leader of a republic, of course, has the right to have some privileges, say, a car, I do not know. Nazarbayev flies on his private plane. I do not see any crime here. But for some reason people are very interested in this and rumors on the subject go around fast.

[Yeltsin] You see, it has happened in our country that it has developed into an exaggerated form.

[Fesunenko] This is understandable: People live poorly and when somebody lives better it is annoying. I am not even condemning anyone for this.

[Yeltsin] This is exactly right. But if it were with your own money, well, it is probably o.k. But when all privileges are at the expense of the state and at the expense of the party cash-box, this, of course, arouses people's indignation.

[Fesunenko] That is clear. Boris Nikolayevich, well, I want to finish talking about personal subjects, so to speak, and then we will go over to social and economic issues and to your program etc. There are a few questions; I have chosen three typical ones. In connection with your last speech, in particular, (Pavel Ivanovich Dolnakov) from Sochi writes: At 2215 On 31 May there was a program on Russian TV, the program in which Yeltsin when answering a question from a foreign correspondent stated that there were five assassination attempts on his life and he asks who, when, and where these terrorists acts were committed, who their organizers were, and what measures were applied to those who were guilty. A similar question was asked by Comrade (Nogibin), a veteran border guard. He asks whether it really happened, and if so who was to blame and what was done to them, so to speak? There is a message, honestly, I do not know whether it is from people who are sympathizing with you or whether there is a concealed meaning here. Boris Nikolayevich, rumor has it that something will happen to you before the election, it seems, sensation is always in Yeltsin's interests. Calm us down, please, take care, look after yourself and after your health. (Shulgin) from Ryazan. So, there are three messages practically on the same subject.

[Yeltsin] Well, something is indeed always happening to me, just like today. When I was travelling to the studio....

[Fesunenko, interrupting] You got stuck in traffic and almost missed the program.

[Yeltsin] It took me an hour and 15 minutes to get here. Everywhere there were jams, jams on all the roads. As far as the five assassination attempts are concerned, I never said that. But it is true that something is always happening to me. There have been these chance incidents, and they are often difficult to explain. There was the dip—fully dressed—in the Moscow river. Then there was the car accident. Then that plane which came down. In general, these chance incidents have occurred.

[Fesunenko] As far as the aircraft is concerned, do you have a personal plane at the moment?

[Yeltsin] No, there is no personal plane. Let us wait for June. It will be decided then.

[Fesunenko] Well, the president of Russia is entitled to one, like Nazarbayev. And now another question. Not a pleasant one, I have to say straight away, but an answer is needed from someone in your position. But first I have to say again that, as a prominent, well-known and popular person, you of course attract a lot of attention—you have a lot of friends, and no doubt no fewer enemies. I remember....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] No, fewer!

[Fesunenko] You think fewer?

[Yeltsin] Fewer!

[Fesunenko] That's fine. It means you are an optimist, and I must congratulate you. I remember the unpleasant business of the publication in PRAVDA of the article from the Italian newspaper LA REPUBBLICA. It made a very unpleasant impression on me, and on many other people.

[Yeltsin] It made an even worse impression on me!

[Fesunenko] I can imagine! But, at the same time, there was another incident which has not yet been cleared up. It is dealt with in a letter which was brought to me literally half an hour before the program. We would not have raised this business—the letter says—had it not been for the fact that last Friday, in a Russian Television program, you, Boris Nikolayevich, brought up the old red herring—I quote what my colleagues have written—that we, the engineers and the technicians at the TV technical center allegedly used technical means personally and maliciously to distort the video recording of your speech at an American university. We do not wish to discuss whether the speech should have been shown on Central Television or not. The decision was made by Comrade Nenashev, the former chairman. But since your statements affect our personal and professional honor, we would like to ask this. Do you sincerely believe this red herring yourself, or did you trust your advisers? Is it not time to apologize to us, the video engineers at Central Television, and, incidentally, to your electorate? If an independent technical examination is needed, we are willing. One could also invite the Americans, if we Russians are not trusted. So this is from the engineers and technicans at the TV technical center. It is signed on their behalf by senior engineer (Shevchenko) and chief of technical services at the news complex, (Oleg Klimanov). I will hand this letter to you. Perhaps you want to say something now, or perhaps you will come back to it later.

[Yeltsin] I can tell you now. (Yeremeyev), an employee there, wrote to me and personally came to a commission of inquiry set up by the Supreme Soviet, where all the facts were described: The first tape and the second tape, and the differences between them. So it was in their own words—it was written by a technical engineer from the center who had been involved in it. I do not know

whether (Yeremeyev) works there now or not, but he said that he did not want to conceal this, and was ready to cooperate with any inquiry. In fact he did answer questions at the Glasnost Commission; Denisov was chairing. So I think that there is no reason for any apology here, and as far as a further investigation is concerned, if people want to, let them investigate it.

[Fesunenko] Fine. Thank you. I think that the comrades who wrote this are watching. They can sort out with (Yeremeyev) who is right, and who is to blame. And technicians like them are in the best position to sort it out.

[Yeltsin] Yes, of course, it is best if they look into it with (Yeremeyev).

[Fesunenko] Now, Boris Nikolayevich. I think we have had enough questions of such a deeply personal nature....

[Yeltsin] As you like, Igor Sergeyevich. If you like, we could devote the whole hour to just these sorts of questions.

[Fesunenko] No, that would not be sensible, it is simply that we have received a lot of questions....

[Yeltsin] I have enough of these....

[Fesunenko, interrupting] "issues?"

[Yeltsin] Stains in my biography.

[Fesunenko] I see, it is just that there were a lot of these questions and it would show, all the same, a lack of respect to those who posed them if we were not to touch upon them at all. I should like to say immediately in addition to this that we naturally got rid of any questions which were in any way offensive. Whereas this is is a legitimate interest, and our professionals, incidentally, are also concerned about this.

[Yeltsin] Moreover, there was of course, nothing new in this, so we had to bring out the same old disinformation.

[Fesunenko] I see. And now, Boris Nikolayevich, there were a lot of letters, and I must say, that just now before coming on set when we were waiting for you and I had already lost my patience and was worrying that you would be late, stuck hopelessly in the traffic on Prospekt Mira, at that moment, a woman who had come from Riga came up to me and she gave three questions for Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin from Baltic residents who do not speak the republics' native language, that is to say, from Russians. There are masses of these questions. There main thrust lies in establishing your relations to Russians in other republics, first and foremost, in the Baltic republics. They reproach you for the fact that you have abandoned them, that having signed agreements and had dealings with Landsbergis and other leaders, you are not paying any attention to the fate of the Russians.

In particular, these three questions here are about the actual amount which will be paid to each person, to each Russian who will be forced to leave the Baltic republics and come to Russia. Who is to pay this amount, Russia or the republics which they are leaving? How do you plan to set up our servicemen who will be forced, let us hypothesize, to leave the Baltic republics and come to Russia? The same sort of questions have been posed by people from Velikikhluk and Velikopolskiy, the (Mitrofanov) family from Leningrad, (Markov) from Riga and many other people. I will not give all their names as it would waste time. Over to you.

[Yeltsin] This train of accusations has been following me for about a year, probably. I consider that the accusation is unfounded.

[Fesunenko] The accusation that you are not paying attention to the fate....

[Yeltsin] That yes, that I have supposedly abandoned the Russian population in other republics, particularly in the Baltic republics, to the whims of fate. I believe that on the contrary, when we had no treaty-regulated relations with the Baltic republics, then we could not put forward any claims in cases when there were encroachments on the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And it was after we had been moving toward this signing for a long time, and finally signed treaties with Estonia and Latvia, that these two republics re-examined their legislation and largely changed it in cases where it concerned discrimination against the Russian-speaking population.

What is more, these treaties clearly state that both the indigenous population and the Russian population have identical status and identical rights. They have the same status and rights as we have in Russia, as the indigenous Russian population has here, and the same as Estonians or Latvians. Furthermore, special mixed commissions have been set up whose job is to examine disputes which arise. In fact, there are now fewer of these disputes and complaints from the Russian population in these republics. Third, we agreed that if these mixed commissions could not resolve such disputes, they would be handed up to the chairmen of the republican supreme soviets. It was agreed that we would discuss and settle these questions.

As far as migration is concerned, we agreed that if a situation arose in which people resettled in our republic, compensation for assets left behind would be paid by the republic from where the settler has come from. Either from here to there, or from there to here. But relocation costs here—loans for housing and land—will be paid by us.

As far as servicemen are concerned, we are about to adopt a special decision. This will probably be in 7-10 days' time, a decision on social security for servicemen and their families. It emerges that in our country servicemen are just about the most unprotected people in the state. When they are demobilized or transferred from one place to another, and especially now when they are

being demobilized ahead of schedule from the countries of East Europe—500,000 of our servicemen are being brought home—they have no place of residence, in other words housing, when they arrive. They have no work. They have no area of specialization. Therefore, the first thing we did was to take a special decision on where to resettle them. We gave them credit. Apart from that, we are now adopting this law which introduces a special status, namely protection of servicemen and their families, especially after demobilization. So, we are organizing special courses at places of higher education, for the training or retraining of these military personnel. We are indeed allocating some loans on preferential terms, plots of land, jobs, and so on. Therefore—of course, you cannot say that there are no shortcomings in this matter. There are, as in anything else. Nevertheless it seems to me that the stalemate has now been broken in this, despite the problems which exist. I think we will resolve these problems.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. Boris Nikolayevich, throughout the first—well, not the first half but the first quarter of this year the country in general and Russia in particular were shaken by the miners' strikes. Everybody remembers this perfectly well. A grievous blow was inflicted on our economy. That is obvious. In this connection, there are very many questions about your attitude toward the strikes, about your participation in the solution of this problem, and so on and so forth. There are viewers who note your positive role in solving this issue. But there is a number of our fellow citizens who reproach you for your calls to strike. For example, Comrade (Zhurba) from Taldy-Kurgan, asks: How do you as the head of Russia explain your strike calls to miners, workers and the people who struck? Material aid to strikers in Vorkuta and the Kuzbass from Silayev's government—how do you explain this, he asks. There is no similar precedent in world history of a head of state organizing strikes. Will you, Comrade (Zhurba) asks, support strikes in future private, privatized enterprises? Comrade (Kulisov) from Sterlitamak asks about strikes: Boris Nikolayevich, name a country where a presidential candidate would call for support for a strike. And so on. There is a whole number of others on this same topic. You are being reproached for supporting strikers, in short.

[Yeltsin] No, you have read it wrong.

[Fesunenko, interrupting] How's that....

[Yeltsin] You read that I called for strikes.

[Fesunenko] That is what is written.

[Yeltsin] I categorically reject this. This never happened. Never. Therefore maybe it is a civilized, so to speak, or almost civilized, half-civilized Russia and maybe it is a half-civilized presidential candidate, but nevertheless he never called for strikes. It is a different matter when there is already a strike, and human rights and international standards as a matter of fact give the right to people to strike, if they have already exhausted all other possibilities. In this case, the miners' strike, many understand this in a very primitive way in the sense that if Yeltsin appealed to the miners, then all 144 mines would immediately have begun to work. This nevertheless is primitive. You cannot reason like that. The miners are nevertheless a fairly proud people, and if they are on strike, and moreover if they have political slogans, economic demands, then you must examine them, and not just appeal. They would have just brushed off this appeal. We waited while Union departments, the coal industry, the Union Government worked with them, and we thought that in the end the dialogue would lead to something. But evidently time passed, there was one meeting, another meeting, a third meeting, Pavlov did not make a decision, the leadership did not make a decision, the ministry did not make a decision, and when the dialogue was exhausted we saw that it was necessary for us to join in.

We joined in and I personally went there, to the Kuzbass, for 1 May, to Novokuznetsk, Prokovyevskiy, Selevsk, and had discussions, and before that we had started to prepare, together with the miners, the appropriate document, and that document was signed there in Novokuznetsk. In other words, we achieved an agreement with them. After that, a few days later, they set to work. So I do not of course urge strikes ahead of time, but I do have respect for their position and opinion and for human rights.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. A few more questions on economic subjects before we move on to other....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] I must say by the way—you must excuse me, Igor Sergeyevich—that I consider that in the breakthrough that happened after two months, I should say, of attacks by the conservatives, the right-wing forces when they—you remember Shevardnadze, how he declared that there was a dictatorship looming—all this was in January, February, and March.

[Fesunenko] Yes, yes, yes.

[Yeltsin] That was when Vilnius—and then there was the bloodshed in the Baltic. I think that was a working-class movement, a democratic movement, and they stopped this, well, I should say conservative attack, this strong attack from the right, under which even the leadership trembled.

[Fesunenko] I do not know why they are asking you, Boris Nikolayevich—it is rather a question for the Union leadership. Well, nonetheless, from a rayon party committee, (Lanseva, Anna Pavlovna), from Irbeysk—the village of Irbeysk—asks: Boris Nikolayevich, is an increase in retail prices really expected from 1 July 1991 by a decision of the Russian parliament?

[Yeltsin] We were against that price rise, on 2 April.

[Fesunenko] Yes.

[Yeltsin] That was a big mistake by the government. Because they ought not to have begun economic reform

by suddenly laying all the hardships on the shoulders of the population. You cannot do that. If you remember the 500 days program, this step was not included in it, that is, the first step of suddenly increasing retail prices two or three-fold.

[Fesunenko] Yes, yes, yes, yes.

[Yeltsin] That is a mistake, and of course it will be paid for heavily in the future, by the people of Russia among others. So there can be no question of any price rise, let alone by the decision of the people of Russia themselves—I personally did not even sign that agreement.

[Fesunenko] Now a worker at the NTZ—the Novotrudnyy Zavod from Pervouralsk, Comrade (Myshkin), asks a question that seems to interest many people, it interests me, too: Boris Nikolayevich, what is your opinion regarding the cost of spirits? By the way, Zhirinovskiy is promising to raise the price of a bottle of vodka to almost seven rubles. It is a serious argument. How do you feel about it?

[Yeltsin] I think the financial situation at the moment is such that we should for the time being avoid moving in one direction or the other.

[Fesunenko] Thank you. Now, a lot of questions have come in on agricultural topics, agrarian problems, and so on. For instance, (Anatoliy Grigoriyevich Averin) from Ryazan wants to know where you stand on private property, and particularly the issue of the sale of land. Are you in favor of private ownership of land or not?

[Yeltsin] Am I in favor? What does that mean, given that our Congress of People's Deputies adopted such a law—on the equality of all forms of ownership, including private ownership, of land, too? It is another matter that the congress decided that land cannot be resold for 10 years. That is so.

[Fesunenko] You have simultaneously replied to a question from (Yevgeniy Viktorovich Klykov), who wanted to know your position on the privatization of land. So it can be passed on, but not resold for 10 years.

[Yeltsin] Quite so. By the way, 23,000 farmers' and peasant holdings have already been set up.

[Fesunenko] In Russia, that is....

[Yeltsin] So the land is being transferred to the peasants.

[Fesunenko] There is a whole series of reproaches aimed at you in the same sphere, the agricultural sphere. Quite sharp ones, I have to say. For instance, (Petr Fomich Martov) from Kirovograd asks why last year more than 40 percent of the harvest was left in the fields, and how do you propose to feed the people if the sown acreage in Russia has gone down by 20 million hectares? (Fedorova) from Manzhakovo wants to know what has happened to the checks from the 1990 harvest, Boris Nikolayevich? Was it just the latest misadventure to have befallen the peasants, used by you in the struggle for power? That is what it says here.

[Yeltsin] I see. As far as the harvest losses are concerned, the conditions last year were of course very difficult and complicated. Then relations between countryfolk and townspeople did not get established quickly. Everyone—we, the country folk, and the townspeople, and those in charge of executive authority locally—could no doubt be blamed for this, for the fact that it did not prove possible to bring in the whole harvest. I do not agree with the figure of 40 percent, but the fact is we did fail. The rain came down, and the machinery also let us down.

As far as the 1990 harvest checks are concerned, the decision stated that we had to settle up before 1 October this year. We will settle up. It was not done for publicity purposes. It was done for businesslike reasons. The decision was adopted after I was elected chairman, so it would have served no purpose as some sort of pre-election publicity stunt. We really are finding things a bit difficult as far as hard currency and everything else is concerned, but I say this everywhere and we firmly intend to settle up by and large by 1 September, and fully by 1 October, as the decision stated. As far as agriculture as a whole, and the reproaches, are concerned, well, we did put in more funds—but because the Union Government increased wholesale prices of equipment, construction and assembly work, building materials, and so on, one thing came on top of the other, and the increase in investments in agriculture did not take place. That is so.

We have ended up as hostages to this rise in retail prices, therefore today, with Silayev, we signed a resolution, but not for television. We simply made the preparations for this. It was a decision we had to adopt on indexation, that is, compensation for this difference between what is laid down for rural people and the price which they are actually charged by enterprises for machinery, and the prices charged by builders who build accommodation and so forth. This compensation is not only being introduced very soon, but 6 billion rubles [R] is to be paid as compensation for the first six months of this year.

[Fesunenko] We are now moving on to questions about social provision. Nikolay Romanovich Isakov, former director of Krasnyy proletariy, phoned us this morning, and dictated the following question to our telephone operators before the beginning of the program:

Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich, why do you promise more than you can fulfill? In your election campaign you have stated that your program envisages increasing minimum wage, pensions, and grants to one and a half times above the Union average, increasing holidays, shortening the working week by one hour, and this is in the face of the complete disruption of industry's production program. But, as you know, there is no money for this. Where are you going to get it from? What are you counting on?

[Yeltsin] We have resolved all of this, all of this. I can give an account. We have increased the minimum pension by one and a half times by setting up the Russian pension fund and we invested R8 billion in this. We have increased the minimum wage and it is now R180. We have increased grants for students and they now receive R144. Incidentally, a resolution has been signed today to exempt students from taxation for all types of summer work—at enterprises, sovkhozes and kolkhozes—so they are totally exempt from taxation. In addition, we have reduced the working week by one hour. We have established a minimum period of leave of 24 working days for all categories of working people, although 40 percent of enterprises, particularly those not in the production sphere, have only 15 working days. We consider that this is justified, particularly in connection with the work of women so that we can help women in their very difficult social position, and in their position in the family and at work. It is of course unjustifiable to call upon them to be exclusively in the family. They must be given the opportunity to work at enterprises, but at the same time we do of course need to ease somehow their family existence.

[Fesunenko] Boris Nikolayevich, forgive me for persisting with this point. But where will this money come from? I know that our country currently has a huge budget deficit. So, if you are going to increase pensions by 50 percent, if you are going to increase wages or student grants, this will have to be taken from someone. From whom are you going to take it?

[Yeltsin] I have already told you. We have set up Russia's pension fund.

[Fesunenko] And from where will the funds come for that?

[Yeltsin] R8 billion of this money, money we were entitled to, was taken from us here in Russia.

[Fesunenko] The center took it.

[Yeltsin] The center took it. Where it went after that, I do not know. Therefore, after setting up Russia's pension fund, we decided to retain this R8 billion ourselves. This is money which has been lawfully earned by Russia's citizens. We cannot simply give it away just like that. So there you already have a basis on which to increase pensions by 50 percent.

Then there is the budget. We have endorsed, adopted a law on the budget for 1991, using the one-channel system for the first time. Previously the Union, and Russia, too, used to collect tax from all enterprises. But we said no. Russia used to lose R70 billion. So we said no. Now we will concentrate everything here in Russia, in the Russian bank, and contribute a fixed, calculated sum to the Union budget. We will decide which program we are going to participate in, work out how much we should contribute to them, and that is what we will pay. Instead of R70 billion, we have calculated that we will be paying R23.4 billion. In other words, we are retaining almost R50 billion extra, as it were. That is where this money is coming from.

[Fesunenko] Obviously then I can assume—this is my question—that this is the money you will use to finance the great housing construction for servicemen which was promised—there's a question about that, too—during your meetings with the men of the Northern Fleet and the Tula garrison. There you promised to solve the housing question for officers and warrant officers, to increase wages for servicemen, by taking about R30-40 billion from the Union budget.

[Yeltsin] No, that is the wrong interpretation.

[Fesunenko] It is not like that?

[Yeltsin] Yes, I understand. What I was saying was that 1,000 apartments would be allocated for servicemen being demobilized and brought home from the countries of the former socialist camp. Five hundred have been allocated for those being transferred to the northern regions, and 500 apartments for Tula and a number of other towns in the central area. I was not talking about some great solution to the overall housing problem for servicemen. But I have already told you about social security for servicemen.

[Fesunenko] Thank you, Boris Nikolayevich. A question has been brought to me just five seconds ago which I would very much like to read. (Aleks Dukelskiy), from Tel Aviv; it appears that Tel Aviv is watching us.

[Yeltsin] Fancy that.

[Fesunenko] He asks a question to Mr. Yeltsin: What is your attitude toward the continuing emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel?

[Yeltsin] The law on immigration and emigration has now been adopted. As a result, one may expect an increase in the number of people emigrating. This is, of course, a deplorable thing for Russia. Our objective—and we have set this out in the corresponding programs—is to reduce this outflow as much as possible, especially the outflow of the intelligensia. We have already lost too much of it during all the years which have passed. I disapprove of this. But, at the same time, of course, we must not encroach on somebody's rights if he wishes to emigrate.

[Fesunenko] You do not intend to erect any administrative barriers?

[Yeltsin] Not under any circumstances.

[Fesunenko] Here is a question addressed to you, but it is about your loyal, so to speak, First Deputy Khasbulatov. (Kira Vladimirovna Andrushenko), from Saratov, asks: Why did Khasbulatov help the mafioso Suleymanov? Why do agreed commercial prices exist alongside state prices in Russia? Why are the goods not confiscated as the people demand? That is why we suffer.

[Yeltsin] I disagree with this.

[Fesunenko] Is all this gossip?

[Yeltsin] I categorically disagree with this.

[Fesunenko] Here are two or three questions on culture. Let us take this one: (Georgiy Nikolayevich Nosvo), a retired engineer from Lubertsy, says that no one hears from the candidates for the Presidency, do they not have a program or they do not inform the people about concrete programs, on protecting spiritual life and culture. Many nations, to protect children from violence and pornography, build scores of national childrens parks, entertainment arcades, and have educational programs, and so on. He asks whether you would agree to start such work on the territory of the republic if you become the president of Russia?

[Yeltsin] First, I agree to carrying out such a thing. Second, we have a such a program. Third, we think we have actually lost in spiritual life and culture, including the intelligensia, which is, so to speak, a messenger of spiritual life and culture and in religion, which is also a messenger of morality and spiritual life. That is why we want to support religion. Recently, I met with the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia Aleksiy II. We discussed all these problems. I also respect other religious beliefs and support them. We discussed how to raise spiritual life, morality, and culture in the countryside; how to build schools; how to improve social life, also with the help of the church. We discussed the matter of restoring churches: orthodox, buddist, synagogues, and so on.

In general there is no doubt that we need to help culture materially, and we have made the decision to double for the time being in the first instance funds for culture, although we understand that this is not enough, and we consider that in 1992 it will be necessary to double it again. Maybe then it will be as a minimum 4-5 percent of the national income. This of course would not be a bad thing.

[Fesunenko] In this connection, Valentina Starostnaya, a student from Moscow, is interested in the following question. recently it was said on television that a very old choir, under the leadership of Sokolov, would be ceasing its existence. The USSR Government has not found R40,000 for its maintenance. This is only one example of the disastrous position of Russian culture. At the same time, she notes there is a mass of examples of squandering of Russian state money. If you are elected president, will you pay more attention to culture?

[Yeltsin] It's a bit warm here. [Yeltsin removes jacket] Moreover since you've decided to devote an hour to being negative about Yeltsin. Therefore....

[Fesunenko, interrupting] Yes, take it off. I hope it's just your jacket, Boris Nikolayevich.

[Yeltsin] Of course. Give me that telegram, please.

[Fesunenko] My pleasure, here you are.

[Yeltsin] I will take it with me, since this is such a specific example.

[Fesunenko] Well, this is such a popular Russian choir. And only R40,000 are necessary.

[Yeltsin] Of course, I promise that I will help.

[Fesunenko] Fine. Boris Nikolayevich, recently you have begun making—this is a natural thing to do, it is definitely to be welcomed—you have begun making lots of trips abroad, expanding so to speak....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Lots of trips?

[Fesunenko] Well, you went to France and Czechoslovakia.

[Yeltsin] No, no, no. I have made one official state visit.

[Fesunenko] That was to Czechoslovakia.

[Yeltsin] To Czechoslovakia. It is the only one I have made in the year since I became chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Therefore I reject these accusations.

[Fesunenko] They are not accusations.

[Yeltsin] I made a private visit to France during my short, one-week holiday. There's no need for "lots." Why put it like that, Igor Sergeyevich?

[Fesunenko] These are not accusations, just questions. I remember you visited the United States, France, and Czechoslovakia. What is this about? During your visit to Czechoslovakia, Comrade Skvortosova reproaches you....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] More reproaches.

[Fesunenko] ...reproaches you that you laid a wreath, or lit a candle at the grave of Palach, but did not place flowers on the graves of our soldiers.

[Yeltsin] Well, they do not know that as a matter of fact I placed flowers on the graves of our soldiers.

[Fesunenko] Why then was it not broadcast on television at the time?

[Yeltsin] You should lodge the complaint with your own television.

[Fesunenko] Nor was it shown, I think, by Russian television either.

[Yeltsin] No, I do not know the story on Russian television, but it was not shown on central television. Please, blame central television for this, particularly since it has recently started again to distort the facts. I think that, obviously, such a situation has developed now because, in the run-up to the elections, they are starting again, so to speak, to pile up negative information about Yeltsin. I also feel this in our dialogue today.

[Fesunenko] Why?

[Yeltsin] I do not know. Probably the selection....

[Fesunenko, interrupting] There is a great deal of good wishes to you which we are....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] I understand. However, you seem to be, by chance, only selecting certain questions. I understand: This is pure chance. This happens....

[Fesunenko, interrupting] Here, for instance, is a neutral question. What do you think about the possible sale of four islands in the Kurils chain asks (Moroza Kozhmazhaiska).

[Yeltsin] I have always been forthcoming with my view. I have, so to speak, a five-stage proposal not for solving but for approaching this problem. I have spoken about this so often in various interviews that I think there is no sense in my repeating it again.

[Fesunenko] (Tamara Aleksandrovna Gurzdeva), from mid-Volga region, is of the same opinion as you: She is exasperated by the way I am presenting this program. I am asking you too many difficult questions.

[Yeltsin] You see, it is not only me.

[Fesunenko] (Kseniya Nikolayevna Pasichnik): Why is Fesenunko asking the trickiest questions, and only negative ones? We are sending good letters from our collective, and we are indignant about Fesunenko's behavior.

[Yeltsin] It seems that yesterday everybody liked you, while today you are behaving differently. Everybody noticed it at once.

[Fesunenko] I am behaving today the same way I behaved yesterday and as I have been behaving throughout all five of these programs. Here is a question from (Alla Grigoryevna Smirnova): Do you intend to undertake any more steps to save our lads who were serving in Afghanistan and are still held prisoner by the dushmans?

[Yeltsin] We have made several such attempts, including the fact that we have entered into negotiations with the dushmans, but many difficulties exist in this respect. These bands, or more correctly, so to speak, these formations in the territory of Pakistan have split up there into five camps, and whereas earlier we had, so to speak, to deal with just one, we now have to deal with the representatives of five camps. It has become, to quite an extent, more complicated; nevertheless, we are not abandoning this work. We continue this work.

[Fesunenko] A question which requires, of course, a lengthy answer, perhaps, come from (Leonid Pavlovich Telyapkin). It is a program-type, problematic question. How, in the event of your victory in the elections, are you intending to extricate Russia from its crisis? I do not know even whether it is worth your answering. This has all been explained by you.

[Yeltsin] This, of course, covers too much.

[Fesunenko] Let us specify it as follows. Let us suppose that you are victorious and become president of Russia: What will you begin with? What will be your first steps, actions, and decisions?

[Yeltsin] You know, after all, you could blame me again for populism if I say that there will be a certain spectacular decree number one which I shall sign. No, the work being done now will continue to be done. We have the program which was approved—discussed by the congress and approved by the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet has adopted 150 laws and decisions. In other words, the legal basis for the reforms in all the spheres of Russian life has been prepared. Now, the most important thing is realization of this program. This life will go on, I mean, its realization by all the Russian people. I think that each of them has a little part to play in the presidency, and together they should help to solve or realize those laws and those decrees which will be adopted.

[Fesunenko] What do you think about the indexation of incomes? Will it be necessary to implement and do we have to do this? In particular, what do you think about the medical workers' salaries?

[Yeltsin] Yes, regarding the salaries of the medical workers—of course they should be raised. Regarding the indexation, the Surpeme Soviet session which will be held in June-July has put this question on its agenda. And the law will be adopted. I think that it has to be introduced. By the way, the decision to index students grants has already been signed.

[Fesunenko] A lot of viewers are sending letters and just now the same question which I had wanted to ask was passed on to me. (Lubov Fedorovna Zhiguleva), (Vladislav Yevgenyevich Parodiy) from Moscow: Your attitude toward Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev as a man and as a president from a professional point of view? And (Zhiguleva) asks: What is your relationship with the president now and what will it become after you are elected president of Russia?"

[Yeltsin] In the first place I wish to say directly that there is nothing personal in our relationship. I think that—I have said this before—I think that in such state positions neither Gorbachev nor I can let ourselves be guided by personal likes or dislikes. That would quite simply be betrayal of our people. Therefore—of course, we do have different points of view, different positions. But we have gradually—when he veered somewhat to the right in the first three months of this year, I was forced to make a statement as a way of warning him in some way. But he has revised a number of his positions. He has indeed deemed it necessary to get the support of others, including the left shoulder, as we call it. Then it became possible—precisely as a result of the democratic movement, the workers' movement—to hold that meeting on 23 April and sign the joint statement known as Nine plus One. Since that time our relations have become normal

and businesslike. At any rate they are no longer an obstacle to the implementation of radical reform in russia.

It is these very radical means that we want for our 1991-92 program, because if, as some candidates propose, there were to be an interim period, then during the interim period, the system which throughout these 70-odd years has stifled us would take its revenge. We must not permit this. We must not, therefore....

[Fesunenko, interrupting] Boris Nikolayevich, excuse me, I must interrupt....

[Yeltsin, continuing] Therefore, it should be a very very short period—one and a half to two years at most.

[Fesunenko] We have only three minutes until the program ends, although it is hard to believe as the hour has flown by very quickly. Maybe you would like to say a few words in conclusion, or we could take what you have just said as your conclusion.

[Yeltsin] No, I would like to address the voters. Now, the voters have the right to participate in the election of a president for the first time in the 1,000-year history of Russia. Of course, this is a very important and historic step, and I would say that for every citizen and for every Russian this has a great deal of meaning.

Thanks to Russians and the stances they have taken it has been possible both to introduce the presidency which is now needed to strengthen executive power and to implement laws. Thanks to them as well, at the third congress, instead of the attempt to overturn the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and the government, additional powers were given to them. Thanks to them, amendments to the Constitution were also adopted connected with the introduction of a president. I am grateful to Russians, to the voters for such strong support.

Now, of course, I call upon all voters to vote on 12 June for the first president of a Russia which—and I am personally convinced of this—will be reborn. I believe in this.

[Fesunenko] Thank you, Boris Nikolayevich. Allow me to wish you success in these elections. On the whole, a large bundle of wishes of the following sort have come in:

We wish you success. All the best to this honest and courageous person, this cable was sent by Sulak Svetlana Iosifovna from Kharkov.

Natalya Grigorovna Tefrina: Boris Nikolayevich, we believe in you, we wish you success. We can see only you in the post of president of our repubic.

Nikolay Ilich Konoplev, the same thing: Good wishes!

[Yeltsin] Thank you.

[Fesunenko] Others from a great many other people, which you will receive.

I, for my part, thank you for taking part in our broadcast. We wish you success. Do not be angry about the difficult questions. This is our job. Unfortunately, journalists are meticulous people, I wish you success once again during the elections on 12 June, and I remind you, comrade television viewers, that tomorrow the meeting will take place with Tuleyev, the sixth and last candidate for president of Russia. Goodbye, all the best!

[Yeltsin] Thank you, Igor Sergeyevich.

Denies Reports of Lumbago, Heart Attack

LD0606132991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, will continue his working tour around the republic on 7 June. On Friday he will depart for Orenburg, he then plans to visit Sverdlovsk, Samara, and the Republic of Komi. Boris Yeltsin intends to return to Moscow on the morning of 12 June—the day of the election of the first president of the RSFSR.

As the RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY reports, yesterday he refuted a report by the Mayak radio station to the effect that during his present trip around Russia he has had a lumbago attack, and he also denied the allegation that he had recently suffered a heart attack.

Reviews Social Security Achievements

LD0606172691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Opponents of the chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet most often accuse him of lacking a program—of not being able to look ahead. But that opinion is not likely to be shared by the electors he has met recently, including those in Perm. Listen to an excerpt from his meeting at Perm motor plant:

[Begin Yeltsin recording] We cannot take the path of beginning economic reform by first laying everything on the shoulders of the people, and of beginning reform with that. If you remember the 500 days program, it did not contain this. But then they ruined it and imposed such conditions on the 500 days. Now we have a program again. But we are now forced to begin where we have now arrived, thanks to the Union leadership. The maximum of social securtity is what we now have to save somehow. We have raised the minimum pension. Increased it to twice the Union level. Further, we have increased student grants. Further, we have given all workers a minimum holiday of 24 working days, minimum, though for 40 percent it had been 15 days. Further, working hours have been reduced by one hour a week: not 41 hours, but 40. Yes, a 5 percent tax. The presidential one we have removed. Only for special official luxury. That is the path—well, the pensioner also get benefits, there are benefits for the war veterans, for women with children. [end recording]

Visits Radiation Zone in Chelyabinsk

LD0706085791

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 2000 GMT on 6 June broadcasts a 25-minute report by Radio Rossii correspondent Leonid Varebrus on Boris Yeltsin's visit to the area. Reception is good.

The program begins with Varebrus saying that it is impossible to receive Radio Rossii in Chelyabinsk. This is followed by an interview with Yeltsin by an unidentified female correspondent as follows:

[Correspondent] It is wonderful that you have managed to fulfill your promise.

[Yeltsin] Yes, and an old promise, too. It happened that what with one thing or another—the Far East, Siberia, and so on—I have traveled around half of Russia, but have never managed to visit Chelyabinsk before. I know it was my duty and I feel sorry about it, but I am here now. It was impossible to avoid Chelyabinsk on this business trip, particularly with its great problems and its great deeds, so to speak. One must try and find ways to help Chelyabinsk.

[Correspondent] Boris Nikolayevich, did you manage to bring with you the law on giving our city the status of special ecological disaster zone?

[Yeltsin] Such a law has been prepared, but I have not brought it. I think that after I have seen it all for myself, with my own eyes, and you show it to me so that I can not only assess it with a cool head but also feel it in my heart, then I will be able to press for this law to be adopted.

The interview ends at this point. Varebrus then talks to residents of villages visited by Yeltsin on his trip around Chelyabinsk oblast, in the area hit by a radiation emission from the "Mayak" production association in 1951. Addressing Yeltsin, Yevgeniy Georgiyevich Ryzhkov, head of "Mayak's" public relations service, insists that the radiation level in the villages is normal. The river water, however, is unusable, but the residents still use it.

Varebrus then goes on to provide information on radiation levels in the area. He says that the village of (?Metvino) suffered the first and most severe consequences of the radiation emission: the residents received a dose of up to 170 BER [biological equivalent of roentgen]. The radiation level here now is 175 microroentgens per hour. The radiation level in the lakes exceeds the norm by 100 times. Among the local residents, 937 cases of chronic radiation sickness have been recorded. However, there are no cases of acute radiation sickness. The emission affected an area in Kaslinskiy rayon and reached the town of Kamensk-Uralskiy; an area 105 km long and 8 to 9 km wide received 2 curies per square km. At the moment, production waste is still being dispersed into local lakes. A system worth 80 million rubles is needed to stop this. This is planned to be achieved by the 1995.

Yeltsin says on this subject: "By the year 1995, you will add another 300 million km to the existing polluted territory." A man explains that a reservoir was built in 1956 and later expanded, in order to store the polluted water. Yeltsin says: "Well, you or I are not to blame. There is a guilty party somewhere, however, is there not? They have been concealing the truth about this radiation pollution from the people for 30 years. There has been silence. How many people have suffered? I hope that we know better now. I think that the question of the amount of waste to be disposed of must be reconsidered. Not now, while we are standing here; we must sit down in Moscow and calculate everything very carefully; maybe we can approach the issue from that angle."

Varebrus then speaks to people supporting Yeltsin in the streets of Chelyabinsk. Voices complain about the huge problems and speak in support of Yeltsin. An unidentified person says we want someone like Yeltsin, not someone like Gorbachev.

In conclusion, Varebrus speaks to Yeltsin himself, and asks about his impression of the local environmental problems.

Yeltsin says: "In the Urals in general, the ecological situation is indeed disastrous. I would say critical. But here it is a real catastrophe. I think special measures should be taken now, and we are going to take them. I will sign the resolution in three or four days. This includes 4 or 5 percent of hard currency, earned locally, to remain here; 10 percent of the products to be left here; social support, and giving the oblast a Chernobyl status. We must also have an all-union or republican program on the environmental situation here."

Varebrus rounds up by asking Yeltsin if he enjoyed his visit. Yeltsin says: "I enjoyed the trip and the way I was received. Thank you."

Campaign in Voronezh Reported

91UN1697A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 1

["Before the Elections for President of Russia" article by TRUD correspondent P. Varfolomeyev: "Voronezh Meets the Candidate"]

[Text] Despite the fact that Voronezh is sometimes called practically a "preserve of stagnation and an oasis of conservatism," and despite the fact that since the beginning of the election campaign for the post of president of Russia meetings have been held in many party organizations where the orators actively supported another candidate, namely N. Ryzhkov, B. Yeltsin's arrival has evoked the lively and receptive interest of tens of thousands of people. As it is customary to write in official reporting, "along the entire route of the motorcade" the guests were met with smiles and applause....

The schedule for B. Yeltsin's visit was to some degree a traditional one, similar to those which Voronezh traditionally offers all "high officials"—the obligatory visit to

the Electronika NPO [scientific production association] and the Maslovskiy model sovkhoz [state farm]—but to some degree it was also unusual. For the first time, perhaps, the man currently occupying the highest post in Russia arrived not merely to communicate with the masses or view approvingly and with interest what they considered necessary to show him. Boris Nikolayevich and his team managed, under conditions of a severe shortage of time, to conduct an important action—that is to say the signing of the agreement on the economic integration of six oblasts (the Central Chernozem and Orlov Oblast). This is an agreement which, once it is put into effect, promises to significantly change the economic situation in the entire region for the better.

Yeltsin's meeting with local deputies of all levels also turned out to be substantive. The half-hour speech by the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, a speech which had much in common with his election platform, was delivered in more or less reasonable tones and without any hint of that extremism of which Yeltsin and his supporters are often accused.

On industry. If the industrial enterprises are brought under Russia's jurisdiction they will no longer have to operate under a system of limitation of wages despite high profits. In addition, 50-80 percent of the foreign currency which is earned will remain at the disposal of the labor collectives.

On agriculture. I am not against kolkhozes and sovkhozes. If only one-third of the farms in the republic were like your Maslovskiy Sovkhoz and if they were headed by such people as its director, Viktor Pavlovich Pavlenko, then we would not know what to do with all the meat and milk. Presently one of the measures concerning agriculture which must be immediately adopted is the liquidation of the disparity between the absurdly high price for vehicles, equipment, and construction materials and the absurdly low purchase prices for agricultural produce. In this process we must begin not with the usual inflation of prices for grain, milk, and meat but, on the contrary, with a reduction of prices on industrial output. In the opposite event we are doomed to incessant inflation.

On conversion. The defense industry takes up a large part of Russia's industrial potential. As a result, the problem of the advisability of conversion is a very critical one today. At the same time the collapse of the economy's defense sector is intolerable. Today it remains vitally necessary to make use of the military-industrial complex in accordance with its primary function. At the same time it is worth devoting significant attention to conversion as such. For defense enterprises which produce civilian output, it is necessary to establish a preferential system for the taxation of profits which are received from the manufacture of consumer goods. We should properly care for our servicemen. It is a disgrace when a man serves his time in the military and has no civilian profession, apartment, or conditions for the normal survival of his family.

On privatization. It is not a question of selling off our factories and plants to so-called "shady operators" but of ensuring that each worker at an enterprises has his share of the property and his percentage of the common profit and of ensuring that he is absolutely at peace over his future and convinced that he will not be thrown into the streets. If he is compelled to leave for some reason, then he will leave with his own capital, and not like now—practically without the funds for existence. Privatization can be reached by various roads: through loans, through interest-free loans, and through special stocks.

Everywhere Yeltsin visited that day he was asked many questions on the most varied subjects.

"When will life in Russia improve?"

"I suppose that we will begin to extricate ourselves from the crisis in the second half of next year. To promise improvement sooner would be to tell a lie."

"How are your relations with Gorbachev?"

"At present, normal and business-like. We signed the well-known 23 April statement, and we are now working on the Union treaty. And all the tales about how Gorbachev and Yeltsin are getting in each other's way and confronting one another are nothing more than tales. We must not argue—it has a negative effect on the fate of Russia."

"If you are not elected president, what will you do?"

"Plant a kitchen garden."

"In Voronezh as in many other cities there are many 'commuters,' and a trip on the local electric trains has become so expensive that even subsidies are not enough. Is this normal?"

"The Government of Russia intends to cancel the increase in the cost of tickets on local trains, effective this month."

"Boris Nikolayevich, is your political orientation socialist, capitalist, or something else?"

"My orientation is toward the prosperity of Russians and for each person to live in a human manner."

"Is it impossible to reduce prices on food and children's clothing in Russia?"

"Russia cannot take such a step alone. That must be done together with all the republics within the framework of a Union treaty."

"What about reducing the working day if only by one hour for the female workers of Russia?"

"I believe that this question can be examined."

Yeltsin's visit ended with a large rally on the main square—Lenin Square. Judging by the placards, applause, and cries of approval, much of it suited the workers of Voronezh. And not just the rank-and-file citizens. For example, V. Kalashnikov, chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, declared for all to hear, "Being chairman of the oblast soviet and having personally met Boris Nikolayevich, I trust him...."

As for whom the voters will trust, they will have their say on 12 June.

On Possibile Secession From Russia

OW0506133191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1230 GMT 4 Jun 91

[Text] On Tuesday the chairman of Russia's parliament Boris Yeltsin met with workers and peasants living in Perm and Perm region in the River Volga Valley. He arrived in the industrial center on Monday.

At a meeting with the staff of the Verkhnemullinskiy state farm Yeltsin called for restoring the disrupted economic ties with East European countries and establishing new contacts. In the wake of "velvet revolutions" the USSR severed many economic ties with Eastern Europe for political reasons, said Yeltsin. For those countries, he said, the consequences are even harder than for us, since they have no place to market their products at any longer. According to him, he sees new kinds of ties largely in the form of barter transactions, since both sides are short of hard currency.

As for the possible aid to the USSR from abroad, Yeltsin said he understands the stance taken by the West: The West has to wait till a union treaty gets signed, because it cannot conclude long-term agreements without knowing what powers the republics will delegate to the center. The expected 15 or 20 billion dollar loan for the Soviet Union's development should be granted only interest-free, Russia's leader said. Otherwise we shall not be able to accept it, since even our grandchildren won't be able to repay it.

When asked about the possibility of Tatarstan's seceding from Russia, Boris Yeltsin said that the constitution does not provide for the republics' secession from the Russian Federation. He described nationalist calls as a wish to indulge the feeling of ethnic pride. A quiet dialogue is in progress with Tartaria, he said, and we contemplate no sanctions, because they will backfire, and in that case a peaceful solution to this issue would be impossible.

Political Groups Urge Vote for Yeltsin

91UN1700A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 91 p 1

["Appeal of the Political Parties and Social Movements to the Citizens of Russia" published under the rubric "Before the Election"]

[Text] June 12 is the day of the election of the first president of Russia. These elections will put into practice the will of the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies, which was expressed a year ago in the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the republic.

For the first time in the many centuries of the history of the Russian state, its leader will be determined by the free will of all of the people.

The elections are a turning point in the development of our society.

The people, brought to the edge of spiritual degeneracy, are tired of poverty, illegality, lies, and chaos, and the indecisiveness, duplicity, and ideological dogmatism of the government.

The democratic forces are going into the elections with a specific program of activities for the renewal of Russia and are proclaiming their responsibility for the fate of its numerous peoples. The foundations of new economic and legal relations have already been laid in many spheres of life.

We tie the elections of the president of Russia with undoubted intensification of the reforms that have been begun. It is a question of determining the strategic course of the further development of our society: Either a free and civilized future or stagnation and the latest attempt to halt the natural course of history.

The long-suffering hopes of the citizens of Russia are firmly tied to the name of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Support of him will unite everyone who desires to go forward and not to return to the past.

We are in favor of the honest competition of ideas and positions and decisively repudiate single-minded struggle against the presidency in Russia and any attempts to disorganize the work of the electoral commissions and violate the Law on Elections.

We are in favor of a strong, democratically formed executive power along the entire vertical framework of state structures, one which is able to efficiently ensure the implementation of reforms that are timely and intelligible to the people.

This declaration testifies to the possibility of consolidating all democratic forces.

At present the most important thing is to ensure unity of actions in the performance of our common and chief task—the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of Russia—and in the victory and continuation of the new course.

Citizens! Participants in mass social movements, members of the new political parties, nonparty people, adherents of true democracy inside the CPSU, and all who choose in favor of economic and political freedom,

conscientious organization, and order and who are resolved not to allow a return to the past!

We call upon you to take an active part in the B.N. Yeltsin's electoral campaign and to support him in the 12 June elections.

President Yeltsin—this is Russia's real chance for renewal and a return to the family of civilized states; it is a guarantee of civil peace and national harmony and of a free, renewed, and mighty Union, and a pledge of prosperity and respect for the feeling of self-worth of each of us.

Everyone to the elections! Vote for a new Russia!

Vote for Yeltsin—as president of the Russian Federation!

[Signed] From the coordinating council of the "Democratic Russia" movement: USSR People Deputies Yu. Afanasyev, A. Murashev; RSFSR People's Deputies V. Dmitriyev, G. Yakunin, L. Ponomarev.

From the Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of People's Freedom): RSFSR People's Deputies M. Astafyev, V. Kulakov.

From the Peasant Party of the RSFSR: USSR People's Deputy Yu. Chernichenko.

From the Social Democratic Party of Russia: RSFSR People's Deputies L. Volkov, O. Rumyantsev; USSR People's Deputy S. Belozertsev.

From the Democratic Party of Russia: USSR and RSFSR People's Deputy N. Travkin; RSFSR People's Deputy M. Tolstoy.

From the parliamentary group of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet "Communists for Democracy" and the All-Russian sociopolitical movement "Civil Harmony": RSFSR People's Deputies V. Adrov, I. Vinogradova, V. Perfilyev.

From the Republican Party of Russia: RSFSR People's Deputy V. Lysenko; USSR People's Deputy S. Sulakshin; V. Shostakovskiy.

From the Russian Christian Democratic Movement: RSFSR People's Deputy V. Aksyuchits.

Ryzhkov Interviewed on 'Who's Who' Program

LD0606140691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Jun 91

[Interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, candidate for president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic; viewers questions read by program presenter Igor Fesunenko; live—from the "Who's Who" program]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted on Fesunenko's introduction and brief biography of Ryzhkov and saying SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has published Ryzhkov's election program so there is no need to give details of it; viewers ask why Ryzhkov has returned to politics, he says he never left it and gives reasons for his candidacy; viewers ask about his health—Ryzhkov says he is fit, noting that on visit to Bashkiriya he spent eight hours answering questions; Fesunenko asks about Ryzhkov's attitude toward the market economy and his wish to reduce the pain of entry to it]

[Ryzhkov] This is a huge set of questions and of course it demands much time. But unfortunately, we do not have it. Therefore I will be very brief about these issues. I cannot agree with you, Igor Sergeyevich, about the fact that the market, if there is a market, and prices must be free. Yes, when there is a market, when it is a real market, prices really should be free. They should regulate supply and demand. But we are talking about the transition to the market.

[Fesunenko] Ah, you are proposing to regulate prices for the transition period?

[Ryzhkov] Of course, this is a transition to the market. When we have gone over to the market, in a few years, when there will finally be growth in the production of consumer goods, and accordingly a balance between monetary income and expenditure, a balanced budget, then this will not be a problem; then supply and demand will really regulate things. But we are on the path of changing over to the market. In this regard I defend my position, that now when production is declining—and you know that production is declining and that there are all-around shortages—I think that it is impermissible to set prices free at this time. Prices would rise several times over. I am convinced of this.

If [the price rises of] 2 April led to such a situation has arisen in the country, then to continue again to set prices free particularly on essentials—foodstuffs or essential consumer goods—then undoubtedly the situation will greatly deteriorate. Therefore, my position amounts to this: For a certain period, during the change over to the market, it is necessary to have stable prices on certain consumer goods, particularly foodstuffs, in order to ensure that we can protect people at least with regard to the main items.

Now regarding those notes which say that I was the initiator of the price rises and now I seem to be beginning to defend leaving prices at the old levels. In the first place, there can be no return to the old prices. The reform of price formation should have been carried out in 1988. At that time everything had been prepared. But the country's political leadership....

[Fesunenko interrupts] You were prime minister then.

[Ryzhkov] Yes, I was prime minister and a member of the Politburo. And, by the way, I insisted at that time that we should decide that question because the economy could not develop further without a reform of the price formation. Our prices were totally distorted. But I was in the minority. Everyone said that this should

not be done, the situation was too dangerous. Even though I pointed out that in the future it would be even more difficult than in 1988.

[Fesunenko] Nikolay Ivanovich, excuse me for being insistent, could you say precisely who spoke out against your position at that time, some names, please.

[Ryzhkov] Well, in the first place the academics began to speak out against it. Those who in 1985 insisted that there should be a reform without fail, said in 1988 that this should not be done. Some members of the Politburo, who were in it and worked in it at that time, and you know that at that time the Politburo decided many questions....

[Fesunenko interrupts] Not just many but virtually all.

[Ryzhkov] They decided virtually all of the important questions. They spoke out against this. Let me say, too, that Comrade Gorbachev—whereas at first he was more inclined to be resolute, at a certain stage he said: Yes, the situation in the country is very tense. But nevertheless, he decided not to carry out this operation.

I consider that it was wrong to do this. We should have (?acted). Now, what happened in 1990? I am now blamed for providing an impetus for price increases, and so a panic started, and so on, and a lot of questions were aimed at me on this problem last year. Now, tell me, if in 1988 and 1989 every time one of the political leaders, and the general secretary, and I, in my speeches, said that when we come to the questions of price formation and retail prices—after all, the people were primarily interested in retail prices, and not wholesale or procurement prices—that we would definitely hold consultations, such was the phrase, and you remember this phrase, we would definitely hold consultations. In May-June last year I came out—and indeed I reported to the Supreme Soviet on our understanding of reform of retail prices—were we obliged to do this, or not, or would everything be camouflaged, that is, by talking in generalities? When we had been saying for two consecutive years that we would hold consultations, and when we honestly said—I honestly said—that we really did have to reform prices, that this would come to about 50 percent by comparison with existing prices, why was criticism heaped on me?

I honestly carried out my duty, honestly. Yes, I understand, I was subjected to criticism; yes, I understand that I was asking for it, making myself a target; but I was obliged to this, and obliged to do this as the head of the government. Had I not done this, I would have deceived the people. What happened afterwards? You know about 2 April. While in 1988 this would have cost the people 100 billion rubles [R] in price rises, and in 1990 what we were proposing would have cost R160 billion, on 2 April it was R311 billion. It is for that reason that I am now saying that much was done wrong on 2 April, wrong. It could have been done differently, and my program that you just mentioned says that, indeed, what has been done on goods for children is totally wrong. If we do not put it right in the near future and reduce the prices for children's ranges [of goods], I think the time will come when we will have to close down the maternity homes in our country. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] A number of viewers are interested in the quite loud and noisy story, or operation, concerning the ANT state cooperative association. For example, Lidiya Grigoryevna Starodubtseva from Dolgoprudnyy: How did Operation ANT end? To begin with, when the story was unfolding you were head of government, and as far as I recall, either you or your deputy sanctioned the formation of this company, which was later categorized as an attempt to virtually sell off the whole of our Soviet country lock, stock, and barrel.

[Ryzhkov] Well, this story of ANT that caused such a fuss....

[Fesunenko interrupts] But at the moment, there is simply no need to repeat it, it is already known. The matter has died down and a decision was adopted, and perhaps it was all much ado about nothing?

[Ryzhkov] I think it was mostly sound and fury. Basically, the formation of ANT was correct.

[Fesunenko] That is a very important statement, in general.

[Ryzhkov] Yes, correct. I state that ANT, in essence, was created rightly. It should have been a middleman between small and medium-sized enterprises in order to take products and production waste and sell them abroad, to buy goods, and accordingly return them to the enterprises which are selling their output, that is, it was a middleman. But ANT committed very crude violations, for which it suffered, and I, as head of governemnt, was compelled to wind it up. In the situation which exists, nobody in the country has the right to sell weapons without the permission of the government. Meanwhile ANT, in fact, violated this provision, and tried to sell several tanks, passing them off as tractor units, and that is where this scandal came from.

[Fesunenko] Well, this came to light, but now this matter has been left hanging.

[Ryzhkov] It has been left hanging.

[Fesunenko] It is quite clear. This is often the way in our country—a lot of fuss, and then nothing.

[Fesunenko] I think we shall stop talking about prices and agriculture. Your general position is well known, and you will have frequent chances to explain it or spell it out. There are a lot of questions on other matters, and a lot of rather pointed questions, let me tell you bluntly. For example, the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI newspaper recently published an article, and Tamara Ivanovna Smirnova asks the following question, evidently on the information in that expose: You signed a contract with the American firm, Chevron, in 1989 regarding Tengiz, a new oil deposit in Kazakhstan. Tamara Ivanovna Smirnova thinks that this contract did

serious damage to our country's national interests. She asks you how you can explain it. Incidentally, Lidiya Grigoryevna Starodubtseva from (?Yaroslavl) is also interested in that country on Tengiz. Do you regard it as a blow inflicted on our country's interests, or not?

[Ryzhkov] Negotiations with Chevron were conducted over two years, and they are still in progress now. We certainly do have a deposit called Tengiz. It is in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan is more involved in this issue now than the central government is. Yes, negotiations are in progress there, with the aim of setting up a joint enterprise and of extracting both oil and gas. There is a special kind of gas there: it has a high level of hydrogen sulfide. For that reason, the intentions which were devised at that time and the negotiations which are under way today are mutually advantageous. Therefore, it should not be viewed as a case of us simply handing over the deposit to somebody free of charge, and so on. I believe that if a joint enterprise which enables us both to extract and to refine oil and gas is set up in Tengiz, this will be beneficial both for the Soviet Union as a whole, and for Kazakhstan, and for all of Russia. [passage omitted]

[Fesunenko] There is a whole series of questions of this kind: Are you aware that in several rayons of the country the collection of signatures in your favor is taking place under pressure, that coercive agitation, so to speak, in favor of your candidature is under way? What is your attitude to reports of this kind?

[Ryzhkov] I have been asked this question at meetings. I would like to say the following: That in accordance with the decision of the Central Electoral Commission, all matters relating to the collection of signatures of support have been entrusted to local soviets of people's deputies, and they, so to speak, dealt with this matter. They checked the authenticity and so... and they examined the regularity of all this. Second, when the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission gave a report at the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia at which the candidates for president and vice president were registered—I was present at the congress—this matter did not arise. So, in my view, this is rather information with which some are attempting, to a certain extent, to discredit one of the candidates for the post of president. [passage omitted]

Addresses Strategic Missile Personnel

PM0506131491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jun 91 Second Edition p 2

["Russia: Chronicles of the Election Marathon" report from TASS, RIA, and "own information" column]

[Text] RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential candidate N.I. Ryzhkov visited the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy 31 May. He had meetings there with the Strategic Missile Forces leadership, the professorial and teaching staff, students, workers, and employees of the academy.

N.I. Ryzhkov then presented his election program at a meeting, and answered numerous questions from the audience. The participants in the meeting listened with great attention to the presidential candidate and received with satisfaction his stance on problems of the social protection of Russia's population in the complex period of transition to the market and his views on urgent problems relating to the stabilization of the situation in society and in the USSR Armed Forces.

Speaking at the meeting, academy chief Colonel General Yu. Plotnikov, Doctor of Technical Sciences Col. O. Borodin, and Major Ya. Nikolayev, expressing the opinion of the majority of missilemen, put forward concrete proposals for the RSFSR presidential candidate's program and wished him success in the election.

Platform, Supporters Assessed

91UN1700B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 91 p 1

["Before the Election" article by Vladimir Sluzhakov: "N. Ryzhkov: Firm Measures and Unusual Decisions"]

[Text] N. Ryzhkov began his election campaign energetically, receiving in the process the broad support of the press of a certain tendency. In a series of interviews he reported that he was completely healthy and ready for serious work. Judging by everything, the candidate is supported by influential political forces, the military-industrial complex, and the "Soyuz" group. Many oblast newspapers which are under the control of the CPSU are devoting whole issues to the candidate. Presently Nikolay Ivanovich is practically reviling the policy of his successor. In his words, he was prepared to increase prices by a factor of 1.5 to two with very strict social protections, but he says he was prevented by exactly those people who increased them by a factor of to four with almost no compensation. Presently one can see some outlines of Ryzhkov's election program. In particular, speaking on 23 May before the electorate of Krasnogorsk, he declared that "in the event I am elected President, the entire political system will be oriented toward purifying the country of pollution, bureaucratism, and barracks-like living." The former chairman of the Council of Ministers also declared that perestroyka has not taken place in the form in which it was conceived. Under the appearance of reform, the framework of a mighty state has begun to come apart. He "fought the politicians who tried to derail perestroyka; I fought them in the Politburo and in the Supreme Soviet. It is the professional economists, not the politicians and not the experts of the 'Group of Seven,' who should determine the republic's economic policy."

His election strategy consists of fighting for the votes of practically all social categories, and the main theses of his program consist of the following: Immediately signing the Union and Federative treaties; developing a special legislative act which clearly defines the position of the Russian Federation and defends the rights of the

Russian-speaking population beyond its borders; indexing wages; reducing prices on basic food goods and prime necessities, first and foremost on children's goods; increasing wages for workers employed in the state sector by a factor of two; calculating a minimum wage for pensions and stipends proceeding from scientific norms; and intensifying the direct struggle against crime.

The candidate is opposed to "shock therapy" in the economy because it is fraught with serious social costs for millions of workers. The former chairman of the Council of Ministers reported that he has the most unusual means of resolving the food question, which he presently considers the "chief political question."

In the process Ryzhkov stresses that he is opposed to jumping hastily into market relations and that he also "has worked out a set of firm measures for the salvation of Russia." "Only a strong authority will save the country."

It is curious that in every instance the candidate limits himself to enumerating his good intentions, refraining from any commentary on his means of realizing his promises, which one now hears right and left.

Ryzhkov spent the entire day yesterday in Smolensk, where just one month ago the oblast authorities did not want to conduct a Russian referendum in any form on the presidency, probably having Yeltsin in mind. But now they have suddenly changed their point of view and are greeting Ryzhkov with open arms. Not one telephone in the CPSU city committee is being answered.

[signed] Vladimir Sluzhakov

"Entry is forbidden to 'unauthorized' deputies." One might well hang just such a sign at the entrance of the Smolensk automobile assembly factory. Former prime minister Nikolay Ryzhkov came here to meet with the labor collective. True, far from all who wished were able to view him with their own eyes, never mind ask him a question. Access was limited. Even deputies of the oblast city soviet experienced difficulties; they were not allowed in the hall. One can describe the theme of the conversation using only the words of the "lucky fellows" who gained access to the meeting. Nikolay Ryzhkov spoke out against privatization and talked disapprovingly of the policies of Union and Russian leaders. At the Talashkinskiy poultry plant this scenario for meeting voters was repeated.

[Signed] Our own information

Zhirinovskiy Discusses Presidential Race

LD0706094491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1853 GMT on 6 June broadcasts a 70-minute news conference with Russian presidential candidate Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy and moderated by Sergey Torchinskiy.

The news conference is formatted in three parts—a 10-minute opening address by Zhirinovskiy; representatives of the other candidates put questions to him; and news representatives put questions to him.

In his opening statement Zhirinovskiy stresses the historic nature of the upcoming Russian presidential elections. He says: "For decades you have been deceived, made fools of, and stuffed full of various dogmas, and the political show still continues." He adds that all leaders have blamed their predecessors for the errors committed. "The Russian state is dying before your very eyes. Culture is in decline, there is no economy, there is destitution and hunger," he says. The country's leaders tour Western countries begging for aid. They fear 12 June, regarding it as the day of reckoning, when the electorate will exact revenge for the years of deception, Zhirinovskiy says, adding: "They are afraid of me, because I am the only one of all the republican presidential candidates who is not connected with the elite. I was never there, at the top. I shall represent you, millions of Russian citizens, those who received, and still receive in these terrible years, only 200 rubles and live in two-room apartments. There are the everlasting queues, from the maternity hospital to the grave. There is a total shortage of everything. You are made to do nothing but work—work so that those at the top get rich."

Zhirinovskiy says that perestroyka has ground to a halt, entailing the final destruction of the state. A new scenario is being presented to the electorate—the confrontation between Russia and the center. "There is no confrontation. It is still one and the same team." "They are escaping from the sinking ship, but in order that you should continue to believe in them, they are changing their political colors," he adds.

Zhirinovskiy makes the point that he is only 45 years old. He would be Russia's youngest president. The bad old days of the gerontocracy are over. How do Russia's new leaders differ from the old ones, he asks. They enjoy the same old privileges. "Once again there is total deception and making fools of you," he says. He goes on to describe how, under his presidency, Russia would be restored to its former glory as an integral state in which the army would not have to shed blood within the country. He says the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is an artificial creation, and that the new Russia will encompass the whole of the present USSR. He goes on to criticize the former economic policy involving the financial bolstering of corrupt regimes abroad.

Zhirinovskiy says: "If I do not win the elections, I will not be the loser. You, the inhabitants of Russia, will be the losers." He says that all wealth today is concentrfated in the southern republics. The southern mafia is continuing total corruption here in Russia. They are destroying our culture. They are pressuring the central government, including the republic's new government, he adds. He says that Yeltsin's policies have led to the migration of countless Russians from their places of

residence. This must be stopped, or there will be civil war or a military coup. Foreign policy has been a total failure. We have been driven out of many countries recently, he says, and adds that now we are being driven out of the Union republics. War monuments are being defaced both in the USSR and in eastern Europe.

Zhirinovskiy rounds off the first part of the program by saying that the other presidential candidates, in particular Yeltsin, Bakatin, and Ryzhkov refuse to join him in a roundtable debate.

The program continues with the other major contenders' representatives then handing written questions to Zhirinovskiy and with the representatives making brief statements in support of their candidates while Zhirinovskiy studies the questions.

The first questions comes from Yeltsin's representative and concerns Zhirinovskiy's past allegation that, when abroad, Yeltsin failed to visit Soviet war memorials. This is simply untrue, the questioner writes, and he invites Zhirinovskiy to apologize. Far from apologizing, Zhirinovskiy attacks Yeltsin for ignoring the Russian population wherever he happened to be. Yeltsin was more interested in contacting the leaders of the various popular fronts. "Wherever Yeltsin is, there is war. There is fascism, and there is counterrevolution," Zhirinovskiy says.

To this, Yeltsin's representatives retorts: "I am horrified at what will happen to Russia if such a president is elected."

Tuleyev's representative suggests that Zhirinovskiy favors lower alcohol prices. Zhirinovskiy replies that there is no point in maintaining the present restrictions and making people pay through the nose for an essentially cheap product.

Bakatin's representative asks Zhirinovskiy to comment on what is wrong with the other candidates. Zhirinovskiy begins with Bakatin. He says that as USSR minister of internal affairs, he presided over an enormous growth in crime throughout the country. This illustrates his incompetence. Bakatin founded a double militia in the Baltic republics, and had struck at Russian interests in the area. He vacillated between support for Gorbachev and opposition to him.

Turning to Yeltsin, Zhirinovskiy repeats that a Yeltsin victory would generate civil war in Russia and in the USSR, and a military coup in the very nearest time. Zhirinovskiy claims that Yeltsin does not understand the ethnic questions. Yeltsin says that nothing will happen to the Russian population in the Union republics. In fact, Russians have been driven from their homes throughout the country. The Russian people have always been martyrs or cannon fodder for wars and revolution.

Zhirinovskiy dismisses Ryzhkov as having been condemned by his own record.

Chairman Torchinskiy asks Zhirinovskiy to tone down his comments on the other candidates. Zhirinovskiy replies that they deserve to be condemned. He dismisses Tuleyev as being just a "railwayman."

Turning to General Makashov, Zhirinovskiy expresses qualified approval for him, but is suspicious about his socialist leanings. "I was never a communist, but not an anticommunist either," Zhirinovskiy says. Makashov's representative asks Zhirinovskiy what post he would like in a future government if he were defeated. "If the winner is not Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, I will occupy the post—I am an international affairs specialist by profession—I am prepared to occupy the post of Russian foreign minister and to ensure a totally new conception in Russia's foreign policy," Zhirinovskiy says in reply. This ends the second part of the program.

The third part of the program is a dialogue between press representatives and Zhirinovskiy and begins with Zhirinovskiy criticizing the press, which he says can be divided into two camps—representatives of the old ruling part, and the so-called new press, which is just the mouthpiece of the leadership of the Russian Republic. "So there is really no independent press," Zhirinovskiy adds.

The TRUD representative asks how the Russian electorate can be expected to entrust power to a man who is unknown and who has never been tested in a position of power. Zhirinovskiy says that the electorate knows the other contenders capabilities only too well. When it is pointed out that his rating among the public is not among the highest, Zhirinovskiy attibutes this to more lies and disinformation on the part of the media, which consistently downgrades the significance of his campaign and the degree of support he enjoys. He urges the electorate to ignore the televisin sociology and opinion polls. This is followed by a tirade against the sins of the press, which is constantly seeking "dirty linen." Zhirinovskiy claims that Yeltsin has the press in his pocket, along with an endless flow of finance for his campaign. "The 12 June elections are not free. They are elections for just one person," he says, adding that it is just another political comedy.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA representative invites Zhirinovskiy to name just one person other than himself whom the country could believe. This elicits another anti-press tirade. Let the Russian people show in free elections whom they wish to believe. Yeltsin is avoiding a face-to-face debate with Zhirinovskiy. Let everyone's medical records be brought out for public display. Let everyone see the parlous state of Yeltsin's health, Zhirinovskiy stresses.

The KURANTY representative, pointedly calling Zhirinovskiy "Mr. Zhirinovskiy," asks him why he had said in an interview that if he were to become president, he would allow a fascist party to be formed. Was Russia, in his opinion, ready to accept him as its fuehrer? Some

altercation follows between Zhirinovskiy, the questioner, and the chairman about how Zhirinovskiy should answer the question. Zhirinovskiy maintains: "I will answer in the way that I, a republican presidential candidate, want to." After some debate, Zhirinovskiy states that there is now no legal restriction on the names of parties. Moreover, "today there are very many parties that do not bear the name Nazi—the popular fronts, and so on—but whose actions are precisely fascist and Nazi," he says. Parties must be judged by their actions. Zhirinovskiy adds: "I am a fierce opponent of fascism, but today fascism and the ground for it are prepared by such papers as KURANTY." As for whether Russia wants him as Fuehrer, Zhirinovskiy says that Russia does not need a fuehrer; it needs a president who is free from the mafia and the top elite.

The GLASNOST representative draws attention to Zhirinovskiy's relative lack of success in his former jobs. Why does he think that he would be a success as president? Zhirinovskiy explains that his progress was blocked by the Communist Party. As a non-party member his achievements were modest. He intends to see that no other persons suffer henceforth in the same way. His future Russia will be a law-governed state. Officials who do not obey his orders will be prosecuted. "I shall never send tanks anywhere. I will solve everything through a new economic policy," he states.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA representative questions Zhirinovskiy about his program and about how long he has embraced its principles. This generates heated controversy about the differences between his program and that of the centrust bloc, and the extent to which NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is a truly independent paper.

The PRAVDA representative is next, and asks Zhirinovskiy how he aims to effect his policy of concord. Zhirinovskiy says that he would cooperate with all groups that seek to maintain the country's integrity, irrespective of their names. He goes on to expound his housing policy.

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA representative asks Zhirinovskiy for his views on the armed forces. Zhirinovskiy says that he would make the army a professional outfit, raise officers' salaries, and remove the army from criticism. The army would not be involved in inter-ethnic conflict within the country, he adds.

The MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI representative asks Zhirinovskiy about the nature of those who support him and their reasons for doing so. This leads to another tirade. Answering a supplementary question about how he proposes to maintain a dialogue with other political groups when he is clearly incapable of conversing in a civil manner with the press, Zhirinovskiy replies that what is needed is a dialogue with the voters. "They have grown tired of you. They are tired of you all," Zhirinovskiy says.

The IZVESTIYA representative questions Zhirinovskiy about the functions of his running mate, Andrey Zavidiya. Zhirinovskiy says that Zavidiya will look after the economy under his direction. Asked about who pays for Zhirinovskiy's trips abroad, Zhirinovskiy maintains that his travels cost the Russian Federation nothing—he is invited, and the foreign hosts pay.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's representative asks why the democratic and independent press do not like Zhirinovskiy, and why the Yeltsin camp is cautious about his appearance on the political landscape. Zhirinovskiy highlights his differences from the other candidates, who are all essentially the same. He threatens them with legal action should be become president for destroying the state and the economy.

The ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA representative asks whether Zhirinovskiy avails himself of the services of image consultants. Zhirinovskiy replies that he does not want to create the image of a new tsar, unlike Yeltsin, who he calls "Tsar Boris II."

The representatives of the other candidates finally make brief comments on the news conference, and the chairman then winds up the proceedings.

Election Program Cited

91UN1697B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 3

[Article prepared by N. Nikulina: "Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: To End Confrontation"]

[Text] **We present our readers with one more of the candidates for the post of president of Russia—Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy. He is 45 years old and graduated from the Institute of the Countries of Asia and Africa of Moscow State University as well as the legal department of Moscow State University. He has worked in various public, state, and cooperative organizations. Now he is the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, from which he was nominated as a candidate.**

From the Dossier of SELSKAYA ZHIZN

We decided to begin our dossier with V.V. Zhirinovskiy because he is only known to a small circle of people. In order to be impartial, we offer excerpts from his public speeches, the stenographic report of the congress, his election program, and other official sources.

The Theses of His Program

"The main thing is the necessity of ending the confrontation between Russia and the center. If this does not take place, the situation in the country will deteriorate."

"Another important feature is to resolve the nationalities question properly. Today the economy is stalling for the most part precisely because of this."

"The main thing is the economy. In the economy one must begin with the zero option. In the first place, if I am elected president of Russia, then on the very first day after disclosure of the results of the elections I will make a speech with the president of the USSR and declare that confrontation between Russia and the center has ended and that civil war in the USSR has ended."

"...It is necessary to give all people equal opportunity and a single tax policy and let them compete under equal conditions. Everyone! As they wish! The same thing in the countryside as well. Let the members of the kolkhoz [collective farm] and the private farmers work as they wish and let them engage in normal competition; in some places a strong kolkhoz will swallow the private farmers and if not, the private farmers will nibble away at a weak kolkhoz. And let all this happen gradually. On an economic basis alone, without politics and ideology."

Theme of His Election Campaign:

"I will defend the Russian people and the minorities on the entire territory of Russia and the USSR."

From an Election Leaflet:

"I am young, energetic, and precisely the president that our long-suffering republic needs."

"Russia will approach the 21st century as a renewed state under the leadership of a young president."

Upon his election to the post of president of Russia, V.V. Zhirinovskiy, among other measures, proposes to adopt: A new Union constitution and new legislation; effective legislative acts to protect citizens from the criminal element; to reduce prices on alcoholic beverages and demand that they be sold at all trade outlets.

From long conversations with journalists at the congress:

"The main thing is that people be given the opportunity to choose. On 12 June the residents of Russia can elect a president: Ryzhkov, Yeltsin, or me, for example. If they do not vote, let them regret it!"

From answers to the questions of RSFSR people's deputies:

[V. Ryumin] ...Why were you nominated when you understand very well that you will not win?

[Zhirinovskiy] I have already said that I understand very well that I would win if free elections were to be conducted in autumn of this year. That is the first thing. Secondly, I have one goal—for the multiparty system and pluralism to become a reality.

[Ye. Ambartsumov] Whom do you represent?

[Zhirinovskiy] ...The average middle sectors. Wages of 200 rubles and a two-room apartment. I do not represent those on top, the radicals, or those on the bottom—those from the jails, the drunks, and the bums. No, I represent our middle sectors—the millions of Soviet citizens.

[B. Konovalov] Where is the guarantee that what you say is not just empty words?

[Zhirinovskiy] No one who has not yet received the post he is campaigning for can give a guarantee. You will give the guarantee if you elect me. ...I guarantee one thing: The strictest execution of the law. I will not have any ukases that will not be carried out. They will be carried out immediately.

From the conversation of V.V. Zhirinovskiy with our correspondent.

[Nikulina] Vladimir Volfovich, what do you consider to be fundamental in the peasant question?

[Zhirinovskiy] Not to get in their way. Not to hinder them. To leave the peasant in peace. Then the carts, wagons, and trucks will bring food in day and night. We must give the peasant equipment. What are we doing now? Are we helping him? We are mocking the private farmers and the members of the kolkhozes. We have to remove all limitations from both the member of the kolkhoz and the private farmer.

[Nikulina] What qualities of a president do you consider most important?

[Zhirinovskiy] Competence. Only that. As the Japanese believe; I have met with them many times. Here it is the opposite. Anything you want, but not professionalism. On job applications there is not even any space for "professional qualifications."

[Nikulina] As a citizen of the republic, for whom are you going to vote?

[Zhirinovskiy] I want people to vote for me. When there are other elections and other candidates, I will examine the selection of those candidates. If they begin to obstruct us, then we do not need them. The population will choose for itself. It will choose correctly and not make a mistake.

[Nikulina] What is your opinion of the results of the voting at the congress when you were approved as a candidate?

[Zhirinovskiy] It was a very correct distribution of forces. It is the very thing that the population wants. That was the very 52 percent that I will receive from the voters. But do not toy with me. We, the candidates, should be presented under equal conditions. I proposed a telephone marathon to them all. You will see—they will not do it. They are frightened, and as a result they will lose.

Candidate Vadim Bakatin Visits Volgograd 6 Jun

OW0706032091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Russia's presidential hopeful Vadim Bakatin came to Volgograd June 6 on a one-day visit. He saw the Hall of Eternal Memory on Mamaev Hill, the oldest factory in the Volga region Krasny Oktyabr, the central department store and the agrimarket where he chatted with city residents.

Bakatin outlined his program and answered journalists' questions at a press conference held afterwards.

Touching on the economic concept of his economic program, the presidential hopeful said that "one could pass from market to socialism in one night, but it's a long way to try to do the opposite; it's the same as to make an egg from an egg shell."

Speaking about his priority measures as president, Bakatin stated his intention "to attend to agriculture, not to set about lowering vodka prices (a shot at another presidential candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy)." A rapid and forced privatisation of land may lead to hunger and cold, says Bakatin.

Speaking about the situation in the military, the candidate claimed that "to improve discipline in the military, generals' discipline must be improved."

Visits Interior Ministry Academy

OW0506152091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1500 GMT 4 Jun 91

[Text] On June 4 Vadim Bakatin who is running for the post of President of Russia, now member of the Council for Defense of the USSR and former Soviet interior minister, has had a meeting with the electorate at the Academy of the Soviet Interior Ministry.

In his speech Bakatin made a reference to the question he is often asked in the run-up to the general elections: who has instructed him to run for Presidency? It is usually inferred that the man was Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Bakatin said he has joined the race "guided solely by my own conscience and not pressed by anyone."

At the same time he admitted tremendous pressure was exerted on him last year when he was urged to run for Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, yet he said then he flatly refused to do that.

Vadim Bakatin said current Presidential candidates compete with each other not in "their election platforms but in promises". He called "sheer populism" the promise made by former Soviet President Nikolay Ryzhkov to cut prices and raise wages. Bakatin was also critical of Boris Yeltsin's promise made in his speech in Voronezh to lift all ceilings on wages and salaries, noting however that he was unfamiliar with Yeltsin's program, because it has not so far been made public. We had Mikhail Gorbachev promising that before, and all we have now is exacerbation of inflation, Bakatin said. He was equally pessimistic about Yeltsin's intent to cut the working week by one hour.

According to Vadim Bakatin, Russian Premier Ivan Silayev's decision to abolish state orders for enterprises in 1992 was unrealistic. The state orders are to be retained and made "profitable for indutrial enterprises with the help of tax rebates".

Bakatin also condemned the "disintegration of the power structures and the war between republics and the centre, the competition in populism", declaring that "we are suffering from indecision, half-hearted measures and confrontation".

Bakatin spoke high of the "9+1" agreement, the country's current foreign policy, yet said a consistent policy in "foreign trade is clearly lacking".

Answering questions from the audience Bakatin said he favoured "a genuine multi-party system whereby all political parties are active in people's residential areas, and not at the workplace". He pointed out that "the trouble with the Communist party is a lack of policy, which cannot be replaced by a declaration, which allows for loose interpretation".

Makashov Remarks in Sverdlovsk Cited

91UN1704B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 22, 5 Jun 91 p 2

["Part of speech" by General Makashov, candidate for president of Russia, at a meeting with the electorate in Sverdlovsk, date not given, recorded by N. Zenova: "Whoever Is Like Lenin"]

[Text] **The situation in the country.** Five years ago we were having a bad time and were poor, but everything was available. Televisions, refrigerators.... As a result of work, work on the destruction of our state—I cannot put it any other way—we have managed in five or six years to bring ourselves to this pass.... When people say that there is no alternative to the market, then, I'm sorry, they are pulling the wool over people's eyes. There is always a choice....

The law enforcement authorities. Why are our law enforcement authorities not working? Because they are squint-eyed, they are looking like this, to the left-to the right: What if one acts in accordance with the law and is then indicted? But here we have Pugo repudiating the actions of the OMON [special purpose militia detachment]. How can this be?! I know on the territory of the district about each combat vehicle which leaves the pool, there is an operational duty-officer service for this, and if I do not find out, my staff will be punished. No one should ever repudiate himself, he have civil and political bravery.

Diplomacy. What kind of diplomacy is it which only makes concessions? We are agreeing to out and out concessions on all issues. I realize that diplomacy would have conquered had we withdrawn our forces, and had NATO withdrawn its forces, from Germany. This would have been a victory. Poor France declared that it needed five years to withdraw its forces, to build barracks and apartments for its officers. But we are so rich that we signed, and the next morning the troop trains were rattling along....

"Personalities". ...Tyulkin is similar to Lenin in outward appearance even—prominent forehead, intelligent, an orator. And an honest man also.

...I believe that egoism, which we observe in certain leaders, should be kept hidden deep in one's pocket or tucked much further away. And when two leaders arrange between them such sluts [as published—potaskushki], the people could have something to say to both of them and employ some instrument of the kick-in-the-pants type.

Vice Presidential Candidates Activities Reported

Abdulatipov on Need for Common Sense

91UN1704A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 22, 5 Jun 91 p 2

[Statement by Ramazan Abdulatipov, candidate for vice president of Russia, recorded by S. Boguslavskiy: "'For a Policy of Common Sense'"]

[Text] I am, as you know, a young politician. The anniversary of the first freely elected Russian parliament also, in fact, marks the first year of my political career. Two years of working in the CPSU Central Committee administrative system prior to this were to some extent a continuation of my former research and teaching activity. I delivered lectures, traveling around the country, and attempted to implement in the governing party of our multinational state if only elements of a scientific approach to the analysis and forecasting of interethnic relations. Prior to this, no one, apparently, except perhaps the KGB, had bothered with this.... But this is not surprising. After all, only two years before my arrival in the CPSU Central Committee it was authoritatively declared from the highest party platform, in defiance of the obvious facts and simple common sense, what is more, that the nationality question had been successfully resolved in our country....

It was probably not fortuitous that it was at that time that yet another attempt was made to "spur on" the natural course of development, infelicitously called the "strategy of acceleration." It was this, as you know, which laid the mine which blew up our consumer market and brought about runaway inflation, setting the money-printing presses rolling at full capacity. The statements of one of those who, in fact, determined our government's economic policy at that time, to the effect that we have been deflected from the right path of perestroyka only in the last 12-18 months, appear strange in this connection.

In the six years of this "perestroyka" the people's situation has deteriorated catastrophically. It is under these conditions that democratization and glasnost, which we have lacked, have resulted in lawlessness and lies and have stimulated violence and legal nihilism.

Amid the general shortages, which have become a nightmarish reality for the people of our country, a shortage of three things is particularly taking its toll on the health of Soviet society. The shortage of common sense in the economy. The shortage of morality in politics. The shortage of social justice in the day-to-day life of millions of working people.

For seven long decades we attempted to prove, contrary to the experience accumulated by mankind, the unprovable: that it is possible to build the richest, most prosperous society by suppressing people's personal interest and ignoring their real present-day requirements and needs in the name of the universal good in a "shining future." The further we went along this path, the more the general felicity promised under full communism had the ring of the promise of a paradisaical life in another world of the afterlife, for life in this one was frequently reminiscent of hell. Only it was not sinners who suffered in this hell but ordinary, honest toilers and entire peoples of our country.

The special path of social progress distinct from that of the rest of mankind has ended in a remote historical impasse. A great country, potentially the richest in the world, perhaps, appears on the threshold of the third millennium as a beggar with outstretched hand, enviously and ingratiatingly looking now to the West, now to the East.

All this is the result of the intention, as boastful as it was irrational, of building a new, happy life not on the natural foundation which had been laid by previous history and our forefathers but on the ruins on the world from which we had all emerged. History does not forgive people such mistakes. Even more when they fail to learn the lessons from their mistakes.

We cannot arrive at an efficient economy without switching to the market. Even the most indolent Oblomov understands this today. But we cannot make of the market a new ideology forcibly imposed on people if we want to return the country to the tracks of normal, natural-economic development, which we left seven decades ago. The transition to the market cannot be allowed to be even remotely reminiscent of the forcible, administrative means with which we attempted to "grace" our peasantry in the years of forced "collectivization." The market will not emerge all of a sudden. And it accepts just one "ideology"—that of common sense.

Returning common sense to our ailing society and our economy, which is in its death throes, is the main task of Russian politicians. And we must not succumb to the pressure of extreme political forces either from the right or from the left. It is this which is the main source of my disagreements with B.N. Yeltsin, which I have always expressed openly. And I have always been prepared for cooperation in movement toward a constructive center, toward concord, not confrontation. It is these principles which are the core of the election program of V.V. Bakatin and myself. Incidentally, B.N. Yeltsin himself has scored notable successes only when he has proceeded from the same principles.

So the essence of our position is simple: concord and creation and the prosperity and revival of the peoples of Russia—a single sovereign federal state—defense of the honor and protection of the security of all Russians and an improvement in their social situation and general morale.

In order to fly, a bird must be proud. We need more than ever today feelings of pride and dignity.

Russia and Russians have an opportunity for choice. We have one Russia. Russia can get by without us—we cannot get by without her.

Rutskoy Interviewed

OW0706094591 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1900 GMT 3 Jun 91

[Studio interview with A.V. Rutskoy, RSFSR vice presidential candidate, by journalist Irina Mishina; from the "Utro 120 + 30" program; time not specified — recorded]

[Text] Just a little over a week remains before the election of the Russian president. Each candidate for this position has nominated a vice presidential candidate. Journalist Irina Mishina talks with one of the candidates for the post of vice president.

[Begin recording] [Mishina] The candidates for the position of Russian president have been determined. At the same time the names of those who will be running for vice president have become known. Among them is Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskoy whose name was proposed by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Today he is a guest in our studio. Quite honestly, I have wanted to invite Aleksandr Vladimirovich for a long time, not only because he is running for the position of vice president, but because as an individual he is an interesting political figure. In fact I do not know how to best present you. I could introduce you as a member of the Russian Communist Party [RKP] Central Committee, as a leader of the Communists for Democracy faction of the Russian Parliament, or as a colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union. What would be best?

[Rutskoy] You know, if I were to recount all the activities I am engaged in it would take a long time, of course, and I think it would be somewhat immodest. So I think we should stick to the specific topic which you noted at the very beginning.

[Mishina] Very well then, I have a general question. It was previously customary here that anybody could be a politician, even a person who did not have the requisite education. However, recently we have been experiencing a shortage of real, professional politicians. How did you get into politics?

[Rutskoy] I got into politics guided by the contemporary situation. My decision in this regard, why I took this course, lies in the fact that we cannot continue living this way.

[Mishina] You are not bothered by the fact that you were not the first candidate proposed by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin for the position of vice president? Many had previously turned down the offer?

[Rutskoy] In this case Boris Nikolayevich of course had an opportunity to make a certain choice. By a turn of fate his choice rested on me.

[Mishina] You were previously considered to be one of the prominent figures of the RKP. Then you headed the parliamentary Communists for Democracy faction. Now, as far as I know, you are mainly working with the democrats. Is this a coincidence or not?

[Rutskoy] No, it is not a coincidence and I was never a prominent member of the RKP. I was married against my will! I...

[Mishina, interrupting] But you were and remain a member of the [RKP] Central Committee?

[Rutskoy] Yes I do, deliberately. Deliberately at present. Now why...

[Mishina, interrupting] Why?

[Rutskoy] Because when it was proposed [that I leave] I categorically refused. I was elected at the congress and I remain in it deliberately because to leave the CPSU, and thereby to renounce membership in the Central Committee, would not take much effort. But it is more difficult to be in it and to work within the party itself with the aim of democratization. It is much more difficult in the party than in society. The party's function is ideology. Now today, in this situation, in the contemporary situation the times themselves force us to return to realities, not to some kind of prospects or choices, but to simple realities. When I came in here I asked a rather dignified lady that you have working here: What would you like? And she said: You know, I do not care what it is called, but I would simply like to live [well].

[Mishina] You travel around the country often. What most concerns the people?

[Rutskoy] Well, in meeting voters during the preelection campaign...everybody has problems with food. Whether this is moral or immoral, you understand, people will probably judge for themselves, but I consider it to be completely immoral. How could it turn out that for 74 years in our society we built something and cannot understand what we built, calling it...

[Mishina, interrupting] By various names.

[Rutskoy] Yes, socialism, communist prospects... So how did it turn out that in this society a person is in practice not protected, although I hate to use the word because I tossed it out a long time ago. The state must guarantee a person's rights. It is quite simple: Socially a person is not specifically determined to be a person.

[Mishina] LITERATURNAYA GAZETA asked the Russian presidential hopefuls what would be their first decree if they were elected. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin responded that he does not want to be fettered by some sort of obligation. Yet nevertheless, what would be the first thing you would undertake if you were elected to the post of vice president?

[Rutskoy] I am familiar with Boris Nikolayevich's position, why he declined to respond. His position is to stabilize the situation in our society, to give these strata—since they cannot be called classes because the state dealt with these people in such a way that they have indeed taken on some sort of classless condition and an incomprehensible form, the form of life of these people—[changes thought] in fact concern for these people.

[Mishina] Various things are said about Boris Nikolayevich's character. Some say he is an inflexible person, some say he is occasionally rash [ne vzveshennyy]. How do you find him in working with him?

[Rutskoy] I would probably judge his character as follows. First of all he is demanding, but not inflexible. These are concepts that simply cannot be compared, inflexibility and exactingness. Inflexibility suits me more, because I cannot stand it when a person, instead of clearly and precisely saying why something has not been fulfilled, begins beating around the bush. I cannot stand this.

[Mishina] Do you ever argue with him or do you always agree with him?

[Rutskoy] You know I have argued with him on many occasions.

[Mishina] Do you have a family?

[Rutskoy] Of course.

[Mishina] Tell us about it, if it is not a secret.

[Rutskoy] I have an older son who is studying at a medical institute. My younger son is studying in the Moscow Suvorov Academy and has finished his first year. My older son has completed his first year at the medical institute. So they are catching up to me. And there is my wife.

[Mishina] Figuratively speaking, who is the general in your household, your wife or yourself?

[Rutskoy] I am of course. How could it be, well, you understand, like a general [words indistinct].

[Mishina] Well, relationships in the family form in various ways these days.

[Rutskoy] Well, you know, a man should be a man and he should treat a woman correspondingly. And a woman must be a woman. So this is the situation that we have. My wife left the CPSU and I did not. You can imagine the discussions we have on this score!

[Mishina] Do you have plans to withdraw?

[Rutskoy] No. Prospects have been created and we are presently engaged with the Communists for Democracy faction, the parliamentary group. We are of one mind to turn this movement into a parliamentary party.

[Mishina] How many people are in it now?

[Rutskoy] Presently parliamentary groups of Communists for Democracy are being established at every level of soviets of people's deputies. A group of this kind has already been created in the Mossoviet [Moscow City Soviet]. A group of this kind has been created in Barnaul. At the same time the All-Russian Civic Concord social and political movement has been set up in parallel. We are attracting everyone to this movement, including CPSU members, those who have withdrawn from the CPSU—we get many letters from such people — nonparty people, and [members of] other social and political movements. In other words, no differences exist.

[Mishina] Do you have any hobbies, although I understand you are short for time?

[Rutskoy] We have a genetically inherited talent for painting. That is, painting is not only a psychological form of rest, but also a desire. I have two author's certificates for monumental works of art. One is the Boris and Gleb Monument marking the jubilee of the academy [not further identified] and there is the panorama devoted to the conquerors of space and aviation at Monino.

[Mishina] Yeltsin plays tennis. Have you tried sports?

[Rutskoy] You know, I do not want to copy anybody, although this is very fashionable today. I simply do not have the time, honestly speaking.

[Mishina] Well, I wish you success in all the positions that you named and successes in your preelection activities and I wish you a good family rear guard. As a military man you probably know that a sound rear is half the victory.

[Rutskoy] Yes, thank you. [end recording]

RSFSR Deputies Authorized To Observe Elections

OW0606082291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 5 Jun 91

[Text] Sergey Filatov, Secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Vassily Kazakov, head of the Central Electoral Committee, have informed district electoral commissions of the fact that People's Deputies of the RSFSR have been officially authorized to monitor the June 12 presidential elections in the republic.

An observer may request any of the electoral commission materials irrespective of where a commission may be situated, and may appoint his or her official representative to perform as observers in electoral commissions.

The voting procedure and ballot counting may be watched also by representatives of various political, professional and other public associations, as well as mass movements, labor staffs, residential area associations, and the media.

The presence of observers at a polling station requires no preliminary notice. The observers, however, must produce an official document certifying their authority, such as a stamped protocol of a meeting of people who sent them to monitor the voting.

Moscow Mayoral Candidate Klyuyev Interviewed

91UN1688B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 May 91 pp 1-2

[Report by T. Pomelova on responses to questions after speech by Vladimir Vladimirovich Klyuyev, candidate for the post of mayor of Moscow, doctor of technical sciences, professor, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and general director of the Moscow Scientific Production Association Spektr, at the Pravda House of Culture; date not given: "'For the Mayor a Tie Is Not the Most Important Thing'"]

[Text] [Question] How do you estimate your chances of victory?

[Klyuyev] I am a scientist, engaged in diagnostics, and I look realistically at what occurs. My name is not well known to Muscovites. Nonetheless, I am taking part in the election campaign. Why?

First of all, to proclaim my own position, which reflects the views of many of my scientific colleagues and managers of enterprises, which is not only our assessment of what is happening but also a forecast of the development of the situation and a constructive program for getting out of the crisis. If Muscovites support me, I will try to do as much as possible for its adequate implementation. [end Klyuyev]

The question, which was posed at the end of the speech by Vladimir Vladimirovich Klyuyev, candidate for the post of mayor of Moscow, doctor of technical sciences, professor, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and general director of the Moscow Scientific Production Association Spektr, contrary to the expectations of the questioner did not put him on the spot. There also were more difficult questions from the "Yeltsinists" and from the military, economists, party committee secretaries, pensioners, and militiamen—the hall of the Pravda House of Culture was full.

To answer everyone and to be liked by everyone are very different things. Indeed, the candidate for the post of head of the city did not set such a task for himself.

[Question] Why were you fired as secretary of the raykom [rayon party committee]?

[Klyuyev] The most difficult day for me was when I was elected first secretary of the Leninskiy Raykom. It was the only time in my life that I cried, on leaving the association. This was in the year 1986. The proposal for my election was made by Yeltsin, with whom I had occasion to work. He made a different impression on colleagues. In my opinion he is a man who listens to the person he is talking to, even an opponent, and you can argue with him, defend your point of view, and resolve specific questions.

After his departure I also asked "to resign." Not only for political reasons: I am a scientist, and I never planned to become a "professional" party worker. However, I think that in these two incomplete years I acquired useful managerial experience. I make so bold as to hope that I did not do anything bad in Leninskiy Rayon. [end Klyuyev]

We will note that Vladimir Vladimirovich not only did not harm his rayon, on whose territory the Spektr association (a collective enterprise registered in Moscow under number 2) is located, and which he has headed since 1976, but he also brought it a lot of benefit. Computerization of all of the schools in the rayon, the first family store in the city, completion of the construction of the Palace of Youth, which was dragging on for 11 years, the conduct of the first scientific analysis of the ecological situation to determine the sources of environmental pollution and neutralization of their influence—this is not a full list of what was done. Scientists of the Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov helped in coping with the rayon's problems.

[Question] How do we overcome the food crisis in Moscow?

[Klyuyev] We were expecting a miracle last autumn: They did not take part in the harvest, but they wanted full counters. The miracle did not happen. There is nothing reprehensible in buying food even abroad, for hard currency. But, first, money has to be earned for this, and a lot will be needed. There is none for the time being.

As long as there is none, localities near Moscow will have to help. This is the only way out now.

[Question] Your attitude toward property and privatization?

[Klyuyev] All types of property are equal. War between them is impermissible, and there must be competition—that is the practice of the whole world. First of all, it is necessary to privatize small enterprises, stores, and hairdressers.

[Question] To which of your competitors would you yield first place?

[Klyuyev] I had occasion to work with Saykin, Bryachikhin, and Luzhkov. I value and respect their professionalism in equal degree. But Saykin, perhaps, has more work experience in the post of chairman of the Moscow Gorispolkom [Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee].

[Question] What do you think of private property in land?

[Klyuyev] We will have to wait on this in Moscow.

[Question] In what way will you begin to resolve the housing problem?

[Klyuyev] It is now being resolved on a "large scale"—from Tverskaya Street. It cannot be said that it is being done very successfully. It is necessary, in my opinion, to give free rein to private business initiative in the rayons. Let them earn and build. Cooperative and state construction will supplement each other.

[Question] Where will you find the financial resources to implement your program?

[Klyuyev] The budget of the regions must be increased by a factor of three to five: They are now impoverished. What can be expected of a rayon if there are less resources in its budget than money in the account, for example, of our association? A businessman's creativity is a good prescription both for an enterprise and for the rayon, and for the city. How to earn is an economic matter, in the full and literal sense of the word, but, of course, in accordance with the law.

Besides this, Moscow is a unique city. Income from tourism, hard currency from the intermediary services of foreign firms, and the support of cooperatives that bring profit to the city—all these are unused reserves.

[Question] What do you value in people?

[Klyuyev] Professionalism.

[Question] If you are elected mayor, will you remain in the CPSU and a member of the gorkom [city party committee]?

[Klyuyev] The party did not prevent me from becoming a scientist and a manager. I am convinced that the party should not interfere in the economy, replacing economic laws with ideology. It is a political organization, and it must realize itself precisely in such a sphere. It is another matter that now, in my opinion, the CPSU is working unsatisfactorily. But this is not a reason for leaving its ranks.[end Klyuyev]

The meeting in the Pravda Palace of Culture was the first. What impression it created on the audience—potential voters—and what the reaction of the audience will be , which is one hundred times larger after V. Klyuyev's speech on television, is difficult to judge now. It is also difficult for the voters themselves to evaluate the possible manager of Moscow on the basis of answers, even to dozens of questions.

Who is he, one of the candidates for the high post? He was born in Moscow in 1937. After completing secondary school (it is interesting that academician-to-be Legasov studied with him in a parallel class) he entered the Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman. He received a degree in mechanical engineering. His future career was very unusual.

At 27 years of age he was a candidate of technical sciences, at 36, a doctor, and at 50 he was elected a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. At 27 years of age, a senior researcher, at 33, director of the Introscopy Scientific Research Institute, and at 39, general director of the Moscow Scientific Production Association Spektr. Such brilliant successes are due not only to abilities, knowledge, and good luck, but also to a resolute and strong character.

Spektr, which became one of the first collective enterprises in the capital (our newspaper wrote about this), this year increased by 10 million rubles the volume of output of instruments for quality control and technical diagnostics of products of practically all branches of the economy. The high technical level of articles of the association is achieved due to the direct cooperation and the creation of joint ventures with major firms in England, Germany, and Italy. Business contacts are also being arranged with businessmen in the United States, France, and Argentina.

The director believes that without knowledge and maximum use of foreign economic experience, both "Western," as well as "Eastern," we will not overcome the crisis, not to speak of achieving a world level of quality and the output of competitive products.

Incidentally, Moscow's economic safety (this is what the candidate calls stability and balance in the economic development of the city), together with ecological and personal safety (this means the fight against crime), are the basis of V. Klyuyev's preelection program.

He sees Moscow most of all as a megalopolis, where it is necessary to create acceptable conditions of living for 9 million residents as fast as possible, and only afterward as the capital of the republic and the country.

In the event of victory he intends to select a "team" on the principles of professionalism and competence; however, he is ready to cooperate and seek compromise solutions with the management of the Moscow Soviet and deputies irrespective of ideological disagreements and level of schooling. The main thing is the practical result. There is no doubt in Vladimir Vladimirovich Klyuyev's mind that this is attainable, and also in the minds of the scientists of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute who nominated him as candidate to the post of mayor of the city.

...After the speech to the full hall, finally, one can relax. However, relaxation is relative. One comes with "the very last question," another extends an invitation to a large defense plant, and a third, from a Moscow rayon newspaper, persistently asks that he talk about "himself personally:"

"You are a sportsman, you play hockey with your sons. Give us some pictures. Unofficial ones, please, 'without a tie.'"

[Klyuyev] I do not know how interesting and new this is. In this case, I am a conservative, and it is difficult to switch. But a tie, in my opinion, and, indeed, for the mayor, is not the main thing...

Khasbulatov Urges Early Solutions on Union Treaty

LD0506181791 Moscow TASS in English 1452 GMT 5 Jun 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow June 5 TASS—There are currently no obstacles in the USSR that will "make it impossible to sign the union treaty", said deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov. He made this comment today in an interview with journalists prior to his talks with the delegation of the Italian Senate that arrived in the country at the invitation of the Russian Federation Parliament.

Khasbulatov described as "major movement forward" work on the draft union treaty at the Novo-Ogarevo government residence near moscow.

"One should strictly abide by the spirit and letter of the 'Statement of Ten'," Khasbulatov said. "Very serious decisions were made there and, I think, no forces should be allowed to avoid consistently fulfilling it." In this context, Khasbulatov expressed concern over the position of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

He believes that the draft union treaty can be submitted for discussion by constituent republics in its current form. Out of the outstanding problems, Khasbulatov named the taxation problem. Several republics insist on making payments into the union budget rather than paying a federal tax (this approach as endorsed by the Russian Supreme Soviet). According to the deputy chairman of the parliament, this is for "the supreme Soviets of republics" to decide.

Having noted a certain stabilisation of the political situation in the country, he said that this "enables us to tackle successfully the main tasks in the sphere of the economy". Khasbulatov pointed out that if the economic situation continues to worsen, the conclusion of the union treaty will have no effect.

"Contradictions from below that are generated by popular discontent cannot be corrected by any political nuances. Herein lies the danger," he added. "Political problems, contradictions should be solved as soon as possible and forces joined to attain economic goals."

Khasbulatov warned against "excessive enthusiasm" over foreign aid given to the Soviet Union.

"Our economic system," he explained, "is not sensitive to massive injections of foreign aid. We can end up straddled with a huge foreign debt, which will be wasted unless we undertake major structural changes in the economy and liberate the economy from the state tyranny."

Khasbulatov stressed the need to create internal "preconditions for business activity".

Views Political, Economic Options

PM0606111091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 18, 5-12 May 91 p 16

[Report on interview with Russian Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov by Lyudmila Telen; date, place not given: "One From the Professional Wave. Ruslan Khasbulatov: 'Why Do You Keep Running to Staraya Square...?'"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Telen] Radical democrats have accused you of being loyal to "right-wingers" and the latter—of sympathizing with democrats.

[Khasbulatov] simply speaking, there's stragegy and there's tactics. The goals which the Republic's leadership has set itself, and which it will not back away from under any circumstances, are well known. A single russia with extensive rights for the autonomies, an equitable alliance with the sovereign republics, the democratic structures of authority, a market economy. But to reach these objectives in a society torn apart by contradictions there is a need to act with flexibility.

[Telen] That is, to make concessions?

[Khasbulatov] At any rate, not to see them as treachery to the cause of democracy. I am convinced that reasonable people, even with differnt political views, can always reach agreement. [Khasbulatov ends]

This year Russia's parliament and the entire deputy corps have had to overcome more than one crisis. The debates around the Declaration on Sovereignty, land

reform and private land ownership, the Union Treaty-...But parliamentary discord was most acute in February-March, when the question of convening an extraordianry Congress of Russia's People's Deputies arose. Khasbulatov's first victory was the date of the Congress: through his effort it was put off from March 4 till March 28, from "before the referendum' till "after" it.

[Telen] At the extraordinary Congress you looked clam and collected. Were you really sure of the favourable outcome?

[Khasbulatov] On the contrary, I was perfectly well aware that that congress might be the last both for me and for Yeltsin. I was well aware of the behind-the-scenes preparations carried out by our opponents. And of course I carefully thought out the scenario of the coming Congress. I deemed it necessary to be level-headed, to quell emotion so that no one should lose their head in the heat of the moment and overlook something important. And another thing. To my mind, an open struggle was preferable to us. And I deliberately revealed confidential details. I bluntly told the "Communists of Russia": "Enough of hatching conspiracies. Why do you keep on running to Staraya Ploshchad (the headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee—Ed..)?"

[Telen] Did they protest?

[Khasbulatov] They laughed it off...

[Telen] Do you really believe that dialogue is possible with a political opponent?

[Khasbulatov] Of course, as long as you don't give in to the feeling of personal dislike. I have developed the habit of ignoring it when doing business. Unfortunately, others haven't.

[Telen] Do you level this reproach at your opponents?

[Khasbulatov] And at my colleagues, too. For example, they are all set to turn down Slobodkin's variant of the Constitution right away. Well, of course he's a "right-wing Commmunist", moreover one of the diehards. On the other hand, there's more similarity than difference in his version and in Rumyantsev's text. And look how the disputes are carried out. If anything goes wrong, the crux of the matter is brushed aside and off they go again: "But what did you do before 1985?" Unvaryingly. With invectives. But in Britain's parliament, even in the most furious clashes, you hear: "Dear Sir, I heard your arguments with interest, but permit me to say..." Alas, the deputies have been stricken by the same diseases as the rest of society—intolerance, lack of cultural tradition... [Khasbulatov ends]

The victory of Yeltsin's line at the 3rd Congress was largely a victory for "flexible" tactics. Against a backdrop of mounting contradictions, its decisions appear to be markedly restrained. Even the most unexpected one—redistribution of power among the top authorities—can hardly be called extremist. For the umpteenth time, officially now, Russia's leaders have started talking about a "round table" calling upon all political forces to take part.

[Telen] Do you support the demand for the USSR President's resignation?

[Khasbulatov] Today Gorbachev's resignation would play into the hands of reactionaries. But, on the other hand, I'm worried by the fact that the president is no longer concerned about his image in the West. Maybe because the external factor no longer works in internal policy? This is particularly dangerous in a country where reactionaries are still strong: In these circumstances an easily influenced politician can turn into a Saddam Husayn...Be what it may, I pin my hopes on the "round table" and on the President's participation in it. [Khasbulatov ends]

Professor Khasbulatov and other politicians from the "professional wave" have not yet managed to achieve much in the field of statesmanship. And whatever they have managed to do looks rather more like potential than current success. But maybe this is what has been preordained for them?

However, the "professional bastion" is the only thing left to hold back the extremist forces on the flanks. Is it at all fortuitous that Khasbulatov and Volkogonov in Russia's parliament, Prunskiene in Lithuania's parliament and Popov and Sobchak in municipal councils have been ever more obvioously shifting towards the centre? It is not becaue they are moving to the right, but because uncontrollable and spontaneous forces have appeared to the left of them. Profiting by their prestige, these real (and not invented by the President) centrists are still in a position to check the "ultras", to reconcile polar forces at least during negotiations, and to make these negotiations more civilized.

[Telen] Do you believe that the current political confrontation can be settled peacefully?

[Khasbulatov] Yes, I do, if we don't waste time. The reckoning is now a matter of days.

[Telen] Why then, even after the Russian leadership's proposals, does the President still go slow?

[Khasbulatov] He is still influenced by the forces which made him renounce the 500 Days Programme, renege on understandings with Russia and dictate their terms to the republics.

[Telen] But the situation has changed...

[Khasbulatov] Yes, and it gives us our last chance, perhaps. The President must come to understand that the "round table" serves his own interests, that this is the only chance for Gorbachev to survive as President. If interest doesn't work, then force may. The wave of mass strikes may compel the President to accept negotiations. If negotiations are still possible, and if totally different politicians don't replace us...[passage omitted]

Silayev Endorses Far East Self-Government Idea

PM0606153791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jun 91 Union Edition p 2

[Igor Abakumov report: "Far East-Moscow: Separation Without Divorce"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Prime Minister Ivan Silayev has stated at a session of the Far East Association of Soviets of People's Deputies Coordinating Council that the idea of transferring some state powers to new territorial and economic formations will be supported by the Russian Government.

First and foremost, Ivan Silayev said, such functions as the licensing of foreign economic activity, and quotas for catches of valuable varieties of fish or timber procurement should be transferred from the center to local level. This will allow the local authorities to use additional resources to supply their population with goods and services and to develop business activeness and foreign tourism in the region.

The expansion of the Far East's self-governing potential will make it possible to really improve not just the socioeconomic situation in the region, but also to considerably reduce interethnic tension.

Currently the Far East Association of Soviets of People's Deputies includes 11 of the region's oblasts, krays, and republics. Buryatia and Chita Oblast, which were previously part of the East Siberia Economic Region, have applied to join the association.

Volgograd Tour Noted

LD0506220691 Moscow TASS in English 2118 GMT 5 Jun 91

[Text] Volgograd June 6 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev's business visit to the city on the Volga is connected not only with implementing radical reforms and switching to market relations, but also with the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia.

During a meeting with people's deputies and heads of local executive committees, Silayev focused on a programme, which he said was the "Yeltsin-Silayev" programme. He said it aims to create economic incentives to boost russian citizens' business activities.

Silayev said the incentives included a new taxation system aimed to stimulate the development of production, support to all forms of property and new forms of economic relations. He said it is planned to concentrate on developing the production of consumer goods and foodstuffs.

Silayev favoured multistructure agriculture, noting that collective and state farms will have equal rights with individually-operated farms, the growth of which proves that there is movement to the market.

Russian Party Constituent Congress Held

PM0606093591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 First Edition p 5

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov: "Russian Party Supports Makashov"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the Russian Party has been held. Delegates from 36 oblasts of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] took part in its work. The economist V. Korchagin, editor of the newspaper RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, was elected chairman.

The new party sees as its main aim the resurrection of the Russian nation and the defense of the life, dignity, and rights of Russians in the Union republics. The Russian party is a resolute opponent of privatization and regards it as the auctioning off of Russia, as the country's occupation without weapons. With a view to the free transfer of the means of production, housing, and land to the working people and for the struggle against sabotage it is planned to introduce by legislation an emergency situation for a period of one year and to issue each working person with a share equal to the average cost of one work place—25,000 rubles.

"At the moment of the perfidious betrayal of the nation's interests," party chairman V. Korchagin believes, "we all need to remember that the people and the army are united. Russophobic and anti-army sentiments as a rule come from the same sources."

At the forthcoming election of the RSFSR president, the Russian Party has decided to support Colonel General A. Makashov. His program is patriotic, V. Korchagin believes.

RSFSR Constitutional Debate Worries Isakov

PM0706110791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 May 91 Second Edition p1

[Interview with V.B. Isakov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic, by correspondent N. Garifullina; date and place unspecified: "'The President Will Inherit a Very Heavy Legacy...'"]

[Text] So, after almost one and a half days discussing the draft law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the RSFSR," the Congress of People's Deputies passed a resolution to approve it yesterday. An enormous amount of work has been done: There were almost 150 amendments, some of which have been adopted, some considered in different wording, and others voted down completely. Well, that is the way work on an important legal document normally goes. There have been periods of calm, light storms, and reefs on the way, however. This was the starting point of a conversation between our SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent and Professor V.B. Isakov, doctor of juridical sciences and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic.

[Garifullina] Vladimir Borisovich, as a legal expert, how do you view the discussion surrounding the draft laws under consideration?

[Isakov] I must say that the course of the discussion on the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution arouses all kinds of feelings in me. On the one hand, I appreciate that everything new coming into being in our life has to force its way through the asphalt of outmoded instructions that are out of line with statutes and some constitutional norms. It is not a simple process: It is sometimes difficult, with disputes and discussions. But, on the other hand, I am concerned by a certain relief that could be felt in the Supreme Soviet when the laws on the president and the presidential elections had been discussed and adopted. They were passed with virtually no discussion. The very important Law on the Constitutional Court was also adopted with hardly any discussion. The same kind of easy attitude can be seen in the Congress of People's Deputies, which is worrying, of course.

I do not think all deputies fully appreciate the complexity and responsibility of the decisions being adopted. Generally speaking, something has happened with our deputies since the Third Congress. There is a feeling of liberation from responsibility, as if everyone has sighed with relief and said to himself: Thank God, we have given the chairman additional powers and we are not going to be electing the president for a while—let him have a headache if he wants to.

[Garifullina] But what happened to Article 8? You said several times from the microphone that the wording adopted by the Supreme Soviet was suddenly replaced by completely different wording—it is not known by whom. Could you explain the gist of this please?

[Isakov] You mean Article 121-8 or Article 8 of the Law on the President. If you look at the amendments that we have made to the Constitution, you will see that it is rather one-sided: The president's rights and powers are enshrined in fairly broad terms, but the restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the president are minimal. You are particularly struck by the place and role of the Constitutional Court. The amendments are worded in such a way that the Constitutional Court substantially limits the powers of the Supreme Soviet and even of the Congress, but there is not really a single amendment under which the Constitutional Court in any way limits the future president. I feel we are incorporating some defects into the Constitution itself. After all, if we are going to demarcate powers, we must ensure that there is at least some balance between them so that we do not have a situation where one power starts to crush another. I fear we are incorporating inequality of powers into the Constitution.

Unfortunately, it has become everyday practice in the Supreme Soviet—I have talked about this many times and now it has happened: After the document had been adopted, a substantial correction was made and Article 121-8 was arbitrarily changed. I insisted that deputies be given the real, authentic text.

[Garifullina] What is the result of the article being "corrected"? What aspect is favored by the change?

[Isakov] As far as I am concerned, the article adopted by the Supreme Soviet is more balanced. First, the clause stating that presidential decrees must be based on the Constitution, laws, and decisions adopted by the Congress and Supreme Soviet—which is natural, as that is the executive power—was followed by a clause stipulating that decrees at variance with the Constitution, laws, and decisions adopted by the Congress and Supreme Soviet could be annulled by those bodies. In my eyes, that is balance.

But after the Supreme Soviet, the article was worded as follows: "On the basis of a decision of the Constitutional Court." It seems that the Constitutional Court is higher than the Congress and Supreme Soviet. If you consider that its composition is rather questionable and that this body may not be formed for a year or two, we will have a situation where no presidential decree can be annulled without the Constitutional Court. That means the executive power will have virtually free rein.

The same has happened with presidential decrees on cadre issues. In the butchered text of the article, the president can replace any executive power official. Once again, a decision by the Constitutional Court is required to abrogate his decree. More defects. Once again, representative power finds itself constrained. In my view, if we elect a Constitutional Court, it must counterbalance executive power and legislative power in equal measure. Or perhaps it should counterbalance executive power to a greater extent, because legislative power is still collective, whereas executive power is represented by an individual. But we have a situation where, to a significant extent, the Constitutional Court is oriented toward limiting the prerogatives of legislative power.

That is what I opposed. I tried to ensure that deputies received the real text adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, however, the discussion was limited and cut short, and deputies only received an indeterminate version.

[Garifullina] Yesterday Boris Nikolayevich promised to investigate what happened to these versions and how the substitution was made. What has been established so far?

[Isakov] You see, to be perfectly honest, I do not hold out any great hopes of this being done, because the Commission for Monitoring Observance of Congress and Supreme Soviet Regulations is still showing no signs of life, although we have had three sessions and four Congresses. Moreover, the very same Sergey Mikhaylovich Shakhray who has actively upheld violations of the law in this particular case is on the commission, so I doubt that we will find out who was responsible for butchering the wording of the article adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

[Garifullina] Vladimir Borisovich, if you recall, there was a rather stormy discussion about the clause which obliges the president to suspend his party membership. Some deputies believe that this is not just an infringement of human rights but that, from the ethical viewpoint, it places the president in a very ugly position: He becomes president thanks to support from the party, but then, once he has achieved victory, he gives it the boot. Moreover, he fought for power as the leader or representative of his party—so he is obliged to pursue its policies. So we have three different ways of looking at it. What is yours?

[Isakov] To be perfectly honest, I do not consider this to be a fundamental issue. It has more to do with moral and political significance than substance. Nevertheless, the real political course followed by a leader, whether he is chairman or president, is not necessarily connected with his formal affiliation to a particular political party. We can see this extremely clearly in our own example. Consequently, I think form has overshadowed substance in this respect. As far as I am concerned, the substance of the matter is that both the leader of the Supreme Soviet and the president must be someone capable of protecting everyone's interests as much as possible, someone free of narrow party bias and preferences. That is fundamentally important. But forcing him to leave his party or remain within it? Well.... Maybe that would be a guarantee to some extent, but we must think of other, more serious and more powerful guarantees. They could be pluralism of the press, really full glasnost of actions, the possibility to freely discuss the actions of the president and other leaders, and, ultimately, the possibility to raise the question of their being recalled.... Unfortunately, we are often distracted by purely symbolic aspects....

[Garifullina] Today Deputy Sergey Baburin said that dualism of executive power is incorporated in the law that has been passed....

[Isakov] I think there is some sense in that. On the one hand we have dualism, and on the other we have acted in a rather contradictory manner. The president is head of the government, but he can easily rid himself of it by personally accepting its resignation. We have incorporated—as a constitutional norm—the possibility for the president to change governments like a pair of gloves and thereby walk away from his own responsibilities as head of executive power.

We also can no longer ignore the fact that we now have three legal authorities: the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and State Board of Arbitration. I think it is irrational that legal power should be split in this way. There must also be some unity in this sphere.

[Garifullina] Vladimir Borisovich, the congress has evidently now moved on to the second phase. Do you feel satisfied with the atmosphere and level of discussion? And which feeling is strongest: satisfaction or disappointment?

[Isakov] It is very hard for me to analyze my feelings while the congress is in progress. They will probably sort themselves out after a while—then I will be able to answer your question. But I shall tell you what worries me most of all: Our congress has become passively obedient—unlike the USSR congress, which is called aggressively obedient. Yes, our congress has become passively obedient, voting for things which different people see in different ways, shall we say. Why has this happened? How have deputies come to this? We should certainly give these questions some thought. I have already said a little about this. But it seems to me that the atmosphere in the congress in some ways reflects the atmosphere in our society. There is the same apathy, disillusionment, and disbelief that anything can be changed; the same desire and urge to absolve oneself of personal responsibility for everything happening in our society.

I consider that to be most dangerous and worrying of all.

The president we elect will inherit a very heavy legacy. Whoever is elected will find it very difficult, and I think we will all have to do what we can to help him out of this crisis. Him and society....